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Abstract 
 
 
 
The present thesis crafts a framework to investigate how a risk averse owner-
manager’s corporate control considerations affect simultaneously conducted in-
vestment and financing decisions in awareness of the competitive context on the 
product market. The model configures the decision maker’s objective function as 
depending on both, monetary income and decision power exerted via her owner-
ship share. To the best of our knowledge, this study provides the first theoretical 
examination of financial structure choice which (1) simultaneously endogenizes 
financing and investment decisions, (2) accounts for the implications of the deci-
sion maker’s corporate control considerations arising on the grounds of her even-
tual ownership share, and (3) examines the crucial role of firms’ individual and 
environmental characteristics (including the prevailing market conditions such as 
the competitive context, the firm’s operations/cost structure, and the decision 
maker’s risk attitude). The model generates elementary results which relate to 
and complement pertinent findings within the differing streams of theoretical 
financial structure literature. Further results clearly contrast the findings of prior 
theories, but are consistent with existing empirical evidence.  
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 ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Definition and Purpose of the Study 
How do firms’ decision makers conduct their financial structure1 decisions? The 
present thesis scrutinizes this question by arguing that addressing three basic 
shortcomings of the pertinent theoretical financial structure research changes 
several standard results of the literature and leads to further insights. These 
three shortcomings refer to 
(1) the separation of investment and financing decisions,  
(2) the neglect of corporate control considerations of the firms’ deci-
sion makers, 
(3) the isolation of financial structure analysis from the properties of 
the competitive context and of the focal firm’s operations/cost 
structure. 
By explicitly accounting for these notions, and by additionally emphasizing 
the role of firms’ individual and environmental characteristics (such as wealth 
constraints and environmental risk), the present thesis means to contribute to 
overcome the prevalent research gap concerning the linkage between financial 
structure choice and these (widely neglected) antecedents. 
Based on the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani/Miller in their famous 1958 
article, a long-standing debate on the optimal design of financial structure 
evolved throughout the following decades. Ever since, a variety of different con-
                                         
1 The terms financial structure and capital structure are used synonymously and only 
comprise the durable capital endowment of enterprises, i.e., equity and long term debt. 
Short-term financing is excluded from the considerations of the present study. 
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ditional approaches have been developed, each of them illuminating capital 
structure decisions from an idiosyncratic perspective. Though these differing 
theoretical approaches have broadly confirmed the general importance of vari-
ous influencing factors (such as taxes, asymmetric information, and agency 
costs), their explanatory contribution can hardly be considered satisfying. This 
assertion is strongly supported by the fact that observable debt-equity-ratios 
are subject to considerable variations, even within industries that are apparent-
ly homogeneous with respect to the identified influencing factors.2  
The present thesis argues that the three shortcomings outlined above con-
stitute a prevalent characteristic of the majority of works dedicated to the ques-
tion under scrutiny. Existing models typically disregard the focal decision mak-
er’s corporate control considerations. Moreover, a conceptual separation be-
tween investment and financing decisions is practically ubiquitous. Finally, the 
widespread isolation of financial structure analyses from the properties of the 
output market needs to be underscored. The model developed in this thesis dis-
closes how results are influenced and even reversed by the deliberate considera-
tion of these notions. To the best of our knowledge, the present study provides 
the first theoretical examination of financial structure choice which simulta-
neously accounts for these three aspects briefly outlined in the following.  
1.1.1 Simultaneous Investment and Financing Decisions 
One of the most astonishing features of the pertinent financial structure litera-
ture concerns the fact that practically all significant models strictly separate the 
financing decision from the investment decision. A firm’s financial structure is 
merely interpreted as the debt-equity-ratio. The determination of this ratio is 
usually analyzed in total isolation from the determination of the firm’s overall 
investment level. Hence, this overall investment level is usually taken as fixed 
and purely exogenous. Arguably, this may result in misleading conclusions, es-
pecially for entrepreneurial decision makers who of course have to make deci-
sions about both the composition and the level of their firm’s capital endow-
ment. If the interrelation between level and mixture of the firm’s capitalization 
is nontrivial, simultaneously endogenizing these two features of financial struc-
ture may alter or even reverse the results and, thereby, provide a rationale for 
prevalent contradictions in existing literature. 
The present thesis postulates a more holistic view by arguing that the op-
timal relative proportion between debt and equity (the financing decision) is 
tightly interwoven with the choice of their absolute levels (the investment deci-
                                         
2  See MacKay/Phillips (2005), pp. 1433-1435; or Myers (2001), p. 82. 
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sion). Contrary to the existing literature,3 the model developed in this thesis 
aims at overcoming this conceptual separation by simultaneously endogenizing 
both decisions. Thereby, the model does not fall victim to the myopia described 
above.  
1.1.2 Financial Structure and Corporate Control 
An important notion underlying the determination of financial structure con-
cerns the collateral properties of equity and debt, i.e., equity carries voting 
rights whereas debt does not. Surprisingly, a direct question that immediately 
arises on the grounds of this consideration has been largely ignored by the fi-
nancial literature: how will a controlling shareholder (who owns a considerable 
block of shares and acts as an owner-manager) use the relative proportions of 
inside equity, outside equity, and debt in the firm’s stock of capital to maintain 
or defend her intra-organizational power? Minimizing the probability of a loss of 
control might be regarded as a fundamental consideration of controlling share-
holders.  
The present thesis accounts for this consideration by configuring the focal 
decision maker’s objective function as not only depending on her pecuniary 
wealth, but also on the degree of corporate control exerted via her ownership 
share. Our analysis shows that accounting for the utility of control, in conjunc-
tion with a supposed risk aversion of the decision maker, triggers interesting 
deviations from the standard results of the pertinent financial literature. 
1.1.3 Financial Structure and the Competitive Context 
The description of firms’ behavior on markets and the description of firms’ in-
ternal properties, such as financial structure, have been intensely scrutinized by 
economic literature for several decades. However, for the most part of the con-
tributions dealing with these two major components of the theory of the firm, 
the respective analytical coverage exhibits a conceptual separation which iso-
lates the examination of the focal aspect. The internal linkage connecting both 
elements has been discussed rather sparsely. However, the interdependencies of 
financial markets and output markets are often multifaceted and only partially 
understood by economic theory.  
A stylized illustration of these interdependencies obviously suggests the em-
ployment of features stemming from the theory of industrial organization. In 
contrary to the analytical frame of a general equilibrium context, modern indus-
                                         
3  See Chapter 2. 
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trial organization literature is commonly based on a partial analysis of firms’ 
behavior on product markets. Unfortunately, this theoretical workhorse funda-
mentally disregards the influence of financing decisions by implicitly presuming 
that all market competitors exhibit a sufficient endowment with equity capital.4 
While both demand and supply side of product markets have been examined to 
a considerable extent, the manifold interweavements with related “preparatory 
markets” such as financial markets have been largely neglected.5 Hence, the 
interdependencies of corporate financial structure choice and product market 
characteristics have, hitherto, remained mostly unexplored.  
The present thesis aims at contributing to surmount the disclosed research 
deficit. It investigates the antecedents of corporate financial structure decisions 
by developing a model which explicitly accounts for the prevalent competitive 
context on the output market. 
1.2 Conceptual and Methodological Foundation 
Within the scope of a scientific study, the disclosure and clarification of its un-
derlying conceptual foundation allows for both a coherent demarcation of its 
general range of significance and an accurate setting of individual research 
priorities.6 Economic literature generally differentiates between two basic con-
ceptual perspectives,7 namely the transformation-oriented evolutionary concept8 
and the scarcity-oriented rationality concept. 
The present study’s underlying conceptual foundation is outlined by the ra-
tionality perspective. Within the frame of the rationality concept, economic 
activities essentially serve the purpose of profit maximization. Enterprises are 
interpreted as production devices, and human beings pursuit the maximization 
                                         
4  See Tirole (1993). 
5  Stadler (1997), p. 153. This contribution provides a brief discussion of research deficits 
regarding the unexplored interdependencies of financial markets and product markets. 
6  See Ulrich (2001), pp. 85-100. 
7  See, for example, Sachs/Hauser (2002), pp. 18-23; Specht (1997), pp. 24-25; or Thommen 
(2004), p. 441. 
8  The evolutionary concept interprets enterprises as non-deterministic and open social 
systems which interact with their environment. The underlying conception of human na-
ture is analogously characterized by the perception of humans as complex beings. Eco-
nomic activities are essentially seen as processes that serve the satisfaction of human 
needs via goods and services. See Nelson/Winter (1982). 
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of their private utility. All endeavors aimed at this maximization are characte-
rized by two important notions which assume that human beings, firstly, react 
to incentives and, secondly, are subject to scarcity. The rationality perspective 
is characterized by the employment of a simplified, stylized conception of the 
real world. 
Basically, the essential purpose of the consecutive analysis is to derive a de-
finite set of conclusions from a given set of assumptions via a deductive process 
of reasoning. We develop a positive model which aims at the disclosure of 
cause-and-effect-chains and emphasizes prevalent causal relations. Such causal 
relations are most easily expressed by employing logical “if-then” assertions, so 
that the validity of the “if”-condition (i.e., the set of underlying assumptions) 
triggers the “then”-result. A mathematical treatment is well-suited for both 
making explicit these underlying assumptions and conducting the deductive 
reasoning process to derive the corresponding results. Furthermore, the exami-
nation of causal relations within an imperfectly competitive environment in-
cludes the elicitation of the reactive relatedness of competing enterprises’ deci-
sions. This in turn establishes the necessity of an interactive decision theory to 
explore their competitive behavior. Within the scope of microeconomic theory, 
interactive decision problems are referred to as games, and the interactive deci-
sion theory to describe, explain, and predict the outcome of interactive decision 
problems is referred to as game theory. Consequently, game theory, which is 
deeply interwoven with the conception of the rationality perspective,9 provides 
a suitable and highly developed analytical framework for the examination of 
imperfectly competitive market interactions.  
Hence, given the outlined research purpose, the rationality concept appears 
to be indeed particularly well-suited for the imminent analytical challenge. This 
challenge is tackled by employing a mathematical treatment, which allows for a 
rigorous description of the underlying assumptions, the analytical process, and 
the derived results. The analytical construct developed in the present thesis is 
not supposed to provide a comprehensively realistic reflection of the world, but 
to explicitly disclose coherences between defined influencing factors of an owner-
manager’s financial structure decisions. Thus, the deliberate employment of 
stylizations and abstractions, which corresponds to the methodological nature of 
economic modeling in the spirit of the rationality perspective, establishes and 
determines the architecture of the chosen research design.  
                                         
9  Game theory achieved its remarkable success mainly because it allows for a rigorous 
examination of the multifarious implications of rationality, self-interest, and equilibrium 
within the context of both market and nonmarket interactions. See Gibbons (1997), p. 
127. 
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On a further note, it feels necessary to underscore that the analysis con-
ducted throughout the present thesis is grounded in the methodological indivi-
dualism.10 Hence, a collectivity is never seen as an autonomous instance of deci-
sion making. The modeling is rather based on the presumption of strictly indi-
vidual choices. Thereby, group behavior is to be explained by the aggregation of 
decisions by individuals, and these individual decisions constitute the basis for 
all observable (and unobservable) actions, including interactions with other 
individuals. The methodological individualism complies with the rationality 
concept’s postulate of rational players. A decision maker is found to be rational 
if she11 exhibits consistent behavior with respect to a given objective, i.e., if she 
conducts all decisions at her disposal so as to maximize her personal objective 
function. This objective function is solely based on her individual set of prefe-
rences. 
1.3 Risk and Expected Utility 
When considering the foundations of rational decision making, it is important 
to distinguish between actions and consequences. Actions are deliberately cho-
sen and induce corresponding consequences. A rational decision maker has well-
defined preferences over these consequences and is meant to choose a feasible 
set of actions that leads to her most desired set of consequences.12  
From an ex ante perspective, a definite mapping of actions to consequences 
(in the sense that each action deterministically leads to a particular conse-
quence) is hardly possible. Hence, we need to shed light on the choices of a de-
cision maker in an uncertain environment in which the actual correspondence 
between actions and consequences is stochastic. 
Surprisingly, the notion of risk has a relatively short history within the field 
of economic research. A rigorous formalization of a decision maker’s choice in 
the presence of uncertainty was not accomplished before the path breaking ef-
fort of von Neumann/Morgenstern (VNM) in 1944.13 VNM crafted a rigorous 
axiomatic foundation for rational decision-making under uncertainty which was 
                                         
10  See Schumpeter (1908). 
11  Throughout this thesis we will refer to the focal decision maker (the controlling share-
holder) as female. 
12  Kreps (1988) provides an exhaustive and intuitive exposition of the axiomatic founda-
tions that underlie the basic theory of choice. 
13  Even though Knight (1921) and Ramsey (1931) provided important antecedents. 
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tightly connected to the notion of expected utility. Once this basic task was 
completed, VNM’s expected utility hypothesis obtained an important generali-
zation by Savage (1954). In the VNM frame, uncertainty is viewed as objective, 
i.e., there is a definite quantification of how likely various outcomes are, ex-
pressed in the form of a probability distribution. Savage’s frame views uncer-
tainty as being subjective, i.e., the probability distribution is a numerical repre-
sentation of the decision maker’s personal expectations and emerges on the 
grounds of her private beliefs. There are no externally imposed objective proba-
bilities. 
The shape of a decision maker’s utility function is determined by her atti-
tude towards risk. A decision maker who strictly prefers receiving the expected 
value (EV) of an uncertain asset for certain rather than the uncertain asset is 
called risk averse; a decision maker who prefers to receive the uncertain asset 
rather than the EV for certain is called risk seeking. A decision maker who is 
indifferent between the EV for certain and the uncertain asset is called risk neu-
tral. A central feature of quantified utility models is that diminishing marginal 
utility in the sense of Gossen’s first law14 implies risk aversion. If risk aversion 
holds for all possible outcomes over an arbitrary asset X with support [X; X], 
then the utility function U is concave in X. Similarly, risk seeking behavior im-
plies that U(X) is convex, and risk neutrality implies that U(X) is linear. 
Hence, knowing that a decision maker is risk averse substantially restricts the 
shape of her utility function.15 
The model developed in this thesis assumes risk averse decision makers, i.e., 
utility functions are strictly concave and increasing in wealth. In other words, a 
decision maker will always prefer more to less (U' > 0) and her marginal utility 
of wealth decreases as wealth increases (U'' < 0). It will be shown how risk aver-
sion, in the interplay with endogenous investment decisions, crucially deter-
mines the adopted financial structure and changes some of the standard results 
of the pertinent literature.  
Conform to Savage (1954), we model the space of consequences as the space 
of possible end-of-period wealths for the focal decision maker. The action space 
is accordingly defined by the given set of (constrained) decision variables at her 
disposal. It is important to understand that the chosen actions have neither an 
impact on the properties of future states of the world nor on their (subjective) 
probability distribution. 
                                         
14  See Gossen (1854). 
15  See also Demange/Laroque (2006), pp. 71-72. 
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1.4 Structure of the Study 
The present thesis is subdivided into eight chapters. The remainder is struc-
tured as follows. 
Chapter 2 gives a representative overview on the different conditional ap-
proaches within the financial structure literature and elaborates on how our 
setting relates to these existing models. Chapter 3 outlines the analytical frame-
work and sets up the fundamental building blocks of our model. Chapter 4 pro-
vides a simplified analysis in order to prepare the ground for the subsequent 
chapters, which examine the role of fixed costs (Chapter 5), incorporate the 
firm’s full revenue and cost structure (Chapter 6) and scrutinize the product 
market context (Chapters 6 and 7). To be more specific, Chapter 6 delineates 
investment and financing decisions in a monopolistic setting, before the influ-
ence of a product market competitor in a duopolistic setting is scrutinized in 
Chapter 7. The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which summarizes the findings 
and compares them against the results of prior research, before discussing rele-
vant implications and possible limitations. 
 
 TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
Corporate financial structure has been explored by many scholars. Their explo-
rations aim at understanding the relative proportions of debt and equity 
adopted by firms to finance prospective target investments. Typically, these 
target investments are exogenously given, which constitutes one of our major 
criticisms of existing models. In the following, the differing streams of literature 
that have mainly contributed to the theoretical examination of corporate finan-
cial structure choice are reviewed.16  
2.1 Financial Literature until the mid-1980s 
The pertinent financial literature until the mid-1980s can be roughly catego-
rized into  
(1) Neoclassical study of finance, 
(2) New institutional study of finance. 
2.1.1 Neoclassical Study of Finance 
In his pioneering examination of decision criteria regarding optimal investment 
behavior, Fisher (1930) presents a model which, as an elementary attribute, 
disregards risk and which can be deemed to be the basis for all subsequent 
theoretical disquisitions on the properties of corporate investment and funding 
decisions. The presumption of a risk-free environment renders obsolete all dis-
crimination between different investors (shareholders, creditors). The costs of 
capital correspond to the unique global interest rate prevalent on the financial 
                                         
16  Nota bene, this chapter is meant to provide a representative rather than exhaustive re-
view. 
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market. The optimal level of capitalization is reached once the marginal renta-
bility of the investment equals the marginal costs of capital.  
Based on Fisher’s considerations, the basic works of Durand (1952) and So-
lomon (1963) deduced an optimal capital structure by simple capital cost con-
siderations. This optimal capital structure is characterized by a minimization of 
total capital costs. It stringently depends on the leverage-contingent progression 
of the costs of both debt and equity. Firm leverage is defined as the proportion 
of debt vs. equity, i.e., the debt-equity-ratio of an enterprise. The respective 
progressions of the costs of equity and debt are based on intuitive assumptions 
regarding the behavior of creditors and equity investors. Since creditors have 
prior claim on the firm’s assets and earnings, equity investors demand a higher 
rate of return to compensate for their higher risk. Hence, Solomon (1963) pre-
sumes the costs of equity (rate of return demanded by equity investors) to be 
higher than the costs of debt (interest rate), considering both as distinct func-
tions of the adopted debt-equity-ratio. The corresponding visual representation 
is depicted in Figure 1 (adapted from Bitz, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overall capital cost function and optimal firm leverage choice. 
(Source: adapted from Bitz, 2000) 
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Increasing firm leverage, i.e., gradually substituting higher-risk equity by 
lower-risk debt (which, thus, exhibits a lower interest rate compared to the rate 
of return requested by equity investors) lowers the average costs of capital faced 
by the firm. As long as the firm’s debt-equity-ratio does not exceed a defined 
critical level of firm leverage, the bankruptcy risk remains negligible and the 
creditors do not adjust their prices. Hence, the cost curves are assumed con-
stant up to this “threshold level”. As firm leverage rises beyond the threshold 
level, investors react by adjusting their demanded prices to the augmented 
bankruptcy risk, which is resulting in a subsequent augmentation in the slope of 
both functions. The resulting total capital cost curve allows for the identifica-
tion of a leverage-contingent minimum, which simultaneously determines the 
optimal financial structure choice of the firm.17  
Economics literature concerned with the exploration of capital cost properties 
received a strong boost in its theoretical foundation from the subsequently 
emerging general equilibrium approaches. In their famous 1958 article, Modig-
liani/Miller have shown that, under a set of restrictive assumptions, firm value 
is independent of the corporate financial structure. Their basic assumptions 
include the presence of an efficient financial market, risk-neutrality, and the 
absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information. This assertion, 
often referred to as the irrelevance theorem, is reckoned one of the principal 
results of the neoclassical study of finance. In essence, Modigliani and Miller’s 
celebrated paper is widely regarded as the starting point for modern corporate 
finance theory. It constitutes a pioneering effort to provide a theory of financial 
structure by systematically analyzing assets and drawbacks of disposable capital 
sources.  
However, the irrelevance theorem also has been subject to strong criticism. 
This criticism mainly concentrated around two conceptual aspects of the model, 
namely the disregard of the impact of bankruptcy risks and, in particular, of 
tax imposition. A re-consideration by Modigliani/Miller (1963) accounts for the 
latter aspect.18 It is shown that a leveraged firm holds a superior value com-
pared to a non-leveraged firm if interest payments shield income from corporate 
taxation. The value of this debt tax shield equals the product of the debt 
amount and the tax rate. Bearing in mind the results of the Capital-Asset-
                                         
17 Moreover, it has been broadly acknowledged that a gradual substitution of equity by 
debt causes an increase in the return on equity as long as the internal return exceeds the 
costs of debt. This relationship between the return on equity and the costs of debt is 
commonly labeled as the leverage effect. See, for example, Perridon/Steiner (2004), pp. 
488-489. 
18  Modigliani/Miller (1963) assume a simplified fiscal system, including a corporate income 
tax and an individual income tax.  
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Pricing-Model (CAPM), it is easy to show that this result holds even if debt is 
considered to be risky.19  
The former of the two critical aspects is emphasized by Stiglitz (1969), who 
stresses that leveraged firms are prone to higher interest rates due to their in-
creased bankruptcy risk. Stiglitz notes that, as long as firms and banks differ 
with respect to their probability of default, there must be a difference between 
the interest on deposits and the interest on credits – even when assuming per-
fect markets.  
Thus, within the frame of the theoretical investigation of financial structure 
decisions, these two factors constitute the first market-related imperfections 
discussed in the pertinent literature, thus leading to a gradual turn-away from 
the perfect market premise. By the adoption a static one-period model, 
Kraus/Litzenberger (1973) subsequently derived an internal optimum of the 
debt-equity-ratio by trading off leverage-related tax savings against bankruptcy-
related losses in firm value. Bankruptcy occurs if the firm cannot meet its debt 
obligations, and basically implies costs.20 Expected bankruptcy costs are in-
curred when the (perceived) probability that the enterprise will default on debt 
is positive.21 Since this probability rises with the chosen firm leverage, the ex-
pected bankruptcy costs increase in the same direction, inducing an internal 
cost optimum in the interplay with potential tax-savings. This comparison of 
taxes and bankruptcy costs constitutes the quintessence of the static trade-off 
theory, a branch of research which presumes that firms aim for a target finan-
cial structure by gradually augmenting the level of firm leverage until the mar-
                                         
19 A general CAPM-based proof of Modigliani and Miller’s propositions can be found in 
Sharpe (1964). 
20  First of all, bankruptcy leads to a transfer of control rights from the previous sharehold-
ers to the creditors. Whether bankruptcy results in an actual liquidation or in a continu-
ation of the business primarily depends on the relative size of the liquidation value com-
pared to the going concern value. See Haugen/Senbet (1978), p. 383 ff. 
21  Contingent on the new control right holders’ (i.e., the debtholders’) intention to institute 
bankruptcy proceedings, potential bankruptcy costs may be direct and/or indirect. Direct 
bankruptcy costs are essentially all administrative and legal charges associated with the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Indirect bankruptcy costs are essentially all costs that may 
emerge as a consequence of the public announcement of the firm’s financial distress. For 
example, these could be profit losses incurred by the firm due to imminent degradations 
of business relations with suppliers or customers. If an enterprise is known to be close to 
insolvency, suppliers may be less willing to continue their business relations due to pri-
vate risk considerations. Analogously, customers may abstain from buying its service or 
goods in fear of being exposed to a future situation where the firm cannot assure its war-
ranties. However, the general relevance of bankruptcy costs is by no means beyond dis-
pute. In particular, Haugen/Senbet (1978) assert that bankruptcy-related costs are neg-
ligible if capital market prices are assumed to be competitively determined.  
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ginal tax-advantage of additional debt is just offset by the marginal increase in 
the present value of possible bankruptcy costs.22 In short, equity is substituted 
with debt until the firm value is maximized.  
Empirical literature, at first glance, offers considerable evidence for the va-
lidity of the trade-off theory.23 However, one of the basic corollaries of the 
trade-off theory is a positive correlation between the locus of optimal firm leve-
rage and profitability. Highly profitable enterprises exhibit a lower bankruptcy 
risk than less profitable firms and are, thereby, able to exploit the tax-
advantage of debt financing to a larger extent. Hence, for highly profitable 
firms, the internal optimum of the debt-equity-ratio is larger than for less prof-
itable firms. Intriguingly, empirical results disclose the exact opposite relation: 
highly profitable firms are mainly characterized by a low level of firm leverage. 
Several studies concordantly confirm the negative relation between firm leve-
rage and profitability.24 Given the trade-off-theoretical implication that highly 
profitable enterprises are able to and will exploit their valuable debt tax shields, 
this empirically observable negative relation constitutes a fundamental discre-
pancy which has been tagged very fittingly as “the capital structure puzzle” 
(Myers, 1984). Moreover, Frank/Goyal (2008) point out that corporate income 
taxes do only exist for roughly a century. Debt financing, however, has been 
common a long time before such corporate income taxes were introduced.25 
Therefore, tax considerations can hardly be deemed to completely justify the 
use of debt,26 which obviously renders all attempt to empirically confirm the 
general validity of the trade-off-theory quite futile. 
Aside from the trade-off-theoretical framework, Miller (1977) arrived at the 
conclusion that the consideration of different sources of tax imposition may 
reproduce the initial 1958 result of Modigliani/Miller: the value of the firm is 
independent of its financial structure. Though, in this case, the independence is 
of a statistical kind; while claiming the overall amount of equity and debt in the 
market to be fixed, Miller arrives at no prediction on how these quantities are 
divided up among firms.  
Further articles that follow the same spirit of analysis have shown that ac-
counting for the existence of individual tax imposition leads to fairly heteroge-
neous results. A particularly interesting paper by De Angelo/Masulis (1980) 
                                         
22  See, for example, Myers (2001), p. 88 ff. 
23  See, for example, Fama/French (2002), or Rajan/Zingales (1995). 
24  See Myers (1984), Titman/Wessels (1988), or Rajan/Zingales (1995). 
25  See Frank/Goyal (2008), p. 59 f. 
26  This assertion does, nota bene, not allow for the reverse conclusion that taxes can be 
safely disregarded when examining today’s enterprises financing decisions. 
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points out that the firm’s objective is the optimization of its periodical surplus 
after taxes. These authors show that Miller’s 1977 irrelevance result is heavily 
sensitive to simple and realistic modifications in the modeling of the corporate 
tax code. They demonstrate that the explicit consideration of tax deductible 
non-cash charges27 such as accounting depreciation allowances28 triggers a 
unique interior optimum for the firm’s leverage choice in the market equili-
brium.29 Hence, De Angelo/Masulis show that the value of the firm depends on 
the deductible amount of the taxable surplus and, thereby, on leverage deci-
sions.  
2.1.2 New Institutional Study of Finance 
The new institutional study of finance essentially scrutinizes issues beyond the 
explanatory reach of the neoclassical approaches. Unlike these approaches, new 
institutional financial theory acts on the assumption of imperfect markets, 
which are subject to transaction costs and information asymmetries, thus ac-
counting for the existence of institutions like, e.g., financial intermediaries. The 
new institutional perspective does not merely describe pertinent aspects of the 
financial sector, but actually analyzes them and seeks for normative recommen-
dations.30  
New institutional approaches have early on dealt with the impact of agency 
considerations31 on financial contracting and, thereby, on corporate investment 
behavior. The application of such agency considerations has substantially con-
tributed to the establishment of the new institutional study of finance. Al-
though still neglecting the strategic features and implications of the competitive 
context,32 the consideration of agency costs and information asymmetries 
                                         
27  Such tax deductible non-cash charges are tagged tax shield substitutes for debt by De 
Angelo/Masulis.  
28  As pointed out by, among other, Samuelson (1964), lawmakers’ desire to make the net 
present value of cash revenue streams independent of the tax rate and to avoid the con-
version of income taxes into taxes on principal induces them to allow for subtractions 
from the net operational revenue, i.e., tax deductible accounting depreciation allowances. 
See Samuelson (1964), p. 604. 
29  See De Angelo/Masulis (1980), p. 27. 
30 See Perridon/Steiner (2004), p. 24 f. 
31  Agency theory explores the behavior of human beings within contractual relations, and 
how their actions are affected by incentives. These incentives serve as a device to align 
the interests of the contracting parties. 
32  See Hellwig (1989) for a general discussion. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
15 
 
proved to be particularly prolific with regard to the theoretical examination of 
firms’ financial structure decisions. 
Within the frame of these agency theoretical models, financial structure es-
sentially serves as a device to either minimize agency costs or to credibly dis-
close private information. The starting point of the first category is the 1976 
article by Jensen/Meckling, whose fundamental concept of agency cost minimi-
zation via financial structure decisions has been subject to a multitude of sub-
sequent variations. The most significant works related to the second category 
are Leland/Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Grossman/Hart (1982), and Myers/Majluf 
(1984). 
Minimization of agency costs. Significant research effort has been devoted 
to models that determine corporate financial structure by employing agency 
considerations.33 This stream of economic literature is mainly based on the ex-
amination of conflicts of interest between stakeholders. Applying it to the anal-
ysis of firms’ financial structure decisions reveals three differing types of stake-
holders linked to the enterprise, each of them holding divergent interests: man-
agers, shareholders, and creditors.  
Professional managers are delegated by the shareholders who remunerate 
them in order to act to the best of the shareholders’ interests. However, as Jen-
sen/Meckling (1976) highlighted, managers are foremost conducting their eco-
nomic actions according to their own interest. In other words, they take deci-
sions that rather maximize their own than the shareholders’ utility.34 In particu-
lar, managers may abstain from devoting their complete effort to the firm or 
they may play on their discretionary power to extract indirect benefits. Such 
benefits can be manifold, e.g. the consumption of corporate commodities for 
personal aims or the choice of projects yielding a certain prestige for the man-
ager. Managerial self-interest may be influenced by incentive devices like com-
pensation schemes or share grants, but such alignment of divergent interests is 
necessarily imperfect and, primarily, costly. Hence, the emergence of conflicts of 
interest, which is inherent to the separation of firm ownership and operational 
control, creates costs – the so-called agency costs. Following the definition of 
Jensen/Meckling (1976), agency costs can be classified according to three basic 
categories: 
                                         
33 See, for examples, the articles of Williamson (1988) or Harris/Raviv (1991). 
34 Essentially, this kind of conflict arises as a natural consequence of less-than-full mana-
gerial residual claimancy. Managers, thus, do not gain the entire benefit from their prof-
it-enhancing activities – although internalizing the full costs associated with these ac-
tions.  
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 Monitoring costs, which refer to the principal’s (shareholder’s) costs of 
supervision of the agent (manager). 
 Bonding costs, which refer to the agent’s (manager’s) costs of credibly 
ruling out activities that contradict the interests of the principal (share-
holder). 
 Residual loss, which reflects the impossibility of setting up complete 
contracts and refers to the cash value of the principal’s welfare loss from 
the agent’s residual self-interested behavior (which is not “captured” by 
monitoring and bonding). 
The inefficiencies caused by managerial opportunism are reduced if the 
manager owns a larger fraction of the firm.35 Thus, for an exogenously given 
absolute level of firm capitalization,36 augmenting the debt level increases the 
manager’s share of the firm’s equity and, thus, diminishes the loss due to con-
flicting interests. Another significant aspect is articulated in an illustrious 
statement by Michael Jensen, who describes the fundamental problem  
“...to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of 
capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.” (Jensen, 1986, p. 323.) 
Within this context, corporate debt can serve as a means to discipline man-
agers by reducing the disposable free cash flow: managers are forced towards an 
optimal provision of effort and are restrained from generating unnecessary agen-
cy costs to their personal advantage.  
Grossman/Hart (1982) stress another convenience of debt financing: if 
managers are averse to corporate bankruptcy (maybe because of potential losses 
in reputation on the market for managerial workforce), then augmenting the 
debt level can incentivize managers to conduct better decisions. For example, a 
manager could be incentivized by debt to rather decrease the probability of 
bankruptcy instead of increasing her private benefits by diverting corporate 
commodities to personal purposes. 
In a nutshell, corporate debt increases managers’ fractional residual claim, 
reduces the free cash flows available to them, and drives them towards efficient 
                                         
35 Since increasing the manager’s fraction of ownership is obviously equivalent to a propor-
tional increase of managerial residual claim. 
36  As already indicated, the present thesis argues that keeping the stock of capital fixed lies 
at the heart of many standard results found in the existing literature. The interrelation 
between investing and financing exhibits a considerable degree of sophistication, and our 
analysis will indeed show that the simultaneous endogenization of both decisions changes 
results and leads to further insights. 
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activities in order to balance corporate bankruptcy risks. Thus, increasing the 
level of debt may indeed hold incentivizing power. As summarized by Myers 
(2001),  
“…a high debt ratio can be dangerous, but it can also add value by putting the firm 
on a diet.” (Myers, 2001, p. 19.) 
The second form of conflicting interests originates from diverging objectives 
between debt and equity investors, i.e., creditors and shareholders. Such con-
flicts are particularly prominent when there is a risk of default. If the probabili-
ty of default is positive, then shareholders can cause value-transfers to their 
own benefit (and to the detriment of the debt holders) by investing into more 
risky projects than initially designated. Controlling shareholders (or managers 
who are delegated by the shareholders) are presumably more affine towards 
investment projects which maximize shareholder wealth compared to projects 
which maximize total firm value. Hence, they are likely to implement risky 
projects with a negative net present value in which a small increase in equity 
value is completely eroded by a greater decrease in debt value (overinvestment 
problem). Moreover, they are likely to avoid safe investments with a positive 
net present value in which a small decrease in equity value is overcompensated 
by a greater increase in debt value (underinvestment problem).37 Both overin-
vestment and underinvestment behavior are generally summarized as the effect 
of opportunistic asset substitution.38  
But the creditors, anticipating the shareholders’ behavior, preventatively 
underrate the firm value by an amount that corresponds to the agency costs of 
debt. These expected costs are, thus, factored into the price of debt (i.e., the 
requested interest rates) at the time when it is issued. Moreover, the creditors 
will be driven to furnish debt contracts with protection clauses safeguarding 
their investments.39 Evidently, the elaboration and implementation of such con-
tractual safeguards engenders additional costs. Thus, the shareholders’ tenure of 
control rights tends to result in an increase in the costs of debt and, thereby, in 
less leverage. 
                                         
37  See Myers (1977), p. 147. 
38  By the asset substitution effect, the stock value may increase at the expense of the bond 
value due to the limited liability of shareholders. Being residual claimants, they gain at 
the expense of the creditors, even when the firm value remains constant. Diamond (1989) 
and Hirshleifer/Thakor (1992) show how the problem of asset substitution is dampened 
by the consideration of managerial reputation concerns. 
39  Such protection clauses are commonly tagged covenants. 
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Summing up, agency theory brings forth an optimal financial structure 
that, in principle, is a compromise solution representing a minimization of total 
agency costs. As pointed out by Hellwig (1989), the agency-theoretical explora-
tion of corporate financing behavior essentially constitutes a subset of the gen-
eral theory of incentive-compatible contracting. Its aim is  
“…to characterize optimal (second-best) contracts in situations of moral hazard and 
to interpret and explain the contracts that we actually observe as (Pareto) optimal 
under given incentive constraints. Similarly, financial institutions such as banks and 
nonbank intermediaries are to be explained as efficient mechanisms for reducing cer-
tain types of moral hazard…” (Hellwig, 1989, p. 278.) 
Reduction of information asymmetries. The other major stream of new 
institutional research on the structure of corporate financing is concerned with 
informational asymmetries between stakeholders subdivided into insiders and 
outsiders. Within the frame of the disclosed context, insiders refers to decision 
makers that participate in the inner operations of the firm, while outsiders re-
fers to decision makers who are external to the firm, but who affect and are 
affected by firm properties. Hence, controlling shareholders or managers are 
insiders who hold private information about the firm (e.g. the properties of in-
vestment options or the characteristics of the return stream). Creditors and 
non-controlling shareholders are outsiders who only have beliefs that are subject 
to incomplete and fragmented clusters of information.  
Leland/Pyle (1977) have explored the concept of entrepreneurial risk-
aversion to develop a signaling equilibrium where an entrepreneur's willingness 
to invest her personal wealth into a firm constitutes a quality signal of this firm 
to the market. Hence, the existence of information asymmetries triggers the 
result that, in contrast to the findings of Modigliani/Miller (1958, 1963), the 
financial structure of the firm is related to firm value even in the absence of tax 
imposition. Leland/Pyle (1977) is among of the very few financial structure 
models which consider the impact of risk aversion. However, this model merely 
scrutinizes the (indirect) signaling effect. Leland/Pyle do not craft a holistic 
frame where an owner-manager’s risk exposition is directly balanced against the 
level of expected personal returns. Such a frame would necessitate the introduc-
tion of an alternative risk-free asset for the decision maker’s personal invest-
ment strategy. This would allow for an apportionment of her personal wealth 
between the risky firm project and the safe alternative.40 
Ross (1977) directly relates the debt-equity-ratio to the financial market’s 
evaluation of the firm quality. More specifically, Ross finds that the firm value 
                                         
40  Our results will show that such a setting creates trade-offs which crucially drive the fi-
nancial structure choice of an owner-manager. See Chapter 4. 
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positively depends on the chosen level of this ratio. Good quality firms can in-
cur debt with a much lower bankruptcy risk than bad quality firms, eventually 
inducing a separating equilibrium in the spirit of Spence (1973), where the level 
of debt constitutes a signal of the firm quality to the financial market. The 
same kind of reasoning can be directly transferred to the mode of corporate 
dividend distribution. This mode indicates the expected level of future cash 
flows. High levels of dividend distribution increase the bankruptcy risk of low 
quality firms and are, thus, not imitable by the latter. Hence, in this context 
the level of dividend distribution also serves as a quality signal to the financial 
market. On the other hand, the distribution of dividends also has a negative 
impact on the firm, since it consequentially reduces its possibilities of financing 
target investments by low-cost capital (i.e., inside equity in the form of undi-
stributed earnings). Thus, signaling firm quality via dividend distribution in-
duces costs that have to be traded-off against the firm’s “valuation gain” on the 
financial market.41  
Myers/Majluf (1984) show that, in the presence of a financial market with 
imperfect information about the quality of firms or projects, good qualities are 
possibly underrated to such an extent that they are forced to finance target 
investments via internal funds. Firms are, thus, forced to abandon profitable 
projects for which the necessary financing cannot be procured.42 Hence, an ini-
tial public offering (IPO) of shares transmits two possible kinds of information, 
i.e., an overrating of the firm value by the financial market or a low gear infor-
mation asymmetry. For an environment with considerable information asymme-
tries, this brings about the notion that an IPO constitutes a negative signal 
with respect to the quality of the target investment project and, thereby, to the 
firm value. Vice versa, abstaining from raising equity is interpreted by investors 
as good news with respect to the firm value. As a result, all enterprises will 
strictly prefer debt to equity.  
Upon these insights rests the conception of the pecking order theory, which 
essentially analyzes the interrelation between informational costs (due to infor-
mation asymmetries) and the respective corresponding properties of disposable 
capital sources. The pecking order theory, contrary to the trade-off theory, ab-
olishes the presumption of a target capital structure. It rather argues that fi-
nancing sources are appealed according to an order which is inversely propor-
tional to their respective expected informational costs, thus imputing the exis-
tence of a preference hierarchy with respect to the disposable financing op-
                                         
41  Williams (1988) has developed a model that derives a signaling equilibrium which con-
siders these diverging effects. 
42  In principle, this mechanism constitutes a prime example for the famous lemons market 
problem in the vein of Akerlof (1970). 
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tions.43 Accordingly, firms preferentially cover their financing needs via internal-
ly generated funds, i.e., undistributed earnings, which are evidently not prone 
to information asymmetries. If the available internal cash flows are not able to 
fully cover the (exogenously given) financing needs, thus fostering the require-
ment of additional funds, firms will then raise external capital in the form of 
debt. Lastly, if the debt capacity has also been exhausted, firms will raise out-
side equity in order to satisfy any remaining financing requirements.44 Conse-
quently, there is no static optimal or target financial structure for liquidity-
constrained enterprises. Financial structure decisions are rather resulting from 
aggregate external funding needs, which, due to their dependence from (exogen-
ous) short-term investment opportunities and the level of disposable internal 
cash flows, may be very volatile in nature.  
Hence, the pecking order theory rationalizes the well-documented preference 
of listed corporations for internal funding and the small importance of stock 
issues, which were formerly attributed to the managers’ desire to avoid the dis-
ciplinary forces of the capital market. According to the pecking order theory, 
this behavior is due to the asymmetric distribution of information with respect 
to the firm value.45 
Since the pecking order theory implies a strict preference for internal fi-
nancing, profitable enterprises which generate high earnings are expected to 
exhibit a lower optimal level of debt financing compared to less profitable firms. 
Thus, the pecking order framework, unlike the trade-off theory, proves to be in 
line with most of the empirical observations in this regard. However, empirical 
results do not generally confirm a stringent hierarchy of financing as postulated 
by the pecking order theory.46 Particularly considering young and growing en-
terprises, Fama/French (2002) observe a systematic raising of equity besides or 
even before debt.47 Consequently, in a later article, these authors categorically 
deny the validity of the pecking order theory: 
“…financing with equity is not a last resort, and asymmetric information prob-
lems are not the sole (or perhaps even an important) determinant of capital struc-
ture as suggested by the pecking order theory” (Fama/French, 2005, p. 551.) 
                                         
43  See Myers/Majluf (1984), p. 187 ff. 
44  See Myers/Majluf (1984), p. 187. 
45  See Myers (2001), p. 93. 
46  See Frank/Goyal (2003) or Fama/French (2002). 
47  See Fama/French (2002), p. 15 ff. 
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Summing up, in the presence of information asymmetries, corporate finan-
cial structure is driven by the controlling shareholders’ desire to influence the 
financial market’s valuation of the firm according to their private interests. Ap-
proaches scrutinizing such information asymmetries between insiders and out-
siders are by now a well-established part of the pertinent theoretical finance 
literature.  
We conclude that the new institutional study of finance certainly provides a 
valuable basis for the contractual assessment of operating enterprises’ financing 
decisions under different environmental conditions. As illustrated, financial 
structure is interpreted as a potential means to mitigate intra-organizational 
incentive problems and/or informational asymmetries among insiders and out-
siders. However, this perspective raises some elementary questions. Above all, 
why should financial structure be utilized to incentivize decision makers despite 
the easy availability of a rich set of direct compensation-driven incentive-
schemes? Moreover, possible trade-offs resulting from the decision maker’s risk 
aversion are widely excluded in these models. As stressed above, Leland/Pyle 
(1977) is among the few papers which identifies risk aversion as a driving factor 
of financial structure choice, but the underlying signaling mechanism is rather 
indirect. 
Furthermore, the totality of contractual approaches disclosed above simply 
suppose that post-contractual actions are conducted in an individually “optim-
al” way by the contracting parties. Such actions are, however, mostly rather 
based on strategic interaction than on unilateral optimization.48 The contract-
theoretic approach as brought forward by the new institutional study of finance 
totally neglects the strategic importance of the competitive context for both 
borrowers (competing liquidity-constrained firms) and lenders (competing 
banks). Thus, the stylization drafted by the new institutional study of finance 
neither meets the prevalent complexity of market structures nor their strategic 
interdependencies.  
Moreover, the financing decision is persistently examined in total isolation 
from the investment decision. All the papers discussed above take the firm’s 
stock of capital as exogenously given without accounting for the non-trivial in-
terrelation between investing and financing.  
                                         
48  See Hellwig (1989) for a more advanced discussion on this notion.  
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2.2 Financial Literature after the mid-1980s 
A branch of financial research that emerged due to the limited explanatory 
power of the traditional approaches established during the late 1980’s and is 
henceforth referred to as novel approaches. By the deliberate employment of 
cutting-edge perspectives on financial structure’s mode of function within oper-
ating enterprises, these novel approaches shed new light on the focal issue. 
While traditional theories primarily focused on the financing function, these 
novel approaches constitute an advancement by scrutinizing the role of finance 
within a broader context including other firm-relevant aspects (like corporate 
strategy, internal organization, or product policy). This connective approach 
brings forth a departure from the long-established isolated examination of fi-
nancial structure and, in principle, allows for a “wide-screen” elucidation of its 
role within the overall context. At this juncture, one new emphasis of financial 
structure literature relates to corporate control considerations and resulted from 
the intensified level of M&A activities in the mid-eighties. The emergence of 
capital structure models considering the firms’ market interactions constitutes 
the second new research emphasis. Both notions directly relate to cardinal focus 
areas of the present thesis. 
2.2.1 Corporate Control Considerations 
External funding is provided by investors on condition that the (expected) re-
turns from corporate investments are shared. While debt contracts typically 
specify a lump-sum payment on the creditors’ invested capital amount which is 
independent from firm performance, equity contracts allocate residual returns 
after creditor reimbursements. These returns in turn crucially depend on corpo-
rate decisions (like project choice, staffing decisions, choice of distribution 
channels, marketing strategies etc.) and, thereby, on the choices made by the 
eventual tenant of the corresponding intra-organizational control rights. Thus, 
the determination of the corporate financing mix comprises one crucial aspect 
that had so far been neglected by the financial literature, namely the notion of 
corporate control.  
Most of the research concerned with the relationship between corporate 
control and financial structure addresses Anglo-American markets, where own-
ership is dispersed. However, recent empirical studies suggest that disposition 
on corporate decisions is often concentrated in the hands of a blockholder or a 
small controlling group of shareholders.49 Large part of the enterprises in conti-
                                         
49  See, for example, La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio et al. (2001), or Claessens et al. (2002). 
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nental Europe and Asia are characterized by large controlling shareholders.50 
Evidently, personal corporate control considerations play a much larger role for 
such controlling shareholders than for professional managers, who are hired by 
(dispersed) shareholders. Hence, modeling the firm’s decision maker as an own-
er-manager (as opposed to a salaried professional manager in a principal-agent-
setting) appears to be a promising approach for the model developed in the 
present study. 
Most notably, prior financial research shifted into focus the linkage between 
the general market for corporate control and financial structure. This linkage 
has been explicitly emphasized by several scholars, most notably Harris/Raviv 
(1988) and Stulz (1988), who showed how financial structure decisions influence 
the outcome of takeover combats. Hence, calibrating the corporate financing 
mix so as to control the value of the firm, the takeover probability, and the 
corresponding takeover premium was identified as a new function of financial 
structure choice. In summary, firms that are prone to takeovers are expected to 
increase their leverage on average, which induces an increase of the stock price. 
Thereby, the takeover probability decreases. Thus, the theories brought forward 
by Harris/Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) adopt a strict short-term view to iden-
tify financial structure choice as an instrument of response to imminent takeo-
ver threats.  
The driving force underlying these findings is the fact that equity carries 
voting rights whereas debt does not. Surprisingly, a far more direct question 
that immediately arises on the grounds of this consideration has not been ad-
dressed by the literature: how will a controlling shareholder (who owns a consi-
derable block of shares) use the relative proportions of inside equity, outside 
equity, and debt in the firm’s stock of capital to maintain or defend her intra-
organizational power?  
Power is an intensively discussed area of research in most social sciences. In 
economic theory, however, the notion of power is still playing a minor role.51 
The literature on compensating wage differentials52 scrutinizes the relation be-
tween monetary income associated with a working activity, and other (desirable 
or undesirable) attributes of that particular activity. Following that literature’s 
line of argument, individuals who derive utility from part of their work are will-
ing to trade off that utility against a lower monetary income. Intra-organizatio-
nal power or control, in the sense of being able to direct and give orders to sub-
                                         
50  See de La Bruslerie/Latrous (2007). 
51  Frey/Kucher (2002). 
52  See, for example, Thaler/Rosen (1976), Brown (1980), or Rosen (1986). 
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ordinates, may certainly be seen as such a “rewarding” part of a decision mak-
er’s working activity.53  
Frey/Kucher (2002) analyze empirical data on manager wages in Switzer-
land and capital market returns in the United States. The authors find that 
having more subordinates does not significantly increase a manager’s wage. 
They interpret this as evidence that people are willing to pay for power. Hence, 
decision makers are supposed to value both wealth (W) and control (ࣝ), having 
utility functions of the form U ؠ U(W, ࣝ) with both first derivatives being non-
negative. Exerting a higher degree of control can, thus, compensate a lower 
monetary income, and more wealth can compensate a lower degree of control. 
This described trade-off might be regarded as a fundamental consideration of 
controlling shareholders. Technically, this can be translated via an additional 
utility component that enters the overall objective function of the focal decision 
maker (i.e., the controlling shareholder), besides her utility from wealth.  
What remains is the question of how to actually measure the degree of con-
trol. Following the economic theory of voting power, corporate control can be 
parameterized in terms of power indices for simple voting games. Banzhaf 
(1965, 1968) has demonstrated that a player’s power in a voting body is not 
necessarily proportional to that player’s number of votes.54 Subsequent work by 
Cubbin/Leech (1983) and Leech (1987, 1990, 2002) draws on the theory of vot-
ing power to scrutinize the relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate control. These papers describe the problem faced by an owner-
controlled firm with profitable investment opportunities requiring the raising of 
new capital. If the firm is short of inside equity (e.g., due to limitations to the 
owner‘s personal wealth), expansion may entail new shareholders and a conse-
quent loss of control.  
Interestingly, these considerations are largely absent from the corporate 
finance literature to date. As opposed to Frey/Kucher (2002), who assess the 
number of subordinates as a proxy for the manager’s power, the present thesis 
establishes the basic link between financial structure and the utility of corporate 
control by means of the ownership structure. This ownership structure obtains 
as a direct result of the financial structure decision. More precisely, it depends 
on the adopted mix of inside equity (the part of the decision maker’s personal 
wealth that is invested into the firm) and outside equity (from external inves-
tors). To the best of our knowledge, this linkage between financial structure 
                                         
53  Evidence for the importance of power as a motivator for decision makers is given in 
McClelland/Burnham (2008). 
54  See also Holler (1985) and Felsenthal/Machover (2004). 
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decisions and the utility of control constitutes a, hitherto, widely unexplored 
area within the corporate finance literature. 
2.2.2 Market Interactions 
All the literature streams described so far do not explore whether there exists a 
link between firms’ financial structure and the conditions imposed by the mar-
kets – aside from financial markets. In a survey on corporate financial structure 
theories, Harris/Raviv (1991) explicitly stressed that the role of market interac-
tions had been very sparsely explored and emphasized it as the most promising 
field for further research:  
“In our view, models which relate capital structure to products and inputs are the most 
promising. This area is still in its infancy and is short on implications relating capital 
structure to industrial organization variables such as demand and cost parameters, 
strategic variables, etc.” (Harris/Raviv, 1991, p. 351.) 
However, since this academic appeal, few scholars have shown interest in 
explicitly connecting corporate financial structure decisions with the output 
market characteristics faced by the corresponding enterprises. Basically, Har-
ris/Raviv (1991) identify two basic types of relation between financial structure 
and output markets: the relation of financial structure to industry or product 
characteristics, and the relation of financial structure to the competitive con-
text.  
Concerning the first type (how financial structure relates to industry or 
product characteristics), Titman (1984) was the first to stress that debt levels 
are not only affected by equity and debt holders, but also by the firm's non-
financial stakeholders (e.g., customers, workers, suppliers), who likewise have to 
be considered as claimants to the firm’s cash flows. This notion was elaborated 
within the frame of several exemplary contexts, most notably scrutinizing cus-
tomer needs (Titman, 1984), product quality considerations (Maksimov-
ic/Titman, 1991), or supplier/worker bargaining power (Sarig, 1998). The 1991 
article by Maksimovic/Titman appears to be particularly mentionable. The 
authors investigate the impact of financial structure on a firm’s choice of prod-
uct quality and the feasibility of its products’ warranties. They arrive at the 
conclusion that, ceteris paribus, increases in debt are accompanied by a decline 
in quality.  
Concerning the second type (how financial structure relates to competitive 
strategy), the pioneering article of Brander/Lewis (1986) remains the publica-
tion of reference. Essentially, managers or controlling shareholders are assumed 
to maximize equity value rather than profits or total firm value. As a basic 
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principle, financial structure influences the payoffs to equity and, thereby, af-
fects the equilibrium strategies on the output market. Brander/Lewis (1986) 
were the first to show how firms can deploy financial structure as a means to 
commit themselves to certain output strategies vis-à-vis their product market 
competitors. Various subsequent theoretical models55 follow the spirit of Brand-
er/Lewis and investigate differing modes according to which output markets 
may both influence and be influenced by the choice of corporate financial struc-
ture in an oligopolistic context. They concordantly confirm that a firm’s (and 
its competitors’) output or pricing decisions are tightly interwoven with its 
adopted financial structure.  
The list of empirical results referable to the connection of financial struc-
ture and the product market proves to be fairly short. At this juncture, two 
particular works of reference can be emphasized, namely the pioneering studies 
of Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995). Both authors explore whether increases 
in firm leverage (on an aggregate level) intensify or dampen product market 
competition. Hence, the causal direction examined by these papers is antipodal 
to the present study.  
Chevalier (1995) scrutinizes leveraged buy-out (LBO) activity in the su-
permarket industry and arrives at the conclusion that increasing debt-levels 
tend to have a softening impact on product market rivalry. Phillips (1995) ana-
lyzes four industries – fiberglass insulation, tractor trailer, polyethylene, and 
gypsum industries. While arriving at the same conclusion as Chevalier for the 
first three of them, his results concerning the gypsum industry are antipodal. In 
order to provide a rationale for these inter-industrial differences, Phillips 
stresses the fact that the gypsum industry differs from the other three indus-
tries in that its entry barriers, are particularly low. 
One apparent shortcoming of both works is their obvious inability to endo-
genously explain the essential reference parameter of their investigation: the 
structure of corporate financing. For instance, in the LBO study of Chevalier it 
remains totally unclear why takeovers where actually necessary to conduct the 
financial restructuring measures. If increased firm leverage actually softens 
product-market rivalry, incentives to incur debt must already have been present 
prior to the takeover.56  
                                         
55  See Gertner et al. (1988), Maksimovic (1988), Poitevin (1989a, 1989b), Glazer (1989), 
Bolton/Scharfstein (1990), Showalter (1995), and Wanzenried (2003). 
56  It could be reckoned that creditors needed a signal due from a target company. This 
would of course imply that pre-contractual information asymmetries have an important 
role in the design of such financial contracts. 
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The results obtained from two additional empirical studies by Kove-
nock/Philips (1995, 1997) are also worthy of mention. In essence, both papers 
conclude that high leverage tends to dampen output-market competition. This 
assertion is supported by an earlier study by Opler/Titman (1994), which es-
sentially indicates that high-grade levered firms tend to lose market shares to 
their unlevered competitors. More recent studies by Istaitieh/Rodriguez (2003) 
and MacKay/Phillips (2005) queue up with the above stated findings by show-
ing that financial leverage is higher in concentrated industries where the inten-
sity of product market rivalry is fairly relaxed. 
The fundamental contribution of Brander/Lewis (1986) shall now be discussed 
in greater detail. Their model is concerned with the examination of strategic 
behavior opportunities of controlling shareholders which stem from their limited 
liability in case of corporate bankruptcy. Its rationale rests on the basic consid-
eration of Jensen/Meckling (1976) that increasing levels of debt drive the 
shareholders towards riskier strategies.  
Brander/Lewis (1986) develop a two-stage game where the structure of fi-
nancing is chosen in the first stage and the production level is subsequently 
determined in the second stage. The rational choices of the firms are characte-
rized by the adoption of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept.57 By as-
suming firms’ future profits to be subject to risk, the authors introduce an “en-
vironmental” random variable which affects these future profits. In the unfavor-
able states of the environment, the firm cannot meet its debt obligations, which 
is ultimately leading to corporate bankruptcy. The shareholders then lose their 
firm-inherent money holdings to the benefit of the creditors.  
The authors employ an expected utility criterion to characterize the beha-
vior of risk-neutral decision makers who only have one investment option with 
respect to their private wealth, namely investing into the firm.58 The authors 
queue up with the vast majority of the financial literature by still abstracting 
from the elementary capital investment decision and presupposing an exogen-
ously fixed stock of capital.59 Only the relative proportion of debt and equity, 
                                         
57  In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, firms correctly anticipate the second-period equi-
librium choices prior to making their first-period choices. 
58  As stressed earlier, one crucial pillar of the model developed in the present thesis will be 
the introduction of a (riskless) alternative investment possibility for the (risk averse) de-
cision maker. This constitutes a major deviation from the setting of Brander/Lewis 
(1986).  
59  In another article by Brander/Spencer (1989), the corporate level of capitalization is 
endogenous and directly influences the production level. However, this article (which is 
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the debt-equity-ratio, is susceptible to variations. Brander/Lewis neither con-
sider fiscal impacts nor any kind of bankruptcy costs.60 In their model, the fi-
nancial structure choice essentially constitutes a commitment to a particular 
production strategy. The strategic choice of a particular structure of financing 
restricts a firm’s (and its competitors’) subsequent strategic options and, thus, 
can be taken as a means to commit to particular competitive behavior. Hence, 
market outcomes are not solely determined by parameters such as cost or time 
leadership, but also by the mode according to which financial structure influ-
ences the competitive interaction.  
From this point of view, the study of Brander/Lewis is closely related to 
the strategic commitment literature. These models typically consider a decision 
variable which is chosen in the first stage and influences the production level in 
the second stage. This variable serves as a commitment device which, thus, can 
be employed as a “strategic weapon” by firms competing in an oligopolistic con-
text. Apart from financial structure properties, it can for example be 
represented by the level of advertising (Joosten, 2007), the intensity of Research 
& Development (Zhang/Zhang, 1997), or the design of employee incentive con-
tracts (Fershtman/Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987).  
One major result of Brander/Lewis is that, for symmetric firms, increases in 
firm leverage are enhancing the equilibrium production level if marginal profits 
are higher in better environmental states. The effect is reversed if the inverse 
relation holds. Defining z ∈ [z; z] as the environmental random variable, and zොi 
as the lower threshold of z underneath which the firm cannot meet its debt ob-
ligations, the intuition associated with this result is relatively easy to under-
stand. If marginal profits are higher in better environmental states (i.e., when z 
is large), an increase of debt, which diminishes the domain of favorable states61 
and which is compensated by an increase in the production level, will in turn 
increase the value of profits realized in every favorable state of the world. Aug-
menting firm leverage, thus, triggers an endogenous shifting effect which is de-
picted in Figure 2.  
 
 
                                                                                                           
primarily concerned with moral hazard considerations) does not explicitly deal with the 
duopolistic aspect. 
60  Bankruptcy costs are included in the analysis of Brander/Lewis (1988). 
61  Brander/Lewis explicitly state that  
“…an increase in debt causes ̂ݖ௜ to rise, meaning that the range of states over which the firm 
becomes bankrupt is expanded.” (Brander/Lewis, 1986, p. 961). 
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Figure 2: Leverage-induced reduction of shareholders’ residual claimancy area. 
(Source: adapted from Brander/Lewis, 1986) 
The figure shows that a leverage-induced upward-shift of the lower thre-
shold zො௜ expands the range of states over which the firm faces bankruptcy (area 
left to the threshold level). Due to the limited liability, levered shareholders 
extract payoffs only in good states. This means that, after an increase in firm 
leverage, former low marginal profit states are no longer relevant to the share-
holders, since they are moved from the shareholders’ residual claimancy area to 
the bankruptcy region, where residual claimancy is held by the creditors. The 
shareholders will, thus, seek to compensate this reduction in the equity-relevant 
area by an increase in the level of output.  
With regard to the output effect of the strategic commitment to a particu-
lar financial structure, Brander/Lewis likewise demonstrate that, if marginal 
profits are higher in better environmental states, a unilateral debt level increase 
of one of the two competing firms causes an augmentation of this firm’s equili-
brium output. At the same time, its competitor’s equilibrium output decreases. 
Again, the effect is reversed if the reverse condition (i.e., marginal profits are 
lower in better environmental states) holds. 
All these results are gathered by adopting a comparative statics approach. 
The choice of debt is, thus, purely exogenous so far. To endogenize this choice, 
Brander/Lewis rely on the Nash equilibrium principle. All choices made at the 
first stage are contingent on the players’ rational expectations regarding the 
choices made at the second stage (where the realizations of the first stage deci-
sion variables are taken as given). The intricacy underlying the first stage deci-
sion calculus accrues from the fact that controlling shareholders’ first stage ob-
jective function differs from the second stage, since they maximize total firm 
value, i.e., the sum of equity value and debt value, rather than sole equity val-
ue. The basic point stressed by Brander/Lewis is that shareholders account for 
the reaction of the debtholders, who, given the possibility of bankruptcy, will 
purchase bonds only for their true value. Hence, the maximization of the con-
trolling shareholders’ first stage objective function reveals two basic types of 
Creditors residual 
claimants 
Shareholders residual 
claimants
  z     z   zො            zො'
(shift caused by an increase 
 in firm leverage) 
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conflicting interests. Firstly, between creditors and shareholders, and secondly, 
between the focal firm and its competitor. Since an increase in firm leverage 
increases the output level and, thereby, alters the equilibrium, a particular debt 
structure constitutes a commitment to a particular output structure. The leve-
rage-induced augmentation in the level of output exacerbates the conflict of 
interest between creditors and shareholders and lowers the debt value. 
The fundamental postulate developed in this second part of the Brand-
er/Lewis article can be outlined as follows: if marginal profits are higher in bet-
ter environmental states, the focal industry’s debt levels are strictly positive. If 
the reverse condition holds, no debt is incurred, i.e., all financing needs are en-
tirely covered by equity. This result implies that leveraged firms will generate 
more output compared to the traditional oligopoly case, where bond issuing is 
disregarded and firms are implicitly assumed to be totally equity financed. If 
marginal profits exhibit a positive correlation to the states of the world, leve-
rage confers a strategic advantage, since it causes the competitor’s equilibrium 
output to decrease. Since this consideration is valid for both competitors, taking 
on debt exhibits a pro-competitive effect, since it intensifies output rivalry on 
the product market. 
Summing up, Brander/Lewis demonstrate that the level of debt may signif-
icantly affect the strategic context. Limited liability in an uncertain environ-
ment induces oligopolistic enterprises to take riskier decisions, similar to the 
1976 article of Jensen/Meckling. Firm leverage, thus, exhibits actual strategic 
value and functions as a commitment device which allows for an induced de-
crease of the competitor’s equilibrium output level, while the own output level 
is simultaneously increased. A particular notion which immediately arises from 
the study of Brander/Lewis concerns the fact that, at equilibrium, the chosen 
debt levels of the firms will not maximize their aggregate total value. In other 
terms, the strategic use of debt leads to a prisoner’s dilemma where both firms, 
in their desire to commit to high levels of output, adopt excessively aggressive 
behavior, eventually leading to reduced profits on firm and industry level. This 
notion suggests that cooperative financial arrangements might constitute an 
attractive collusive device62 and is explicitly emphasized by the authors: 
 
                                         
62  Poitevin (1989a) provides an in-depth analysis of oligopolistic collusion induced by highly 
concentrated credit markets. However, the range of areas where such commitment devic-
es that facilitate collusion could possibly be identified is wide. For example, Kirs-
tein/Kirstein (2009) show that a legal framework like collective wage agreements may be 
utilized by oligopolists as a stable commitment device to cartelize product markets.  
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“If credit markets for a particular industry are quite concentrated, then lenders would 
have incentives to act as facilitating decision makers for collusion.” (Brander/Lewis, 
1986, p. 968.) 
As stressed earlier, Brander/Lewis suppose a fixed stock of capital. Hence, 
they analyze the determination of the firm’s debt-equity-ratio in isolation from 
the determination of its global investment level. It has been underscored on 
several occasions that this is one common major premise of the existent finan-
cial structure literature. The present thesis argues that departing from that 
premise of separation by simultaneously endogenizing both level and structure 
of the firm’s overall capitalization may considerably change the results of the 
pertinent literature.  
 THREE 
OUTLINE OF THE 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3 Outline of the Analytical Framework  
3.1 Preface 
The theoretical framework developed in this study is supposed to investigate 
how a decision maker’s risk aversion, her corporate control considerations, in-
terest rates, tax imposition, and the cost structure affect simultaneously con-
ducted investment and financing decisions in awareness of the competitive con-
text on the product market. The aim of this chapter is to outline the analytical 
framework, to disclose the time frame, and to set up the fundamental building 
blocks of the model. The derivation of the results is conducted throughout the 
subsequent Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Although economic theory has come a long way towards a better under-
standing of why and how firms choose their capital structure, there is no cur-
rent model that addresses the three core notions outlined in the introductory 
chapter, i.e., 
(1) the integration of investment and financing decisions, 
(2) the consideration of the firms’ decision makers’ utility of control, 
(3) the consideration of the competitive context on the product mar-
ket.  
From our literature review we further conclude that several pertinent basic 
imperfections, be it the characteristics of the decision makers (who exhibit risk-
averse behavior, are subject to restricted personal wealth, and value corporate 
control), the firm’s properties (such as the cost structure), or institutional con-
straints (such as accounting rules and tax imposition), lead beyond the friction-
less world of Modigliani/Miller (1958). The different idiosyncratic approaches 
CHAPTER 
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that followed Modigliani/Miller do not account for the interplay of these imper-
fections with the three core notions presented above and do not allow for a 
sound explanation of corporate investment and financing decisions. 
The model developed throughout the present thesis accounts for these im-
perfections. It simultaneously incorporates major elements from the fields of 
finance, industrial organization, and corporate governance. This constitutes an 
appealing approach, since it deliberately connects a study of the inside of the 
firm (financial structure, cost structure) with a study of the outside of the firm 
(market structure) against the backdrop of the decision maker’s individual cha-
racteristics (risk aversion, control considerations) and exogenous institutional 
parameters (interest rates, taxation). 
The model follows the spirit of the 1986 article by Brander/Lewis inasmuch 
as it essentially connects financial structure decisions to the output market. 
However, it starts from the consideration that financing decisions are primarily 
affiliated with the disposability of corresponding production facilities, the deci-
sion maker’s (subjective) perception of the future product market conditions, 
her personal control considerations, and her environmental constraints. The 
model may be viewed as an expansion of the work of Brander/Lewis (1986) in 
the sense that some of their most restrictive basic assumptions (e.g., risk-
neutrality of firms, exogenous firm investment/fixed stock of capital, non-
consideration of corporate control, negligence of the cost and revenue structure, 
absence of taxation) are dropped and the notion of power enters the analytical 
frame by means of the focal decision maker’s control considerations. 
The analytical purpose well complements another recent theoretical exami-
nation by Liu/Miao (2007). These authors investigate an entrepreneur’s invest-
ment and financing decisions in a complete markets environment by adopting a 
continuous-time model. They show that managerial characteristics, corporate 
governance, and financial markets influence capital structure and ownership 
concentration. However, corporate control considerations, the cost structure, 
and the product market context are completely disregarded within their model. 
The subsequent analysis is supposed to successively account for these important 
factors. 
3.2 Basic Assumptions 
The model frame discloses the link between financial structure choice, individu-
al and environmental properties, and the cost structure. It relates corporate 
financial structure choice with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function tied 
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onto the focal decision maker in an uncertain environment, which allows for the 
consideration of risk-averse behavior. The decision maker has subjective beliefs 
regarding the probability distribution of profits in future states of the world.63 
The set of basic model assumptions displays as follows: 
A1 The focal decision maker values only two goods, namely wealth and 
control. Hence, her welfare is only affected by  
 the amount of end-of-period wealth which she can acquire, and  
 the degree of control which she can exert throughout the given 
period. 
A2 Wealth and control are achieved through the determination of  
 her personal investment strategy, and  
 the corporate investment and financing strategy. 
A3 Corporate investing and financing decisions are assumed to be con-
ducted simultaneously and to be definite, i.e., they cannot be reversed 
throughout the given period. 
A4  The economy lasts for exactly one period. 
A5  Discounting is disregarded. 
The model frame configures the decision maker’s objective function as de-
pending on her degree of corporate control and on her total personal end-of-
period wealth. Ex ante, her initial wealth is apportioned between the firm’s 
stock of capital and an external risk-free asset. The firm may additionally raise 
debt or outside equity. Since the latter option relocates ownership and, thereby, 
control,64 a non-monetary component enters the decision maker’s overall utility 
function to account for the potential threat of diminished control that she faces 
when calling for equity from external investors.  
Thus, the present model accounts for implications arising from the decision 
maker’s corporate control considerations. In addition, to attain an adequate 
                                         
63  A similar approach is employed by Sandmo in his seminal 1971 article on the theory of 
the (risk-averse) firm in an uncertain environment. 
64  We suppose all stock purchased by equity to be common stock with one vote per share. 
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approximation of reality, we depart from the widely-spread restriction of a fixed 
stock of capital: the focal decision maker can not only choose between the rela-
tive proportions of debt and equity, but is actually able to define their respec-
tive absolute levels.  
The remainder of this chapter is subdivided into two main sections. In a first 
step, Section 3.3 outlines the general frame of the model. This allows for an 
accurate depiction of the basic determinants considered within the subsequent 
analysis. In particular, the set of environmental constraints imposed by the in-
stitutional framework is exposed and examined with respect to its influence on 
the decision maker’s final wealth level. In a second step, Section 3.4 operationa-
lizes the notion of intra-organizational power and establishes the basic link be-
tween financial structure and the utility of ownership and corporate control.  
3.3 General Model Setup 
Consider an entrepreneur’s investment and financing decisions within the scope 
of a mono-periodical finite horizon model. A priori, the focal entrepreneur holds 
full ownership. She, thereby, holds all control rights and acts as a controlling 
shareholder. The focal entrepreneur who, henceforth, will be tagged as the deci-
sion maker D, decides on her personal investment strategy and on the design of 
her firm’s financial structure. Corporate funding can be obtained from her own 
private wealth, from creditors, or from external equity investors. Once the 
firm’s financial structure is set, some time elapses, firm profits and payoffs are 
realized, and the firm is wound down. 
D firstly decides on how to invest her initial private wealth at t=0 (period 
start). D is characterized by a utility function engendering risk aversion with 
respect to her personal end-of-period wealth. Let this utility function be de-
picted by 
(1) U(W1
D, ࣝ) = u(W1D) + v(ࣝ), 
where W1
D represents D’s total end-of-period wealth (at t=1) and ࣝ the de-
gree of corporate control exerted by D over the given period. Too keep things 
simple, D’s overall welfare is additively separable in wealth and control. Hence, 
the decision maker’s degree of control per se does not have a direct impact on 
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her final wealth W1
D.65 The model merely considers D’s direct utility of control 
(i.e., her “enjoyment” of being able to direct and give orders to subordinates, 
see also section 2.2.1), but disregards possible “instrumental” utility that may 
originate from an impact of control on operative decisions.  
The decision maker’s monetary risk aversion is governed by the usual con-
cavity assumption regarding u, i.e., 
u'(W1
D) > 0  and  u''(W1D) < 0. 
The explicit form of the decision maker’s utility function is given in Section 
3.3.4. D maximizes the sum of her end-of-period expected utility of wealth (de-
picted by ॱ{u(W1D)}) and of her utility of corporate control (depicted by v(ࣝ)). 
Hence, the basic problem which D needs to solve is  
Max ॱ{U(W1D, ࣝ)}  
ؠ 
 Max [ॱ{u(W1D)} + v(ࣝ)] 
where ॱ{ . } represents the expectations operator.66 While ࣝ is solely a func-
tion of the ownership structure (which D determines by deciding on her owner-
ship share), W1
D is a function of D’s personal investment into the firm, of the 
global level of investment into the firm (i.e., the size of the firm’s stock of capi-
tal), and of the adopted financial structure, which are all determined by means 
of D’s disposable decision variables (ϕ, α, Γ). ϕ denotes the share of the firm 
owned by D, α denotes the fraction of D’s wealth invested into a riskless in-
vestment alternative, and Γ denotes the amount of debt incurred by the firm. 
Figure 3 depicts the general time frame of the model.  
 
 
 
                                         
65  However, W1
D may indirectly depend on it via the optimal ownership share. 
66  Evidently, only D’s final wealth is subject to risk, but not her degree of control that 
is determined at the start of the given period and enjoyed over the period. Hence, 
the expectations operator is only relevant for u, but not v. 
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Figure 3: The general time frame of the model. 
3.3.1 The Wealth Function 
As depicted in Figure 4, the decision maker’s wealth increase is fed by two basic 
components. The first accrues from the potential income generated by an as-
sumed opportunity to invest into a risk-free asset which yields a certain rate of 
return amounting to r1 over the given period (bond income). This bond income 
is subject to an individual tax imposition at the rate τ1I  (tax rate on bond in-
come). The second component accrues from the potential income generated by 
the risky investment into the firm project, subject to an individual tax imposi-
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tion at the rate τ2I  (tax rate on equity income). This equity income comes in the 
form of cash dividends. 
 
Figure 4: Components of the decision maker’s personal wealth increase. 
Let W0
D represent D’s initial personal wealth (t=0). She fully invests her ini-
tial wealth by assigning a fraction α ∈ [0, α] of W0D to the riskless investment 
alternative, leaving a fraction 1 ԟ α for the risky investment into the firm. 
Hence, α is D’s first decision variable. The upper bound α is assumed to be 
close to (but slightly smaller than) unity, since the decision maker needs to 
keep at least a small part of the firm. 67 The second decision variable ϕ ∈ [ϕ, 1] is 
defined as the share of the firm owned by D.68 The lower bound ϕ is assumed to 
be close to (but slightly greater than) zero, since the decision maker needs to 
keep at least a small part of the firm. Further, let S(1ԟτc) describe the surplus 
distributed by the firm after corporate tax imposition at the rate τc. Therefrom, 
D’s final wealth after taxes consists of 
(2) W1
D =  W0
D  
 + αW0Dr1(1ԟτ1I )  
 + ϕS(1ԟτc)(1ԟτ2I ), 
                                         
67  The present model is concerned with the case of an owner-managed firm, where there is 
no fundamental separation of ownership and control. The underlying assumption is dri-
ven by the idea that the focal decision maker may extract some personal residual benefit 
from running or managing the firm. Possible sources of personal benefit from run-
ning/managing a firm might be seen in the D’s intention to keep a family-owned compa-
ny alive (maybe despite not being very profitable) or D’s disutility from displacing long-
standing employees. This assumption follows the spirit of pertinent financial contracting 
literature like Aghion/Bolton (1992) or Hart (1995). 
68  Retaining a fraction ϕ of the total equity evidently implies the issuing of the fraction 
(1 ԟ ϕ) to external investors, hence reflecting the ownership distribution. 
= +wealth increase (W1D െ W0D) 
(1) bond income 
(riskless asset) 
(2) equity income 
(firm dividends) 
bond income from the riskless asset 
equity income from prospective cash dividends 
initial wealth 
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which is simply the sum of her initial wealth (first term) and her wealth in-
crease over the given period (terms two and three). The first part of this wealth 
increase (second term) accrues from the riskless asset’s return, which is subject 
to individual taxes amounting to αW0
Dr1τ1
I . The second part of D’s wealth in-
crease (term three) accrues from the distributed surplus (dividends) after corpo-
rate taxes, subject to individual taxation amounting to ϕS(1ԟτC)τ2I . Hence, div-
idend payouts are obviously subject to double taxation. This is an entirely usual 
feature of numerous fiscal systems (like, for example, the US tax code) and 
well-established in the finance literature.69 
By considering that W0
D = αW0D+ (1ԟα)W0D and by slight rearrangement of 
(2), D’s final wealth displays as  
(3) W1
D = αW0D(1+r1(1ԟτ1I )) + (1ԟα)W0D + ϕS(1ԟτc)(1ԟτ2I ). 
While D’s bond income is riskless, her equity income depends on the uncer-
tain environment and on her choices regarding the level and structure of the 
firm’s capital endowment. 
The respective determinants of the surplus S shall subsequently be made 
explicit. D invests the amount (1 ԟ α)W0D of her private wealth into the firm 
project. On behalf of the firm, she can additionally call for external funds in 
two different ways, namely by incurring debt with a fixed reimbursement of the 
creditors by an interest rate r2 at period end, or by calling for outside equity 
from other investors,70 which leads to a diminished share of the firm held by D. 
Defining Eex as the amount of the raised outside equity allows for the depiction 
of D’s actual share of the firm as 
(4) ϕ = (1ԟα)W0D
(1ԟα)W0D + Eex  = 
(1ԟα)W0D
E
 , 
which implicitly defines the firm’s total equity E as 
(5) E = (1ԟα)W0D + Eex= (1ԟα)W0
D
ϕ  . 
                                         
69  See, for example, Brealey/Myers (2008), p. 504 ff. 
70  In the frame of the present model, external equity investors are dispersed and (a priori) 
stay off entrepreneurial decisions. Thus, D always holds more shares than any other sin-
gle equity investor. However, external equity investors still constitute a threat for D, who 
may lose her power of decision when holding less than 50 percent of the firm (assuming 
an absolute majority rule). 
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Considering D’s third decision variable Γ as the amount of the incurred 
corporate debt, the firm’s total capital endowment is given by 
(6) K = (1ԟα)W0D + Eex+ Γ = E + Γ. 
It is assumed that the firm’s stock of capital K equals the level of total in-
vestment into its production facilities. The total end-of-period shareholder 
wealth generated by the firm, i.e., the equity value, displays as 
(7) VE = (∏ ԟ A ԟ r2Γ)(1ԟτc) + K ԟ Γ,  
with ∏ as the firm’s operational profit. The parameter A represents an ac-
counting depreciation term which basically serves the purpose to keep account-
able the initial firm value.71 It is assumed that the initial investment fully amor-
tizes over the given period, thus A = E + Γ = K. Under these assumptions, the 
first term between parentheses in (7) is equal to the firm’s surplus S before cor-
porate taxes, hence fiscal imposition is applied to  
(8)  S = ∏ ԟ A ԟ r2Γ = ∏ ԟ (1 + r2)Γ ԟ (A ԟ Γ) = ∏ ԟ (1 + r2)Γ ԟ E.  
Interest payments r2Γ are tax deductible cash charges. Thus, similar to 
Modigliani/Miller (1963), debt exhibits a tax advantage in that it serves to 
shield corporate earnings from taxes. Moreover, similar to De Angelo/Masulis 
(1980), firms also have tax deductible non-cash charges, i.e., the tax code treats 
accounting depreciation A as deductible.72 
Substituting (8) into (3) and considering that, from (4) and (5), 
ϕE = ((1ԟα)W0D/E)E = (1ԟα)W0D, we obtain 
 W1
D = αW0D(1+r1(1ԟτ1I )) + ϕ(∏ԟ(1+r2)Γ)(1ԟτc)(1ԟτ2I ) 
 + (1 ԟ (1ԟτc)(1ԟτ2I ))(1ԟα)W0D, 
                                         
71  Accumulated accounting depreciation primarily constitutes non-cash expenses and is 
applied to reduce the book value of assets over time as they are consumed or used up 
during the value-added process of the firm. Meigs/Meigs (1983, p. 90) or Wolk et al. 
(2004, p. 330 f.), among others, provide comprehensive outlines of this practice.  
72  As already noted by Samuelson (1964) and taken on by De Angelo/Masulis (1980), the 
consideration of tax deductible accounting depreciation crucially influences financial 
structure decisions. Its above representation (in (7) and (8)) basically relies on the mod-
eling of De Angelo/Masulis (1980). 
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which, by slight rearrangement, allows for the disclosure of D’s wealth in-
crease over the given period as the differential between W1
D and W0
D: 
 W1
D
 ԟ W0D = αW0Dr1(1ԟτ1I ) + (ϕ(∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)(1ԟτc)(1ԟτ2I ). 
With regard to D’s balancing between the riskless asset and the risky in-
vestment into the firm, the above expression clearly shows that it is the relative 
proportion of the respective tax rates, i.e., (1 ԟ τ1I )/(1 ԟ τc)(1 ԟ τ2I ), which cru-
cially determines her decision, not their absolute value.73  
To ease the further exposure, the following assumptions are presumed to 
hold henceforward: (1ԟτc) = T, and τ1I  = τ2 I  = 0. It is worth highlighting that 
this abstraction from individual taxes merely serves simplifying purposes and 
does not materially alter the consecutive analysis or narrow its explanatory 
power. Moreover, since tax rates are defined as exogenous constants, it is 
straightforward that in order to return to the initial setting, it suffices to set 
T = (1ԟτC)(1ԟτ2I ) and r1 = r1(1ԟτ2I ). 
D’s final wealth, from these assumptions, is given by  
 
(9) W1
D = W0D + αW0Dr1 + (ϕ(∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T. 
At first glance, this expression appears a bit awkward and difficult to in-
terpret. The reason for this is that, as will be shown, the above expression is 
very well-suited for the subsequent algebraical treatment. Moreover, it is easy 
to verify (see Appendix A 3.1) that expression (9) is equivalent to 
W1
D = (1+r1)αW0D + ϕ(S ·T + E), which clearly expresses D’s final wealth as a 
function of the riskless asset’s return (first term) and of the return from the 
risky firm investment (second term). 
∏ denotes the firm’s operational profit over the given period. This firm 
profit is subject to environmental risk. Thus, D perceives ∏ as a random varia-
ble and estimates its distribution in accordance with her subjective beliefs about 
the distribution of future environmental states (these beliefs are further speci-
fied below). Expression (9) plainly illustrates that D’s final wealth simply is a 
                                         
73  This observation gives support to one of the basic main premises outlined in De Ange-
lo/Masulis (1980), for which the authors provided merely intuitive justification. They 
analyze three possible “tax brackets”, contingent on whether (1 ԟ τ1I ) is smaller than, 
equal to, or greater than (1 ԟ τc)(1 ԟ τ2I ). See De Angelo/Masulis (1980), p.6. 
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linear transformation of ∏. Since ∏ is a random function, its linear transforma-
tion W1
D is likewise a random function. Hence, D’s subjective beliefs about the 
probability distribution of future environmental states directly translate into 
corresponding subjective beliefs about the distribution of future firm profits 
and, consequently, of her final personal wealth. 
3.3.2 The Distribution of Future States 
To proceed forward in the exposure, the distribution according to which D an-
ticipates future states and, thereby, future profits has to be specified. At this 
juncture, it appears plausible to presume that D’s major difficulty resides in her 
endeavor to accurately estimate the demand characteristics, since an enormous 
number of influential parameters which overlay with each other has to be taken 
into account. A partial list of such factors includes consumers’ tastes, their in-
come or general budget constraints, their capacities of information processing, 
their geographical allocation, exogenously induced or erratic trends, cross-
elasticities between products, business cycles, economic shocks, political fram-
ing, national or international legislation, and evidently – competition. 
Hence, the firm profit which D anticipates ex ante appears to be a random 
function which is influenced by a large number of, more or less independent, 
random factors. Assuming D’s beliefs concerning the distribution of future firm 
profits to be governed by a normal (Gaussian) probability distribution does, 
thus, appear to be an appropriate representation. As a major virtue, the normal 
distribution provides the technical convenience to be completely specified by the 
first two moments of the random variable, which obviously alleviates the con-
secutive mathematical treatment. Thereby, ∏ ׽ ࣨ(μ∏, σ∏2 ) 74 and 
(10) ∏ = μ∏ + σ∏z, 
where z ׽ ࣨ(0,1). Hence, z is a standard normal random variable with 
probability density f(z)= 1√2π e
ԟ(½)z2. Equation (10) obtains by virtue of one well-
established general property of the normal distribution: given a Gaussian ran-
                                         
74  For technical reasons, we assume μ∏ > 2σ∏. In general, for a Gaussian function, with μ 
being its mean value and σ its standard deviation, when supposing μ > 2 σ, then nega-
tive realizations of the corresponding random variable are practically excluded (having 
an actual probability very close to zero). Hence, we can approximate expectations of 
functions of this random variable by a truncation in the interval [ μ ԟ 2σ, μ + 2σ ]. 
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dom variable X ׽ ࣨ(μ, σ2), then z = (Xԟμ)/σ ׽ ࣨ(0,1), i.e., z is governed by a 
standard normal distribution. Hence, profit can be expressed as given by (10).75  
Thereby, D’s end-of-period wealth can also be displayed in terms of its 
mean and standard deviation, i.e.,  
(11) W1
D = μW1D  + σW1Dz , 
with  
μW1D  = W0D + αW0Dr1 + (ϕ(μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T 
and  
σW1D  = ϕTσ∏. 
3.3.3 The Decision Maker’s Maximization Problem 
The above specifications allow for an outline of the entire maximization problem 
which D seeks to solve by balancing against each other her three decision va-
riables  
ϕ (share of the firm owned by D),  
α (fraction of D’s wealth invested into the riskless asset), and  
Γ (amount of debt incurred by the firm). 
The decision maker chooses (ϕ, α, Γ) to solve the following constrained op-
timization problem: 
(12) Max [ॱ{u(μW1D + σW1D  z)} + v(ࣝ)], s. t.  ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ 1, 
        0 ≤ α ≤ α, 
        0 ≤ Γ ≤ Γ. 
As stated earlier, both the lower bound of ϕ and the upper bound of α exist 
due to the decision maker’s requirement to keep a minimum share of the firm. 
Generally, ϕ and α must verify the condition ϕ= (1ԟα)W0
D
(1ԟα)W0D+Eex . Therefore, if 
α ≈ 1 ฻ ϕ ≈ 0. The third decision variable Γ is constrained by Γ, which de-
                                         
75  Hartung et al. (1991, p. 143 ff.) provide a concise outline of the normal distribution’s 
general properties. 
ϕ, α, Γ 
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notes the maximum level of debt that is available to the firm. This maximum 
level of debt is assumed to be purely exogenous and will henceforth be tagged 
the debt capacity.  
D maximizes the sum of her end-of-period expected utility of wealth (i.e., 
ॱ{u(μW1D + σW1Dz)}) and of her utility of corporate control (i.e., v(ࣝ)). Hence, 
the model setup reflects the decision maker’s considerations regarding the 
emerging threat of power sharing that comes along with the involvement of 
external equity investors. The general properties of v(ࣝ) and ࣝ are formally de-
rived in section 3.4. 
3.3.4 Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) 
To further specify the decision maker’s preferences, D is assumed to exhibit 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) with respect to her personal end-of-
period wealth. Therefore, a natural exponential function is adopted to model 
the decision maker’s utility profile. Exponential utility functions model a con-
stant degree of risk sensitivity and allow for a rigorous mathematical treatment. 
Let 
(13)  u(W1
D) = ԟe ԟηW1D, 
which evidently belongs to the class of CARA utility functions. The para-
meter η represents the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion which, by 
definition, is equal to ॱ{ԟu''(W1D)} / ॱ{u'(W1D)}.76 This ratio is constant with 
respect to W1
D and allows for the disclosure of D’s certainty equivalent CE as 
(14) CE = μW1D  ԟ 
η
2
 σ
W1
D
2 . 
It is important to underscore that the results derived throughout the subse-
quent chapters still hold when abandoning this CARA assumption. As long as 
the decision maker’s risk premium is positive (i.e., she is risk averse), the qua-
litative results are valid. In other words, the presence of risk aversion is crucial, 
but not its specific form. 
                                         
76  Note that u' = ηeԟηW1D, u'' = (ԟη)ηeԟηW1D and, thereby, ԟu''/u' = η. The greater η, the more 
concave is u, hence indicating D’s increasing risk aversion. 
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3.4 The Decision Maker’s Corporate Control Considera-
tions 
Since control is determined by ownership, the parameter ࣝ (which represents 
D’s degree of corporate control) is a direct function of the decision maker’s 
ownership share ϕ. We assume v(ࣝ) to be a positive affine transformation of 
ࣝ(ϕ). To keep things simple, we assume that D’s utility of control is linear in 
her actual degree of control. Let 
(15) v(ࣝ) = ࣝ(ϕ). 
Hence, before we can approach the analysis of D’s maximization problem, 
we need to shed light on the basic characteristics of ࣝ(ϕ). By drawing on the 
economic theory of the measurement of voting power, this section derives the 
properties of D’s power curve ࣝ(ϕ) from the level of influence exerted by the 
decision maker vis-à-vis a set of dispersed holders of the remaining common 
stock.  
3.4.1 Swing Probabilities as a Measurement of Voting Power 
According to the economic theory of voting power, corporate control can be 
parameterized in terms of power indices for simple voting games.  
We assume D to be a large shareholder77 who faces a set of dispersed small 
holders of the remaining common stock. With less than absolute majority own-
ership, a shareholder’s control can never be full.78 Accordingly, the correspond-
ing degree of control can be operationalized by the ex-ante probability of win-
ning ballots.79 To analyze the interrelation between share ownership and this 
probability, it is necessary to distinguish between a shareholder’s voting weight, 
represented by her proportion of the overall shares, and her voting power, as the 
ability to swing a coalition of other players from losing to winning by joining 
it.80 
                                         
77  “Large shareholder” means that D holds a block of shares. 
78  See Cubbin/Leech (1983), p. 355 f. 
79  Contributions by Cubbin/Leech (1983) and Leech (1987, 1990) develop a formal frame-
work to assess the probabilistic voting power of a large voting block in case of minority 
control. 
80  Banzhaf (1965, 1968) has shown that actual voting power is not necessarily proportional 
to the number of votes. 
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Providers of outside equity are supposed to be highly dispersed and are 
therefore referred to as “small” shareholders; the decision maker D is the only 
“large” shareholder. Let Φ ∈ [ Φ; ࣮] represent the number of D’s shareholdings 
and n the number of dispersed shares. The total number of shares is fixed and 
normalized to ࣮ with ࣮ = n + Φ. Considering ϕ ∈ [ϕ, 1] as D’s share of the firm, 
we have  
Φ = ϕ࣮. 
Let ε represent the smallest possible increment in shares. We assume small 
shareholders to be homogeneous with respect to their share ownership and ε 
shares per small shareholder. A decision by majority vote requires the quota 
࣫ = ࣮/2 + ε. Assume further that D holds at least 2ε shares, i.e., Φ = 2ε.  
Since under majority control the votes of the minority are irrelevant, D’s 
voting power is absolute in the domain ࣫ ≤ Φ ≤ ࣮, where she enjoys absolute 
majority ownership and can swing every possible coalition of small shareholders. 
In formal language, 
 ࣝ(Φ) > 0, ࣝ'(Φ) = ࣝ''(Φ) = 0    for   ࣫ ≤ Φ ≤ ࣮. 
To assess the decision maker’s voting power in the domain Φ < Φ < ࣫, i.e., 
below the threshold level ࣫, we have to formally examine to what extent she 
can swing coalitions when owning less than ࣫ shares. Assuming binary decisions 
where each shareholder can vote either with “yes” or “no”, there are 2n different 
possible coalitions of the small shareholders. Let the decision of each small 
shareholder i be expressed by the dichotomous variable yi with 
yi= ൜
 1, in case of a “yes”-vote,
0, in case of a “no”-vote,  
and let Y= ∑ yini=1 . Hence, Y represents the total number of “yes”-votes 
among the small shareholders per ballot. 
Similar to Leech (1990), it is further assumed that every small shareholder 
votes each way with equal probability independently of the others. i.e., the in-
dividual probability p that a small shareholder votes with “yes” equals 0.5. To 
be more precise, p = 0.5 is a subjective perception of the decision maker who is 
totally uninformed with respect to possible future decision situations and the 
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preferences of the small shareholders.81 Under this assumption, Y is a binomial 
random variable distributed with parameters n and p = 0.5, i.e., Y ~ B(n, 0.5).82  
Therefrom, it is straightforward to compute D’s degree of control (accord-
ing to the absolute Banzhaf Index) as the probability that she can swing the 
ballot. This occurs when Y is at least ࣫ ԟ Φ (which will be henceforth tagged as 
the lower swing bound L(Φ)) and at most ࣫ ԟ ε (which will be henceforth tagged 
as the upper swing bound H(Φ)). Accordingly, D’s swing probability (=ෝ  voting 
power) in the considered domain Φ ≤ Φ < ࣫ obtains as the binomial probability 
Pr(࣫ ԟ Φ ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ ε). 
As an exemplifying numerical illustration, let us assume that D’s sharehold-
ing Φ amounts to 45 shares, as opposed to 55 dispersed shareholdings of 1 share 
per small shareholder (i.e., n = 55). The total number of shares is 
࣮ = Φ + n = 100. A decision by majority vote requires absolute majority sup-
port and ε = 1, hence ࣫ = 51. The binary option space gives rise to 255 different 
possible coalitions among the small shareholders and Y ~ B(55, 0.5). According-
ly, D’s voting power is Prሺ6 ≤ Y ≤ 50ሻ = 0.999999999 (see Table 1 in Appendix 
A 3.2). Evidently, D is virtually dominant with her swing probability being 
very close to unity. 
3.4.2 The Power Curve 
D’s voting power is absolute when she holds absolute majority ownership. Con-
sequently, her power curve exhibits constant value unity for all values of Φ 
equal to and above ࣫.  
To formally derive the progression of D’s power curve for values of Φ below 
࣫, consider two distinct reference states A and B. Assume that in state B, the 
decision maker has one share more than in state A. In formal language, state A 
is characterized by ΦA (D’s shareholdings in state A) and n(ΦA) (number of 
small shareholders in state A). State B is accordingly characterized by ΦB and 
n(ΦB). Let ΦB = ΦA + ε (hence, ΦA < ΦB < ࣫). 
                                         
81  Leech (1990) additionally shows that the assumption p = 0.5 is equivalent to assuming 
that small shareholders’ voting probabilities are randomly and independently drawn from 
distributions with mean ½, regardless of the actual distribution forms. Given that the 
index does not require a uniform distribution, its behavioral interpretation in terms of a 
probability model possesses substantial generality. See Leech (1990), p. 298. 
82  See Leech (2002), p. 12 f. 
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The number of small shareholders is n(Φ) = ࣮ ԟ Φ. For the constant quorum 
࣫ = ࣮/2 + ε, the lower and upper swing bounds that obtain for each of the two 
reference states are given by 
 L(ΦA) = ࣫ ԟ ΦA  and     H(ΦA) = ࣫ ԟ ε  for state A, and 
 L(ΦB) = ࣫ ԟ (ΦA + ε) and     H(ΦB) = ࣫ ԟ ε  for state B. 
Consequently, D’s voting power is given by 
 Pr(࣫ ԟ ΦA ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ ε)   for state A, and 
 Pr(࣫ ԟ (ΦA+ ε) ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ ε)   for state B. 
In order to subsequently disclose the basic properties of D’s power curve in 
the domain below ࣫, we make use of the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.1: The lower swing bound does not exceed the mean value of the cor-
responding probability density function (pdf) for all possible values of Φ. 
Proof: Defining μ(Φ) as the mean of the pdf which obtains from the respective value of 
Φ, we need to show that L(Φ) ≤ μ(Φ) for all Φ. 
 We know that Φ = ࣮ ԟ n(Φ). Recalling that ࣮ = 2(࣫ ԟ ε), and substituting this in-
to the first expression, we directly deduce Φ = 2(࣫ ԟ ε) ԟ n(Φ).  
 From the symmetry of the binomial distribution (since p = 0.5), we can imme-
diately infer μ(Φ) = n(Φ)/2. Hence, the relation L(Φ) ≤ μ(Φ) is equivalent to 
࣫ ԟ 2(Q ԟ ε ԟ μ(Φ)) ≤ n(Φ)/2, which, by substituting ࣫ = ࣮/2 + ε, can be simpli-
fied to n(Φ) ≤ ࣮ ԟ 2 ε.  
 By substituting ࣮ = Φ + n(Φ), the above relation further simplifies to 2 ε ≤ Φ. 
This inequality is generally fulfilled from our basic assumptions concerning the 
large shareholder D.                                                                                ■ 
q.e.d. 
By virtue of Lemma 3.1 we are able to immediately deduce the subsequent 
proposition.  
Proposition 3.1: For Φ ∈ [Φ; ࣫) and n = ࣮ ԟ Φ dispersed shareholders who 
vote randomly,  
(1) D’s power curve increases monotonically in Φ,  
(2) D’s power curve is concave in Φ. 
Proof: It is straightforward to see that the lower bound L(Φ) is a diminishing function 
of Φ, while the upper bound H(Φ) is constant. Hence, a marginal increase of Φ by ε de-
creases the lower swing bound. Given the shape of the binomial pdf (which approaches 
continuity for n → ∞) and the invariance of H(Φ), a marginal increase of Φ decreases 
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L(Φ) and, thereby, increases the area underneath the density function (which is the 
bounded cumulative distribution function Pr(L ≤ Y ≤ H)), i.e., 
Pr(࣫ ԟ (Φ + ε) ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ ε) > Pr(࣫ ԟ Φ ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ ε), 
is true for all Φ ∈ [2 ε; ࣫), which proves the first part of the claim. 
From Lemma 3.1, the lower swing bound always lies left from the mean of the density 
function. Since the pdf is monotonically increasing up to its mean, the marginal power-
increase from a diminishment of the lower swing bound (by an increase of Φ) monoton-
ically decreases. Hence, the increase of the power curve in Φ happens at a decreasing 
rate. In formal language, the relation 
 Prሺ࣫ ԟ ሺΦ + 2εሻ ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ εሻ ԟ Prሺ࣫ ԟ ሺΦ + εሻ ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ εሻ 
< 
Prሺ࣫ ԟ ሺΦ + εሻ ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ εሻ ԟ Pr(࣫ ԟ Φ ≤ Y ≤ ࣫ ԟ ε) 
holds for all Φ ∈ [2 ε; ࣫), which proves the second part of the claim.                  ■ 
q.e.d. 
Hence, the decision maker’s power curve ࣝ(Φ) is strictly increasing and con-
cave up to the given threshold level, and flat from there onwards.83 
Considering that ϕ is a positive affine transformation of Φ (since ϕ = Φ/࣮), 
the properties of ࣝ(ϕ) directly bleed off. Merely for simplicity, we henceforth 
suppose an absolute majority rule with a threshold level at ϕ = ½. Therefrom, 
the basic properties of ࣝ(ϕ) are given by 
 ࣝ(ϕ) > 0,  ࣝ'(ϕ) > 0,  ࣝ''(ϕ) < 0  for   ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ ½, 
 ࣝ(ϕ) > 0,  ࣝ'(ϕ) = ࣝ''(ϕ) = 0    for   ½ < ϕ ≤ 1. 
While owning at least half of the firm’s equity, D enjoys full voting power 
and, thus, exerts absolute control. Hence, ࣝ(ϕ) is an increasing, concave func-
tion until ϕ = ½ and a constant from ϕ = ½ on. 
Since we assume v(ࣝ(ϕ)) = ࣝ(ϕ) (see Eq. (15)), we henceforth treat v as directly 
depending on ϕ, since v(ϕ) exhibits the same basic properties as ࣝ(ϕ),84 i.e., 
(16)  
                                         
83  Table 1 (see Appendix A 3.2) shows D’s degree of corporate control as measured by 
voting power (for ࣮=100, ε=1, ࣫=51) when her share ownership lies below the threshold 
level ࣫. Figure 6 (Appendix A 3.2) gives a graphical illustration of the corresponding 
power curve over the whole feasible domain of Φ. As D’s ownership share approaches ࣫ 
from below, her power increases accordingly, but at a decreasing rate. 
84  In fact, any arbitrary positive affine transformation v(ࣝ) = aࣝ + b (where a > 0) keeps 
the basic properties of ࣝ.  
 v(ϕ) > 0,  v'(ϕ) > 0,  v''(ϕ) < 0 for   ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ ½, 
 v(ϕ) > 0,  v'(ϕ) = v''(ϕ) = 0 for ½ < ϕ ≤ 1. 
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Figure 5: General properties of ࣝ(ϕ) and v(ϕ). 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
A 3.1 Transformation of D’s final wealth function  
The decision maker’s final wealth as displayed by (9) is given by 
W1
D = W0D + αW0Dr1 + (ϕ(∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T. 
Expanding the first two terms yields  
W0
D + αW0Dr1 = (1+r1)αW0D + W0D ԟ αW0D. 
Since W0
D ԟ αW0D = (1ԟα)W0D = ϕE, we obtain 
W0
D + αW0Dr1 = (1+r1)αW0D + ϕE. 
From (8), we further know that S = ∏ ԟ (1 + r2)Γ ԟ E. By multiplying with 
ϕT we obtain ϕST = ϕT(∏ ԟ (1 + r2)Γ) ԟ ϕTE, which can be expressed as 
ϕST = (ϕ(∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T.  
This expression exactly corresponds to the third term in (9). Hence, we in-
deed obtain 
W1
D   = W0D + αW0Dr1 + (ϕ(∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T  
  = (1+r1)αW0
D + ϕE + ϕST 
  = (1+r1)αW0
D + ϕ(ST + E). 
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A 3.2 Numerical and graphical illustration of D’s voting power 
Table 1 
Numerical illustration of D’s voting power when owning less than ࣫ shares 
࣮=100, Ԗ=1, ࣫=51, p=0.5 
Φ n L(Φ) H(Φ) D’s voting power 
(absolute Banzhaf Index) 
50 50 1 50 ~1 
49 51 2 50 ~1 
48 52 3 50 ~1 
47 53 4 50 ~1 
46 54 5 50 ~1 
45 55 6 50 .999999999 
44 56 7 50 .999999996 
43 57 8 50 .999999986 
42 58 9 50 .999999954 
41 59 10 50 .999999860 
40 60 11 50 .999999607 
39 61 12 50 .999998967 
38 62 13 50 .999997452 
37 63 14 50 .999994066 
36 64 15 50 .999986877 
35 65 16 50 .999972339 
34 66 17 50 .999944213 
33 67 18 50 .999892006 
32 68 19 50 .999798755 
31 69 20 50 .999638070 
30 70 21 50 .999370357 
29 71 22 50 .998938216 
28 72 23 50 .998261138 
27 73 24 50 .997229716 
26 74 25 50 .995699762 
25 75 26 50 .993486827 
24 76 27 50 .990361751 
23 77 28 50 .986047917 
22 78 29 50 .980220895 
21 79 30 50 .972511077 
20 80 31 50 .962509738 
19 81 32 50 .949778744 
18 82 33 50 .933863824 
17 83 34 50 .914311026 
16 84 35 50 .890685640 
15 85 36 50 .862592633 
14 86 37 50 .829697393 
13 87 38 50 .791745503 
12 88 39 50 .748580225 
11 89 40 50 .700156512 
10 90 41 50 .646550539 
9 91 42 50 .587964060 
8 92 43 50 .524723216 
7 93 44 50 .457271809 
6 94 45 50 .386159405 
5 95 46 50 .312024951 
4 96 47 50 .235576849 
3 97 48 50 .157570611 
2 98 49 50 .078785306 
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Figure 6: D’s power curve (࣮=100, ࣫=51). 
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THE FIRM WITH A SIMPLIFIED 
REVENUE STRUCTURE 
 
 
4 The Firm with a Simplified Revenue 
Structure 
4.1 Preface 
This chapter constitutes the first analytical stage of the present thesis. It dis-
closes the fundamental building blocks of the model by distinctly examining 
how the decision maker’s behavior in terms of investing and financing is mod-
ified by the interplay of the different model parameters. For now, the analysis is 
cut-down to the most simplistic form and essentially treats the firm as an un-
specified “profit machine” generating random returns which are linear in the 
aggregate investment level. Thus, firm profits directly and merely depend on 
the initial investment. Evidently, this rudimentary representation totally disre-
gards both the cost structure and the market context. These will be accounted 
for in the subsequent Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
4.2 Analysis 
The model frame is supposed to examine the behavior of a decision maker who 
acts as an owner-manager and who evaluates the benefits and costs of alterna-
tive investment and financing plans. The analysis endogenizes the corporate 
investment level and deduces a preference hierarchy which is attributed to the 
disposable capital sources. 
Having elucidated the properties of the decision maker’s utility function in 
Chapter 3, the analysis of her investment and financing choices can now be 
approached. We start by considering a rudimentary case where neither the 
firm’s revenue structure nor its cost structure are made explicit. The firm simp-
CHAPTER 
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ly generates stochastic end-of-period cash flows which are assumed to be linear 
in the overall firm investment. 
4.2.1 The Solution Approach 
As disclosed by (12), D faces a constrained optimization problem. We tackle 
this by setting up a classical Lagrangean (ࣦ) with its corresponding Lagrange 
multipliers (λ1, ... , λ6). By utilizing the certainty equivalent, the expectations 
operator disappears, i.e., u(CE) ؠ ॱ{u(W1D)}. The Lagrangean of D’s optimiza-
tion problem is 
(17) 
ࣦ = u(CE) + v(ϕ) + λ1(ϕ ԟ ϕ) + λ2(1 ԟ ϕ) + λ3α + λ4(α ԟ α) + λ5Γ + λ6(Γ ԟ Γ). 
In the optimum, the above Lagrangean must simultaneously satisfy its ne-
cessary first order conditions and the below stated set of Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions:  
λ1(ϕ ԟ ϕ) = 0, (KT.01)
 λ2(1 ԟ ϕ) = 0, (KT.02)
λ3α = 0, (KT.03)
λ4(α ԟ α) = 0, (KT.04)
λ5Γ = 0, (KT.05)
 λ6(Γ ԟ Γ) = 0, (KT.06)
(ϕ ԟ ϕ) ≥ 0, (KT.07)
(1 ԟ ϕ) ≥ 0, (KT.08)
α ≥ 0, (KT.09)
(α ԟ α) ≥ 0, (KT.10)
Γ ≥ 0, (KT.11)
(Γ ԟ Γ) ≥ 0, (KT.12)
λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6 ≥ 0. (NNC) 
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Since the decision maker faces a concave objective function and linear con-
straints, the solution of the above Lagrangean yields a global maximum of D’s 
objective function ॱ{u(μW1D + σW1D  z)} + v(ࣝ). Partially differentiating ࣦ with 
respect to each of the three decision variables (ϕ, α, Γ) yields the three first 
order conditions (FOCs):  
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = u'(CE)(∂CE/∂ϕ) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = u'(CE)(∂CE/∂α)+ λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = u'(CE)(∂CE/∂Γ) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0. 
By the nature of the certainty equivalent (as disclosed by (14)) and by set-
ting u'(CE) = Ω, these FOCs display as 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0. 
4.2.2 The Profit Function 
Since W1
D is a function of ∏, we have to make explicit the profit function in 
order to proceed further. For the time being, the firm is supposed to generate 
stochastic returns which are linear in the total investment level K. Thus, since 
neither the demand nor the cost function are made explicit, the firm’s profit 
directly and merely depends on K, i.e.,  
∏ = (1+ρ)K, 
where ρ ׽ ࣨ(μρ,σρ2) is a Gaussian random variable which is stochastically 
independent from K.85 Thereby, analogical to the previous demonstrations, its 
                                         
85  Similar to Brander/Lewis (1986), ρ can be interpreted as an unspecified “environmental” 
risk parameter. 
 
Chapter 4: The Firm with a Simplified Revenue Structure 
 
57 
 
linear transformation ∏ is also a Gaussian random variable with μ∏ = (1+μρ)K 
and σ∏ = σρK. By substituting both into (10), firm profit displays as  
(18)  ∏ = μ∏ + σ∏z = (1+μρ)K + (σρK)z. 
The differential terms in the FOCs can now be solved. As shown in the appen-
dix to this chapter (see Appendix A 4.1), the FOCs then display as  
FOC.1:  
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηΓϕK(σρT)2 + (v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.2:  
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0DϕK(σρT)2 + ( λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.3:  
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηK(σρϕT)2 + ( λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
4.2.3 The Decision Maker’s Preference Hierarchy of Financing 
The question addressed throughout this subsection is as follows. Is there a defi-
nite preference hierarchy attached to the firm’s disposable funding sources and, 
if so, what are its preconditions and properties? We approach this question by 
identifying the possible values which D’s decision variables may simultaneously 
adopt in the optimum.  
To ensure the decision maker’s participation in the firm, it is assumed that 
the (expected) returns generated by the firm are higher than the return of the 
riskless asset. Furthermore, the firm’s average returns are assumed to exceed 
the due interest rate r2,
86 i.e.,87 
μρ > r1/T     and  μρ > r2  . 
                                         
86  Evidently, the validity of μρ > r2 constitutes the precondition for the well-known leve-
rage-effect to crop up. 
87  By means of the FOCs and [KT.3 - KT.6], it is straightforward to see that these two 
relations are indeed necessary conditions for the existence of an optimal interior solution 
with 0 < αכ < α and 0 < Γכ < Γ, i.e., with λ3=λ4=λ5=λ6=0.  
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The right hand sides of these two inequalities are related inasmuch as their 
relative size crucially determines D’s arbitration between her personal invest-
ment into the firm (which is controlled by means of the decision variable α) and 
the incurred level of corporate debt (which is controlled by means of the deci-
sion variable Γ). There are three basic possibilities, i.e.,  
 r2T > r1, or  
 r2T < r1, or  
  r2T = r1.  
We assume the first case to be the normal case, i.e., a positive after-tax in-
terest spread which ensures r2T > r1 (the remaining two cases are formally dis-
cussed in the appendix to this chapter, see Appendix A 4.2). 
To thoroughly explore the decision maker’s arbitration between α and Γ, 
we have to examine the conditions under which FOC.2 and FOC.3 hold simul-
taneously. Multiplying the former by ϕ and the latter by W0D, and subsequently 
adding up these new expressions yields the reduced condition 
(19) ԟ(r2 ԟ r1/T)ϕW0DT + ϕ( λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω + W0D( λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0.  
By means of this reduced condition, the below-stated results can easily be 
demonstrated. We make use of the following Lemma to subsequently prove 
Proposition 4.1. 
Lemma 4.1: For r2 ԟ r1/T > 0, optimal solutions for α and Γ must fulfill  
i)  0 < αכ < α ר Γכ= 0 ,  or  
ii)  αכ = 0 ר Γכ= 0 , or 
iii)  αכ = 0 ר 0 < Γכ< Γ , or 
iv)  αכ = 0 ר Γכ= Γ . 
Proof: The four cases of Lemma 4.1 are proved consecutively.  
i)  From KT.3 and KT.4, 0 < α < α implies λ3=λ4=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ5=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT>0 and λ6=0. From 
KT.5, a positive value of λ5 necessitates Γ=0, which proves the first part 
of Lemma 4.1. 
ii)  From KT.5 and KT.6, Γ=0 implies λ5≥0 and λ6=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold in two cases, namely if either  
 λ5=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT>0 and λ3=λ4=0 (which constitutes the case 
covered by the first part of Lemma 4.1), or if  
 λ3+λ5W0D/ϕ = (r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT > 0 and λ4=0 (which, from 
KT.3, implies α=0, thus proving the second part of Lemma 4.1).  
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iii)  From KT.5 and KT.6, 0 < Γ < Γ implies λ5=λ6=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ3=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT > 0 and λ4=0. From 
KT.3, a positive value of λ3 necessitates α=0, which proves the third part 
of Lemma 4.1. 
iv)  From KT.5 and KT.6, Γ=Γ implies λ5=0 and λ6≥0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ3ԟλ6W0D/ϕ=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT > 0. Thus, 
λ3 has to be positive, which, from KT.3, implies α=0. This proves the last 
part of Lemma 4.1.                                                                    ■ 
q.e.d. 
Figure 7 gives a graphical representation of the result outlined by Lemma 
4.1. It shows that, given our basic assumptions μρT > r2T > r1, simultaneous 
interior solutions for both α and Γ are impossible. Appendix A 4.1 provides a 
formal proof that such simultaneous interior solutions for α and Γ are possible if 
and only if r2T = r1 is assumed. 
 
 
Figure 7: Relationship between Γכ and αכ. 
The below-stated Proposition constitutes one of the main results of this 
chapter. 
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Proposition 4.1: Suppose μρT > r2T > r1. In the optimum, the decision maker 
firstly invests her personal wealth into the firm before calling for corporate debt. 
Proof: Proposition 4.1 immediately follows from Lemma 4.1.  
For r2 ԟ r1/T > 0 (Lemma 4.1), D only invests into the risk-free asset if no corporate 
debt is incurred (positive αכ necessitates Γכ=0). Furthermore, corporate debt is only 
incurred if D’s personal investment into the firm is maximized (positive Γכ necessitates 
αכ=0). Hence, the decision maker firstly invests her personal wealth into the firm be-
fore calling for debt (which is only incurred if D’s personal wealth is not sufficient to 
meet her corporate investment objectives).                                                      ■ 
q.e.d. 
Proposition 4.1 conveys that the decision maker is driven towards a definite 
preference hierarchy regarding the two focal funding options. The intuition be-
hind this result becomes quite evident when considering the following. Given 
r2T > r1, the effective costs of debt are higher than D’s opportunity costs of 
personally investing into the firm, since the return of the risk-free asset is rela-
tively low. Hence, D’s personal wealth takes precedence over debt to feed the 
firm’s stock of capital.88 In fact, the decision maker’s wealth constraint is not 
binding (i.e., her initial wealth is sufficient to meet her corporate investment 
objectives by itself) in cases i) and ii), contrary to cases iii) and iv), where the 
resulting “financing gap” is (as good as possible) filled by external debt.  
It is easy to show that the reverse hierarchy is adopted if the reverse basic 
condition r2T < r1 holds. The special case r2T = r1 induces total ambiguity re-
garding the adopted hierarchy between α and Γ (formal proofs are given in the 
appendix to this chapter, see Appendix A 4.1). Hence, a fundamental dichoto-
my regarding the decision maker’s financing behavior becomes apparent, which 
is contingent upon whether r2T is smaller or greater than r1. Recalling that T 
decreases in the corporate tax rate,89 high levels of corporate taxation will drive 
firms towards a stronger preference of external debt. This observation confirms 
the crucial role of tax imposition as described in the pertinent literature. 
In what follows, we continue supposing r2T > r1.90 Having elucidated the deci-
sion maker’s preference hierarchy concerning the investment of her personal 
wealth (i.e., “inside equity”) and the raising of debt, we still need to shed light 
on the role of the third funding source which can potentially feed the firm’s 
stock of capital, i.e., “outside equity” from external investors. For this purpose, 
we examine D’s corresponding behavior by means of delineating the possible 
                                         
88  Adopting a totally different approach, this result gives strong support to similar findings 
attained by Brander/Spencer (1989). 
89  T = (1ԟτc). 
90  As demonstrated in the appendix to this chapter, the reverse case follows easily in a 
symmetric manner. 
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values of the decision variable ϕ in the optimum. Multiplying FOC.1 by ϕ and 
FOC.3 by Γ and subsequently subtracting these new expressions yields the re-
duced condition 
(20) ϕ(v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2) ԟ Γ( λ5 ԟ λ6) = 0. 
By means of the reduced condition (20) (for which both ϕ and Γ are opti-
mized), the second main result is presented. 
Proposition 4.2: Suppose μρT > r2T > r1. In the optimum, a continuum of 
feasible solutions for the value of ϕ exist, which satisfy 
½ < ϕכ≤ 1. 
Proof: In the optimum, as demonstrated by the four cases of Lemma 4.1, there are 
three general possibilities for the solution value of Γ. Therefrom, the feasible solutions 
of ϕ are deduced. 
i) + ii) For Γ=0, the reduced condition (20) simplifies to ϕ(v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)=0, 
which, from KT.1 and KT.2, can only hold if v'(ϕ)=λ1=λ2=0. From the 
nature of the power curve, v'(ϕ) can only be zero for ½ <ϕ≤1. 
iii)  For 0 < Γ < Γ, KT.5 and KT.6 imply λ5=λ6=0. Hence, the reduced condi-
tion (20) can only hold if v'(ϕ)=λ1=λ2=0. Thereby, ½ < ϕ ≤ 1. 
iv)  For Γ=Γ, KT.5 and KT.6 imply λ5=0 and λ6≥0. Hence, the reduced con-
dition (20) displays as ϕ(v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)+Γλ6=0. Since, from KT.2, a posi-
tive λ2 implies ϕ=1, this equation can only hold if either v'(ϕ=1)=λ1=0 ר 
λ2=Γλ6/ϕ ≥ 0, or v'(ϕ)=λ1=λ2=λ6=0. Thereby, feasible solutions of ϕ 
must necessarily satisfy ½ < ϕ ≤ 1.                                            ■ 
q.e.d. 
Proposition 4.2 conveys a substantial result. As long as her corporate in-
vestment objectives can be attained without debt and as long as her disposition 
on corporate decisions is assured, the decision maker is indifferent regarding the 
amount of outside equity brought in by external investors. The intuition behind 
this observation gets very understandable when becoming aware that in cases i) 
and ii) D’s personal return of an additional unit of outside equity is zero. De-
spite the fact that an augmentation of K by additional outside equity induces 
firm profits to increase, the additional surplus is exactly redistributed among 
the new equity providers. Hence, the decision maker cannot raise additional 
personal revenue from her investment by raising outside equity. In fact, as can 
be verified in the appendix to this chapter, her marginal revenue (relating to ϕ) 
is zero as long as D’s corporate investment objectives can be attained without 
calling for debt (Γ=0), i.e.,  
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∂μW1D/∂ϕ = (μρԟ r2)ΓT = 0 
holds in case i) and ii). Thereby, and by considering (1) and (16), we di-
rectly infer that 
   U'(ϕ) > 0,   for   ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ ½,  and 
   U'(ϕ) = 0   for   ½ < ϕ ≤ 1. 
Hence, ceteris paribus, D’s utility is maximized for all values of ϕ that ex-
ceed ½. 
4.2.4 The Decision Maker’s Corporate Investment Objectives 
By proving Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we deduced D’s preference structure con-
cerning her decision variables. However, her actual corporate investment objec-
tives still remain to be made explicit. This investment decision is absent from 
most of the existing models concerned with financial structure choice, despite 
the fact that both decisions are thoroughly associated with each other. The de-
cision maker’s investment objectives can be endogenized and quantified in terms 
of target levels of corporate investment, namely a maximum target level and a 
minimum target level.  
These target levels constitute optimal trade-off points where D’s (expected) 
personal wealth-gain and her risk exposure are balanced. A more detailed dis-
cussion is provided at the end of this section. For now, it suffices to understand 
that  
 the maximum target level constitutes an upper bound up to which 
the decision maker reckons an increase of the firm’s stock of capital 
by her private wealth to be personally beneficial;  
 the minimum target level constitutes an upper bound up to which 
she reckons an increase of the firm’s stock of capital by debt to be 
beneficial.  
Given D’s strict preference hierarchy regarding her disposable funding 
sources, debt is actually only incurred if her initial wealth level lies below this 
minimum target level. 
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Cases i) and ii)  
We begin by treating the first two cases, where Γכ=0. As shown in these parts 
of Lemma 4.1, W0
D is sufficiently large to meet D’s corporate investment objec-
tives without calling for any debt. The proof of the first two cases in Lemma 4.1 
has further disclosed that with 
i) λ5=(r2  ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT ר λ3=λ4=λ6=0, or with 
ii) λ3+λ5W0
D/ϕ =(r2ԟr1/T)ΩW0DT ר λ4=λ6=0, 
FOC.2 and FOC.3 simultaneously hold. Thus, in both cases, we are facing a 
system of only two equations. 
Scrutinizing case i), where 0 < αכ < α and Γכ=0, we have  
FOC.1:  
(v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, and 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0DϕכT2σρ2K = 0. 
With ϕכK=(1ԟα*)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and Γכ=0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(21) (1ԟαכ)W0D = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2,  
which discloses the optimal amount of D’s personal wealth invested into the 
firm (LHS of the equation) and her maximum target level of corporate invest-
ment (RHS of the equation). D’s initial wealth W0
D is largely sufficient to reach 
this maximum target and allows for an investment of the excess amount αכW0D 
into the riskless alternative. 
Scrutinizing case ii), where αכ=Γכ=0, we have 
FOC.1:  
(v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, and 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0Dϕ*T2σρ2K ԟ λ3/Ω = 0. 
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With ϕ*K=(1ԟαכ)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and αכ=Γכ=0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(22) W0
D = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2 ԟ λ3/ΩηW0DTσρ2, 
which discloses that D, despite investing her full wealth into the firm, does 
not reach her maximum target of corporate investment. The remaining differ-
ence between the maximum target level and D’s wealth endowment is given by 
λ3/ΩηW0
DTσρ2, which evidently decreases if W0
D increases to approach the max-
imum target level from below. 
In both case i) and ii), FOC.1 displays as (v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, which, as 
demonstrated by Proposition 4.2, implies  
½ < ϕכ ≤ 1  
for both cases. Hence, the decision maker is indifferent with respect to rais-
ing outside equity as long as her corporate control remains absolute.  
Cases iii) and iv) 
We now treat the last two cases, where Γכ> 0. As shown in these parts of Lem-
ma 4.1, W0
D is not sufficiently large to meet D’s corporate investment objectives 
without calling for additional debt. The proof of the last two cases in Lemma 
4.1 has further disclosed that with 
iii) λ3=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT ר λ4=λ5=λ6=0, or with 
iv) λ3ԟλ6W0D/ϕ=(r2ԟr1/T)ΩW0DT ר λ4=λ5=0, 
FOC.2 and FOC.3 simultaneously hold. Thus, we are again facing a system 
of only two equations. 
Scrutinizing case iii), where αכ= 0 and Γכ> 0, we have  
FOC.1:  
(μρԟ r2)ΓכT ԟ ηΓכϕכT2σρ2K + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
(μρԟ r2)ϕכT ԟ ηϕ*2T2σρ2K = 0.  
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Knowing that ϕכK=(1ԟαכ)W0D+ϕכΓכ and αכ=0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(23) W0
D + ϕכΓכ = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2,  
which, considering that W0
D is fully invested into the firm, discloses the in-
curred level of corporate debt (Γכ) in order to reach the minimum target level of 
corporate investment (RHS of the equation). 
Substituting FOC.2/3 into FOC.1 yields the well-known expression 
(v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, which, again, implies  
½ < ϕכ≤ 1.  
Hence, the decision maker is indifferent with respect to raising outside equi-
ty as long as her corporate control is absolute and as long as her minimum tar-
get level of corporate investment can be attained.  
However, since Γכ now has a positive value, the size of the feasible interval 
of ϕכ depends on the given parameter values. Evidently, with a positive level of 
corporate debt, Equation (23) can only hold if W0
D < (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2. The result-
ing financing gap is filled by the debt. More precisely, by the fraction of debt 
that induces a personal wealth-gain for the decision maker at period end, i.e., 
the fraction ϕכΓכ. Hence, as long as enough debt can be incurred to fulfill the 
condition ϕכΓכ=(μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟ W0D for even the smallest possible value of ϕכ, 
the full interval (½; 1] is feasible for ϕכ. Since the smallest possible value of ϕכ 
is marginally greater than ½, the inequality  
½ Γ > ((μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟ W0D) 
฻ 
Γ > 2((μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟ W0D) 
must be fulfilled, i.e., the debt capacity must be greater than two times the 
financing gap.  
If the exogenous variable Γ is gradually decreased below this level, the deci-
sion maker’s effective degrees of freedom concerning the filling of the financing 
gap are likewise gradually diminished. In fact, the feasible interval for ϕכ be-
comes increasingly contracted from below to finally reduce to the unique possi-
ble value ϕכ=1 as soon as the debt capacity is (smaller or) equal to the financ-
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ing gap, i.e., as soon as Γ ≤ (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟW0D, which means that the boundary 
to case iv) is attained. 
Scrutinizing this case iv), where αכ = 0 and Γכ=Γ, we have 
FOC.1:  
(μρԟ r2)ΓכT ԟ ηΓכϕכT2σρ2K + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
 (μρԟ r2)ϕכT ԟ ηϕכ2T2σρ2K ԟ λ6/Ω = 0.  
Knowing that ϕכK=(1ԟα)W0D+ϕכΓכ, αכ=0, and Γכ=Γ, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(24) W0
D + ϕכΓ = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟ λ6/ΩηT2σρ2ϕכ.  
which discloses that D invests her full wealth into the firm and uses the full 
debt capacity in order to approach her minimum target as near as possible. The 
remaining difference between the minimum target level and W0
D
 + ϕכΓ is given 
by the term λ6/ΩηT
2σρ2ϕ
כ, which evidently compensates for the fact that 
W0
D + Γ < (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 and implies a positive λ6. As shown in the proof of 
Proposition 4.2, a positive value of λ6 necessitates a positive λ2, which, from 
KT.2, implies ϕכ=1.  
Generally encompassing all four cases, the optimality conditions given by the 
equations (21) – (24) all exhibit an identical structure. The left-hand sides de-
note D’s pecuniary involvement in the firm (i.e., “her” part of the firm’s asset 
value ϕכKכ), which she determines so as to meet (or approach) her target level 
(right-hand sides of the equations). We always have 
 
 
 
This discloses a very important notion. The decision maker’s target levels of 
corporate investment do not reflect the total investment intensity of the firm, 
but merely the part of the firm’s capital stock that translates into cash flows for 
D. This is the sum of her part of all equity-induced returns and her part of all 
(1ԟαכ)W0D + ϕכΓכ                ื           Maximum/Minimum Target Level. 
ϕכEכ + ϕכΓכ 
ϕכKכ
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debt-induced returns. Recalling the intuition behind Proposition 4.2, it becomes 
now even clearer that, as long as no debt-induced returns exist (cases i) and ii), 
where Γכ=0), outside equity has absolutely no effect in terms of reaching D’s 
(maximum) target level of corporate investment. Thus, the decision maker is 
completely indifferent regarding the amount of outside equity brought in by 
external investors as long as her power-related utility component v(ϕ) is max-
imized (i.e., as long as ϕ is greater than ½). 
The right-hand sides of equations (21) and (23) plainly reveal how the deci-
sion maker’s target levels vary as functions of her risk aversion and the underly-
ing environment of the firm. The target levels can be directly tied to the sto-
chastic structure of the firm’s cash flow, increasing in μρ and decreasing in both 
σρ2 and η. In fact, the actual existence of these target levels is ultimately due to 
the decision maker’s risk-aversion. They constitute reference points at which an 
optimal trade-off between D’s (expected) personal wealth-gain and her risk ex-
posure is attained.91 Concerning the maximum target level which is aimed at in 
cases i) and ii), the decision maker trades off the wealth effect of personally 
investing into the firm against the corresponding cash flow risk of stock owner-
ship. Concerning the minimum target level which is aimed at in cases iii) and 
iv), the decision maker trades off the wealth effect of debt (leverage effect) 
against the corresponding cash flow risk of due corporate interest payments.92  
Hence, the results show that the decision maker’s investment objectives be-
come more ambitious with improving average environmental states, decreasing 
environmental volatility, and decreasing risk aversion of the decision maker. 
The impact of corporate taxation on the decision maker’s investment and 
financing decisions is particularly interesting. Recall our basic assumption 
r2T > r1. For increasing rates of corporate taxation (τc ՛ or T ՝), the minimum 
target level increases, while the maximum target level decreases. Hence, the 
domain of the optimality case ii) gets smaller and smaller and finally vanishes 
at the limit of our basic assumption, i.e., when r2T= r1. This is because, with 
growing corporate taxation, the difference between decision maker’s costs of 
debt (r2T) and her opportunity costs of investing into the firm (r1) gets smaller 
                                         
91  Recall that W1
D is a linear transformation of the environmental risk parameter ρ. With 
respect to D’s personal revenue, it is easy to verify that not only the expectation value 
μW1D, but also the risk measure σW1D
2 is an increasing function of both inside equity and 
debt. Hence, increasing D’s expected personal wealth-gains by means of augmenting ei-
ther the level of her personal firm investment or the level of corporate debt imperatively 
comes along with a greater personal risk exposure of the focal entrepreneur.  
92  This observation is perfectly in line with the well-established view that debt finance (“fi-
nancial leverage”) pushes up the financial risk of the common stock. See Brealey/Myers 
(2008, p. 229). 
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and smaller to finally vanish. Increasing τc even further would then reverse our 
basic assumption to r2T < r1, and consequently the preference hierarchy be-
tween inside equity and corporate debt would also be reversed compared to 
Proposition 4.1 (see Appendix A 4.2 for a formal proof). 
4.2.5 The summarized Pattern of Investing and Financing 
In order to summarize the decision maker’s fundamental behavioral pattern in 
terms of investing and financing, we denote the minimum and maximum target 
level of corporate investment as TLMin and TLMax respectively, i.e.,  
 TLMax = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2, and 
 TLMin = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2. 
As demonstrated above, our basic assumptions give rise to four possible 
cases. 
i)  if  W0
D > TLMax,  
 ⇒ ½ < ϕכ≤ 1, 
  αכ> 0, satisfying (1ԟαכ)W0D = TLMax, 
  Γכ= 0, 
  TLMax ≤ Kכ≤ 2TLMax.  
D’s private wealth is sufficiently large to meet her corporate investment ob-
jectives, i.e., it exceeds her maximum target level of corporate investment. 
Hence, she incurs no corporate debt and divides her personal investment be-
tween the firm’s stock of capital and the riskless alternative. As long as she 
retains full corporate control, the decision maker is indifferent regarding the 
amount of outside equity brought in by external investors. 
ii) if  TLMin < W0D ≤ TLMax,  
 ⇒ ½ < ϕכ ≤ 1, 
  αכ = 0, 
  Γכ = 0, 
  W0
D ≤ Kכ≤ 2W0D. 
D’s private wealth is sufficiently large to exceed her minimum target level 
of corporate investment, but smaller than her maximum target level. Hence, she 
incurs no corporate debt and invests her full personal wealth into the firm in 
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order to reach the best possible rapprochement towards her maximum target 
level. As long as she retains full corporate control, the decision maker is indiffe-
rent regarding the amount of outside equity brought in by external investors.  
iii) if  W0
D ≤ TLMin ≤ W0D + Γ,  
 ⇒ ½ < ϕכ≤ 1, satisfying W0D + ϕכΓכ= TLMin, 
  αכ= 0, 
  Γ ≥ Γכ≥ (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2ԟW0D, satisfying W0D + ϕכΓכ= TLMin, 
  Kכ = TLMin/ϕכ.  
D’s private wealth is too small to meet her minimum target level of corpo-
rate investment. Hence, she invests her full personal wealth into the firm’s stock 
of capital and incurs supplementary corporate debt in order to reach this mini-
mum target level (filling the financing gap). Inasmuch as this financing gap can 
be filled by the relevant fraction of debt ϕכΓכ and as long as she retains full 
corporate control, the decision maker is indifferent regarding the amount of 
outside equity brought in by external investors.  
vi) if  W0
D + Γ < TLMin, 
 ⇒ ϕכ= 1,  
  αכ = 0, 
  Γכ = Γ, 
  Kכ =W0D  + Γ< TLMin. 
The sum of D’s private wealth and the maximum amount of debt is too 
small to meet her minimum target level of corporate investment. Hence, she 
invests her full personal wealth into the firm’s stock of capital and incurs as 
much corporate debt as possible in order to reach the best possible rapproche-
ment towards her minimum target level. In order to maximize her claims over 
the return stream generated by the firm, the decision maker does not incur any 
outside equity. Thereby, she fully benefits from the corporate debt and its leve-
rage effect, hence maximizing her utility function. 
Figure 8 depicts the range of values for (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) throughout the four cases. 
It gives a graphical representation of the three decision variables’ possible val-
ues in the optimum, contingent on the level of the decision maker’s initial 
wealth W0
D.  
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Figure 8: Wealth-dependent optimality space of (ϕ, α, Γ). 
The right solid vertical line which separates the cases i) and ii) represents 
the decision maker’s maximum target level TLMax = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2. For all 
values of W0
D which exceed this level, D’s private wealth is sufficient to meet 
her corporate investment objectives. Hence, case i) holds. 
The central solid vertical line which separates the cases ii) and iii) 
represents the minimum target level TLMin = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2. For all values of 
W0
D which lie between both target levels, D’s private wealth is only sufficient to 
meet her minimum, but not her maximum target level of corporate investment. 
Hence, case ii) holds. 
The left solid vertical line which separates the cases iii) and iv) represents 
the wealth level TLMin ԟ ߁, from where on the given debt capacity ߁ is sufficient 
to close the financing gap. For all values of W0
D which exceed this level, her 
wealth allows for a complete filling of the financing gap by balancing debt and 
outside equity to satisfy Equation (23). Hence, case iii) holds. For all values of 
W0
D which fall short of this level, D keeps full ownership to personally benefit 
from the full debt capacity in order to approach her minimum target level as 
good as possible. Hence, case iv) holds.  
iv) iii) ii) i) 
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The dashed vertical line within the case iii)-section indicates the level from 
where on ϕכ can take its lowest possible value with the given debt capacity. For 
all values of W0
D which exceed this level, the decision maker has full freedom to 
choose the level of ϕכ in the interval (½, 1] to satisfy the optimality condition 
(23). For all values of W0
D which fall short of this level, the financing gap is 
greater than half of the debt capacity, which means that the lower optimality 
bound of ϕ must rise further beyond ½ to satisfy (23). When gradually decreas-
ing W0
D below this level, the feasible interval of ϕכ becomes increasingly con-
tracted from below to finally reduce to the unique value ϕ=1 as soon as 
W0
D = TLMin = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟ Γ, meaning that the boundary to case iv) is at-
tained. 
The shaded areas indicate the range of possible values of Γכ and ϕכ. It is 
important to understand that these optimal values are interdependent. How-
ever, since the value of Γכ is only ambiguous in case iii), this interdependence 
only becomes evident when inspecting the third case. In fact, the relative ver-
tical distance of Γכ to its corresponding upper optimality bound (blue dashed 
curve) exactly equals the relative vertical distance of ϕכ to its corresponding 
lower optimality bound (red solid curve), and vice versa. If we suppose that case 
iii) holds and D chooses an extreme value for Γכ which lies on its upper opti-
mality bound, the corresponding value of ϕכ must lie on its lower optimality 
bound. The same is true in the opposite case. 
This linear relationship is illustrated by Figure 9 (the lower and upper op-
timality bounds are represented by (Γכ, ϕכ) and (Γכ, ϕכ) respectively). 
 
 
Figure 9: Linear relationship between Γכ and ϕכ. 
ϕכ=1 
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4.2.6 Comparative Statics 
From the disclosed pattern of investing and financing, a set of immediate com-
parative statics results emerges as subsequently summarized. 
Comparative Statics Result 1: The lower the risk aversion, the cash flow 
volatility or the initial wealth and the higher the expected firm-related returns or 
the corporate tax rate,  
 the fewer will be invested into the riskless alternative by trend; 
 the more probable becomes a high fraction of debt in the firm’s stock 
of capital; 
 the higher will be the ownership concentration by trend. 
These observations directly bleed off from the nature of D’s investment ob-
jectives (as disclosed in (21) and (23)). However, it is particularly worth ex-
amining the limiting case. If the decision maker approaches risk neutrality 
(η → 0), her investment targets approach infinity. The same is true if the envi-
ronmental risk tends towards zero (σρ2  → 0 ).
93 As a consequence, the decision 
maker is induced to massively engage into that option which offers the best 
expected after-tax deal. In other words, she simply pumps the maximum possi-
ble amount of both her own wealth and debt into the firm. Accordingly, iv) is 
the only remaining case, where no outside equity is incurred and ownership 
concentration is at its maximum. 
Comparative Statics Result 2: The higher the corporate tax rate,  
 the more will be invested into the riskless alternative by trend; 
 the more probable becomes a high fraction of debt in the firm’s stock 
of capital. 
We have already elaborated on the impact of corporate taxation. It was 
shown that the minimum target level increases in the corporate tax rate, while 
the maximum target level decreases. Hence, the domain of the optimality case 
ii) (see Figure 8) gets smaller and smaller, while the domains of case i) and iii) 
are growing. Thereby, scenarios in which the decision maker invests into the 
riskless asset (case i)) and scenarios in which the decision maker incurs corpo-
rate debt (case iii)) become more probable. 
                                         
93  Evidently, a lower environmental volatility σρ2 directly translates into a lower variability 
of the decision maker’s personal return on investment, i.e., a lower cash flow volatility. 
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Comparative Statics Result 3: A lower debt capacity will, ceteris paribus, 
lead to a higher ownership concentration by trend. 
This result confirms an observation which has already been discussed when 
examining the cases iii) and iv) (equations (23) and (24)). It discloses an inter-
esting notion concerning possible (real) economic consequences of banking regu-
lation. If corporate debt is needed to close the financing gap, an exogenous lo-
wering of Γ (like credit rationing induced by, say, newly imposed banking re-
strictions like the Basel III accord) will, ceteris paribus, contract the feasible 
interval of ϕכ from below (i.e., the lower bound of the interval tends against its 
upper bound 1) as soon as the debt capacity becomes smaller than two times 
the financing gap.  
Comparative Statics Result 4: The smaller the difference (μρԟ r2), 
 the lower the minimum target level;  
 the fewer corporate debt will be incurred by trend.  
As we have seen while examining equations (21) and (23), it is the interplay 
of risk aversion and interest payments which induces an inner optimum for the 
level of corporate debt incurred by the decision maker. D trades off the leverage 
effect of debt against the cash flow risk of corresponding interest payments. As 
the intensity of the leverage effect declines (the difference (μρԟ r2) becomes 
smaller), the level up to which it outweighs the interest related cash flow risk 
decreases accordingly. Again, the result is easily rendered comprehensible by 
examining the limiting case. If (μρ- r2) approaches zero, the minimum target 
level (as disclosed in (23) totally vanishes and only cases i) and ii) are left.  
Comparative Statics Result 5: The higher D’s initial wealth endowment, the 
higher will be the overall investment volume of the firm by trend. 
An increase of W0
D increases the overall investment level in case ii) and iv), 
while it has no effect in case i) and iii). Thereby, the corporate investment level 
is a (weakly) increasing function of the decision maker’s personal wealth. This 
result compellingly highlights that not only funding decisions, but also actual 
investing decisions are crucially depending on the severeness of the decision 
maker’s personal liquidity constraint. 
In fact, the actual feasibility of external equity financing directly depends 
on both, the debt capacity (as indicated by Comparative Statics Result 3) and 
the level of the disposable internal funds: for sufficiently low levels of Γ and 
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W0
D, no outside equity will be raised at all. In general, slow-growing and highly 
profitable firms in mature markets are likely to generate high cash amounts 
from retained earnings, contrary to fast-growing but less profitable firms in 
emerging markets. Hence, such young enterprises will abstain from external 
equity financing as long as the sum of their internally available funds and the 
debt capacity falls short of the minimum target level of corporate investment.  
As a further remark, the debt capacity is treated as an exogenous constant 
in the present model. A refinement of the model which assumes Γ to be posi-
tively related to W0
D could be expected to foster an endogenous amplification of 
this effect: the lower W0
D, the lower Γ, and the lower the feasibility of outside 
equity. It could be worthwhile to examine to conditions under which this me-
chanism yields a separating equilibrium in which small emerging firms invest 
low and large mature firms invest heavily.  
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the behavior of a decision maker who acts as an owner-
manager and who evaluates the benefits and costs of alternative investment and 
financing plans. Case-contingent interior solutions were obtained so that mar-
ginal costs and marginal benefits are balanced.  
The analysis firstly allowed for the endogenous derivation of precise corpo-
rate investment objectives which are contingent on the decision maker’s subjec-
tive beliefs (via μρ and σρ
2), her risk sensitivity (via η), and exogenous institu-
tional parameters (via r1, r2, and T). Secondly, a hierarchy according to which 
the disposable funding sources are ranked arises on the grounds of these in-
vestment objectives. Inasmuch as the decision maker can attain her corporate 
investment objectives, she exclusively relies on equity for the firm’s stock of 
capital. Otherwise, debt is incurred to fill the financing gap. Since the decision 
maker’s personal return on investment is unaffected outside equity, she is indif-
ferent regarding the involvement of external equity providers as long as her 
investment objectives can be attained and her intra-organizational power re-
mains absolute. 
Concerning the impact of D’s of risk-sensitivity on the corporate financing 
mix (Comparative Statics Result 1), our findings fundamentally deviate from 
the results of Jensen/Meckling (1976). According to their logic (which is essen-
tially based on agency considerations), decreasing risk-aversion gradually shifts 
down the relative proportion of debt in the firm’s stock of capital. In fact, our 
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model would generate exactly the same result if the stock of capital had been 
assumed to be exogenously fixed. Since decreasing risk-aversion drives the deci-
sion maker towards a higher involvement into the (risky) firm project, she 
would decrease α in order to invest a larger fraction of her personal wealth into 
the firm, hence substituting debt with equity. However, by endogenizing the 
decision maker’s actual investment decision, our analysis shows that decreasing 
risk-aversion additionally pushes her towards an absolute augmentation of the 
firm’s stock of capital. Hence, she increases both, her personal investment into 
the firm and the amount of corporate debt. At the same time, she reduces the 
amount of outside equity in order to reap more of the financial leverage effect of 
debt. Hence, our analysis shows how the simultaneous endogenization of invest-
ing and financing decisions changes the results and leads to further insights. 
Further concerning the derived funding hierarchy, our findings obviously re-
semble the compelling results delivered by the pecking order theory (POT) of 
Myers/Majluf (1984). Similar to the POT, our results provide a clear explana-
tion for why most small firms raise outside funds primarily in the form of 
debt.94 Moreover, likewise similar to the POT, our model implies a negative 
relation between profitability and firm leverage when interpreting the decision 
maker’s initial wealth endowment as retained earnings from previous periods. 
This prediction proves to be in line with most of the available empirical data. 
However, empirical studies have also observed a systematic raising of outside 
equity besides or before debt (as stressed by Fama/French, 2002), which strong-
ly contradicts the POT’s predictions. Thereby, our model does allow for a sub-
stantial enrichment of the POT’s hierarchy postulate, since the preceding anal-
ysis provides a clear rationale for suchlike behavior. In fact, the hierarchy pro-
posed by the present model can be considered to be less rigid compared to the 
POT. This circumstance is mainly driven by the adoption of a non-linear utility 
function, since otherwise results naturally tend towards corner solutions. In 
addition, it feels necessary to stress the fact that the disclosed results are 
tapped by using an approach which completely differs from the pecking order 
framework. While the insights of Myers/Majluf (1984) crucially rest upon the 
interrelation between informational costs and the corresponding respective fea-
tures of the disposable capital sources, the corporate financing mix as derived 
from our analysis directly depends on the interplay of individual characteristics 
of the decision maker and (perceived) environmental properties. Costs of infor-
mational asymmetries play no role in our setting. 
  
                                         
94  This assertion is especially true for continental European markets like Germany, which is 
confirmed by an empirical study by Hermanns (2006).  
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
A 4.1 Solving the differential terms in the three FOCs 
The FOCs are given by 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0. 
Since σW1D ൌ ϕTσ∏ , σΠؠσΠ(K), and KؠK(ϕ,α,Γ), we can rewrite FOC.1 as 
Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(TσΠ+ϕT(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂ϕ)) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ηϕT2σΠ2  ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂ϕ) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0  
Treating FOC.2 and FOC.3 analogously yields 
Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂α ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(ϕT(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂α)) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂α) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0 
Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(ϕT(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂Γ)) + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0 
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂Γ)) + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0 
Thereby, we now have 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = ∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ηϕT2σΠ2  ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂ϕ)  
+ (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0, 
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∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂α) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = ∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂Γ) + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
To rewrite these three equations as explicit functions of the decision variables, 
we need to solve the differential terms. We tackle this problem by first compu-
ting the three derivatives ∂μW1D/∂ϕ, ∂μW1D/∂α, and ∂μW1D/∂Γ.  
From (11), we have μW1D  = W0D + αW0Dr1 + (ϕ(μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T 
and σW1D  = ϕTσ∏ . Hence, 
∂μW1D/∂ϕ  = (μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ + ϕ(∂μ∏/∂ϕ))T   
=  (μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ + ϕ(∂K/∂ϕ)(∂μ∏/∂K))T, 
∂μW1D/∂α  = (r1+T)W0
D + ϕ(∂μ∏/∂α)T  
= (r1+T)W0
D + (∂K/∂α)(∂μ∏/∂K)ϕT, 
∂μW1D/∂Γ   =  (ԟ ϕ(1+r2) + ϕ(∂μ∏/∂Γ))T   
=  (ԟ (1+r2) + (∂K/∂Γ)(∂μ∏/∂K))ϕT.  
From (6), we can infer K = (1ԟα)W0D + Eex+ Γ = E + Γ= (1ԟα)W0D /ϕ + Γ. 
Hence,  
∂K/∂ϕ  =  (αԟ1)W0D/ϕ2 = ԟ(1ԟα)W0D/ϕ2 = ԟE/ϕ , 
∂K/∂α  =  ԟW0D/ϕ ,  
∂K/∂Γ  =  1. 
Further recalling the functional forms of μ∏ and  σ∏ as given by (18), i.e., 
μ∏=(1+μρ)K and  σ∏=σρK, the three focal derivatives display as 
∂μW1D/∂ϕ  = ((1+μρ)K ԟ (1+r2)Γ + ϕ(ԟE/ϕ)(1+μρ))T   
=  ((μρԟ r2)Γ + (1+μρ)E ԟ (1+μρ)E)T  
=  (μρԟ r2)ΓT. 
∂μW1D/∂α  = (r1+T)W0
D + (1+μρ)(ԟW0D/ϕ)ϕT 
= ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT. 
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∂μW1D/∂Γ   =  (ԟ(1+r2) + (1+μρ))ϕT  
=  (μρԟ r2)ϕT. 
Solving the remaining differential terms in the FOCs then yields 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηϕT2(σρK)2 ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K(ԟE/ϕ) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0 
= (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηϕT2(σρK)2 + ηϕT2σρ2KE) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0 
= (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηϕT2(σρK)2 + ηϕT2σρ2K(KԟΓ)) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0 
= (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηΓϕT2σρ2K + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0.  
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K (ԟW0D/ϕ) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0 
= ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT + ηW0DϕT2σρ2K + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0. 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηϕ2T2(σρK)σρ + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0 
= (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
Hence, from the nature of μW1D, σW1D, μ∏, and σ∏, the three FOCs indeed 
display as  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηΓϕT2σρ2K +(v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0DϕT2σρ2K + ( λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K + ( λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
FOC.1:  
FOC.2:  
FOC.3:  
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A 4.2 Formal discussion of the cases where r2T  < r1 and r2T = r1 
Proposition A4.1: Given our two basic assumptions μρ > r1/T and μρ > r2, 
simultaneous interior solutions for both α and Γ are possible if and only if  
r2T = r1. 
Proof: Considering [KT.3, … , KT.6], simultaneous interior solutions for both α and 
Γ, (i.e., the simultaneous validity of 0 < α < α and 0 < Γ < Γ) necessitate that the cor-
responding condition λ3=λ4=λ5=λ6=0 holds. Thereby, the reduced condition (19) can 
only be valid in one very particular case, namely if r2 ԟ r1/T = 0 holds.             ■ 
q.e.d. 
In this particular case, the decision maker assigns no definite preference hie-
rarchy to the two focal options. In other words, she is indifferent between in-
vesting her personal wealth into the firm or calling for corporate debt and per-
sonally investing into the risk-free asset. Analogous to the normal case, the in-
tuition behind this observation is perfectly evident, since with r2T = r1, the 
effective costs of debt do exactly outweigh D’s opportunity costs of personally 
investing into the firm. These opportunity costs are given by the return of the 
risk-free asset.  
Proposition A4.2: For r2T < r1, optimal solutions for α and Γ must fulfill 
i)  αכ = α  ר 0 < Γכ< Γ or 
ii)  αכ = α  ר Γכ= Γ or 
iii)  0 < αכ < α  ר Γכ= Γ,  or  
iv)  αכ = 0  ר Γכ= Γ.  
Proof: Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.1, the four cases are proved consecutively. 
i)  From KT.5 and KT.6, 0 < Γ < Γ implies λ5=λ6=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ3=0 and λ4= ԟ(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT > 0. 
From KT.4, a positive value of λ4 necessitates α=α, which proves the 
first part. 
ii)  From KT.3 and KT.4, α=α implies λ3=0 and λ4≥0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold in two cases, namely if either  
 λ4 = ԟ(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT > 0 and λ5=λ6=0 (which constitutes the 
case covered by the first part), or if 
 λ4+λ6W0D/ϕ = ԟ(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT > 0 and λ5=0 (which, from 
KT.6, implies Γ=Γ, thus proving the second part).  
iii)  From KT.3 and KT.4, 0 < α < α implies λ3=λ4=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ5=0 and λ6= ԟ(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT > 0. From 
KT.6, a positive value of λ6 necessitates Γ=Γ, which proves the third 
part.  
iv)  From KT.3 and KT.4, α=0 implies λ3≥0 and λ4=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ3-λ6W0
D/ϕ=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT < 0. Since 
(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0DT < 0, λ6 has to be positive, which, from KT.6, implies 
Γ=Γ. This proves the last part.                                                      ■ 
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Proposition A4.3: Suppose r2T < r1. In the optimum, the decision maker 
firstly calls for corporate debt before investing her personal wealth into the firm. 
Proof: Proposition A4.3 immediately follows from Proposition A4.2. 
For r2T < r1, D only invests into the firm if corporate debt is maximized (non-maximal 
αכ necessitates Γכ=Γ). As long as the corporate debt capacity is not attained, D will 
abstain from investing her personal wealth into the firm (non-maximal Γכ necessitates 
αכ= α). Hence, the decision maker firstly calls for corporate debt before investing her 
personal wealth into the firm (which is only done if the debt capacity (i.e., the maxi-
mum possible amount of debt) is not sufficient to meet her corporate investment objec-
tives).                                                                                                   ■ 
q.e.d. 
It is easy to see that, for r2T < r1, the exact reverse hierarchy compared to 
the normal case (as conveyed by Proposition 4.1) is adopted. Since the effective 
costs of debt are lower than D’s opportunity costs of personally investing into 
the firm (the return of the risk-free asset is relatively high), debt takes prece-
dence over D’s personal wealth to feed the firm’s stock of capital. In fact, the 
disposable amount of debt is sufficient to meet her corporate investment objec-
tive in cases i) and ii), contrary to cases iii) and iv), where the resulting “fi-
nancing gap” is (as good as possible) filled by investing part her personal 
wealth. Hence, the analysis of the reverse case to our normal case indeed follows 
in a symmetric manner. 
 
 
 
 FIVE 
THE ROLE OF FIXED COSTS 
 
 
5 The Role of Fixed Costs 
5.1 Preface  
So far, a heavily simplified profit function has been assumed where neither the 
demand nor the cost structure is made explicit. In particular, the adopted profit 
function implicitly supposes that there are no operative fixed costs. The results 
show that the leverage effect of fixed interest payments on debt heavily influ-
ences the adopted investing and financing behavior of the decision maker. 
Hence, it can be suspected that fixed payments that are not financial but opera-
tive may play an important role that has hitherto been neglected in the analy-
sis. 
5.2 Analysis  
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the role of fixed costs for the deci-
sion maker’s financial structure decision. In order to accurately isolate the pure 
effect, we still abstract from the demand properties and the according pricing 
decision. Thereby, the analysis can be conducted without either facing the addi-
tional complexity of a fourth decision variable (the price) or crafting a very 
narrow setting where the market price is exogenously fixed. A more sophisti-
cated definition of the firm’s profit as a function of costs, demand, and price is 
provided in the next chapter. 
Facing the same utility function and certainty equivalent as disclosed by 
(13) and (14), the Lagrangean of D’s optimization problem remains unchanged 
and still displays as 
CHAPTER 
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ࣦ = u(CE) + v(ϕ) + λ1(ϕ ԟ ϕ) + λ2(1 ԟ ϕ) + λ3α + λ4(α ԟ α) + λ5Γ + λ6(Γ ԟ Γ) 
with the corresponding set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
λ1(ϕ ԟ ϕ) = 0, (KT.01)
 λ2(1 ԟ ϕ) = 0, (KT.02)
λ3α = 0, (KT.03)
λ4(α ԟ α) = 0, (KT.04)
λ5Γ = 0, (KT.05)
 λ6(Γ ԟ Γ) = 0, (KT.06)
(ϕ ԟ ϕ) ≥ 0, (KT.07)
(1 ԟ ϕ) ≥ 0, (KT.08)
α ≥ 0, (KT.09)
(α ԟ α) ≥ 0, (KT.10)
Γ ≥ 0, (KT.11)
(Γ ԟ Γ) ≥ 0, (KT.12)
λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6 ≥ 0. (NNC) 
Given that the above Lagrangean is unchanged compared to the previous 
chapter, the general appearance of the three FOCs likewise remains identical, 
i.e., 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0. 
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5.2.1 The Profit Function 
As indicated above, the firm’s profit function still merely depends on K, but 
now fixed costs have to be considered, i.e., 
∏ = (1+ρ)K ԟ F. 
∏ is a Gaussian random variable with μ∏ = (1+μρ)K ԟ F and σ∏ = σρK. By 
substituting both into (10), firm profit displays as  
(25)  ∏ = μ∏ + σ∏z = (1+μρ)K ԟ F + (σρK)z . 
Similar to the preceding chapter, we can now solve the differential terms in the 
three FOCs. Considering the new profit function, we now obtain95  
FOC.1:  
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ FT ԟ ηΓϕK(σρT)2 + (v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.2:  
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0DϕK(σρT)2 + ( λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.3:  
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηK(σρϕT)2 + ( λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
5.2.2 The Decision Maker’s Preference Structure of Financing 
Similar to the preceding chapter, this subsection aims at examining the proper-
ties of the decision maker’s preference structure regarding her disposable fund-
ing sources by identifying the possible values of (ϕ, α, Γ) in the optimum. We 
continue supposing r2T > r1 to be the normal case, hence the effective costs of 
debt are higher than D’s opportunity costs of personally investing into the firm. 
Comparing the three FOCs with the last chapter where fixed costs where 
neglected, only FOC.1 has changed and comprises the additional term ԟ FT. 
Hence, since FOC.2 and FOC.3 remain unchanged, the presence of fixed costs 
                                         
95  See the appendix to this chapter (A 5.1) for the detailed calculus. 
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leaves unaffected the decision maker’s arbitration between α and Γ (which is 
governed by FOC.2 and FOC.3). The reduced condition (19) still holds, and the 
results outlined by Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.1 (Chapter 4) remain valid, 
i.e., D firstly invests her personal wealth into the firm before calling for corpo-
rate debt. As before, this is understandable, since with r2T > r1, the effective 
costs of debt are higher than D’s opportunity costs of personally investing her 
private wealth into the firm.  
However, the decision maker’s behavior concerning the raising of outside 
equity (which is governed by the changed FOC.1) is indeed affected. In order to 
subsequently examine this decision, we again delineate the possible values of ϕ 
in the optimum. Multiplying FOC.1 by ϕ and FOC.3 by Γ and then subse-
quently subtracting these new expressions and dividing by T yields the reduced 
condition 
(26) ԟ F + ϕ(v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/T ԟ Γ( λ5 ԟ λ6)/T = 0. 
By means of the reduced condition (26) (for which both ϕ and Γ are opti-
mized), the Proposition 5.1 is presented. 
Proposition 5.1: Suppose μρT > r2T > r1. In the optimum, there exists a solu-
tion for ϕ, which satisfies the following properties: 
i)  0 < αכ < α ר Γכ= 0  ר ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½, or  
ii)  αכ = 0 ר Γכ= 0  ר ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½, or 
iii)  αכ = 0 ר 0 < Γכ< Γ  ר ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½, or 
iv)  αכ = 0 ר Γכ= Γ ר ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ 1.  
Proof: Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.2, the feasible solutions of ϕ are deduced 
from the four cases as delineated by Lemma 4.1 in Chapter 4. 
i) + ii) For Γ=0, the condition (26) simplifies to ԟF+(v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/T = 0. From 
KT.2, this expression can only hold if v'(ϕ)>0 and λ2=0. Hence, ϕ can on-
ly take the unique value that satisfies (v'(ϕ) + λ1)/T =F. This unique val-
ue of ϕ must ensure that the expression (v'(ϕ) + λ1) is positive, which, 
from KT.1 and from the properties of v(ϕ), implies ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ ½. 
iii)  For 0 < Γ < Γ, KT.5 and KT.6 imply λ5=λ6=0. Hence, the reduced condi-
tion (26) simplifies to ԟF+(v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/T = 0. From KT.2, this expres-
sion can only hold if v'(ϕ)>0 and λ2= 0. Thereby, ϕ can only take the 
unique value that satisfies (v'(ϕ) + λ1)/T =F, which, from KT.1 and from 
the properties of v(ϕ), implies ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ ½. 
iv)  For Γ=Γ, KT.5 and KT.6 imply λ5=0 and λ6≥0. Hence, (26) simplifies to 
ԟF+(v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/T + Γλ6/T = 0. With a possibly positive λ6, the third 
term on the LHS of this expression ensures that the solution value of ϕ 
can be both, lower or higher than ½, hence ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ 1.                     ■ 
q.e.d. 
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It needs to be stressed that, unlike in the previous chapter, ϕכ now is per-
fectly identical throughout the first three cases, i.e., ϕכ always satisfies 
(v'(ϕכ) + λ1)/T =F. Since this solution is strictly unique, Proposition 5.1 reveals 
that, in the presence of fixed costs, the decision maker’s indifference regarding 
the amount of outside equity brought in by external investors in cases i) and ii) 
totally disappears. Moreover, the feasible domain of ϕכ is expanded below ½. 
These deviations are tightly interwoven with each other and result from a basic 
trade-off that the decision maker faces. This trade-off is rendered understanda-
ble by means of Proposition 5.2, which will be presented after the below-stated 
Lemma 5.1.  
Lemma 5.1: If fixed costs are 
൞
  low ( F < Γ(μρԟ  r2) )           
 balanced  ( F = Γ(μρԟ  r2) )
 high  ( F > Γ(μρԟ  r2) )       
ൢ, then ൞
  ∂μ
W1
D/∂ϕ > 0   
∂μ
W1
D/∂ϕ = 0 
 ∂μ
W1
D/∂ϕ < 0 
ൢ . 
Proof: From Appendix A 5.1, we know that ∂μW1D/∂ϕ =(μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ ԟ E(∂μ∏/∂K))T. 
From μ∏ = (1+μρ)K ԟ F, we derive ∂μ∏/∂K = 1+μρ. Hence, we obtain  
∂μW1D/∂ϕ  = ((1+μρ)K ԟ F ԟ (1+r2)Γ ԟ E(1+μρ))T, 
 = ((1+μρ)Γ ԟ F ԟ (1+r2)Γ)T, 
 = ((μρԟ  r2)Γ ԟ F)T. 
The RHS of this equation is positive (negative, zero) if F is smaller than (greater than, 
equal to) Γ(μρԟ  r2), which proves the statement.                                           ■ 
q.e.d. 
Lemma 5.1 paves the way for Proposition 5.2.  
Proposition 5.2: Consider cases i) and ii), where Γכ= 0. An additional unit of 
outside equity then strictly increases the decision maker’s expected income. 
Proof: With Γכ=0, Lemma 5.1 shows that a positive F implies ∂μW1D/∂ϕ < 0. Recalling 
that ϕ=W0
D/(E+Γ), we know that ϕ strictly decreases in the amount of outside equity, 
Hence, a negative ∂μW1D/∂ϕ implies that D’s marginal personal return of outside equity 
∂μW1D/∂E
ex is indeed positive, which proves the claim.                                        ■ 
q.e.d. 
As we can now see, the reason for the observed deviation from the previous 
chapter’s indifference result (as indicated by Proposition 4.2) are indeed the 
fixed costs, since, with a positive F, D’s marginal personal return of outside 
equity is positive as long as F > Γ(μρԟ  r2). Hence, increasing the amount of 
outside equity (by reducing ϕ) induces a positive wealth effect. With a “tradi-
tional” model approach, i.e., if no utility of corporate control had been consi-
dered, this operating leverage effect would yield a corner solution where owner-
ship concentration is minimized by incurring the maximum amount of outside 
then
then 
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equity (ϕכ= ϕ ). However, by considering the power-related utility component 
v(ϕ), reducing ϕ induces a negative power sharing effect on the decision maker’s 
utility function. In the optimum, D trades off the marginal utility gain of the 
wealth effect of outside equity against the marginal utility loss of its power 
sharing effect to attain a unique interior solution ϕכ for her optimal share of the 
firm’s total equity.  
From these considerations, a closer inspection of the optimality case iv) 
shall be conducted by means of Proposition 5.3. 
Proposition 5.3: Consider case iv), where Γכ= Γ and ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ 1. If  
 Γ < F/(μρԟ  r2),  then  ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½ ;  
 Γ > F/(μρԟ  r2),  then  ϕכ= 1;  
 Γ = F/(μρԟ  r2),  then  ½ < ϕכ ≤ 1. 
Proof: We proceed with the proof by focusing the outlined three cases. From Proposi-
tion 5.1, we know that case iv) implies Γכ= Γ. From Lemma 5.1, we further know that 
∂μW1D/∂ϕ = ((μρԟ  r2)Γ ԟ F)T. 
 For Γ < F/(μρԟ  r2), μW1D(ϕ) strictly decreases in ϕ (and has a maximum at 
ϕ =ϕ). The power curve ࣝ(ϕ) is strictly concave and increasing in ϕ for 
ϕ ≤ ϕ ≤ ½, and flat for ½ < ϕ ≤ 1. Hence, the aggregate curve μW1D(ϕ) + ࣝ(ϕ) 
has a unique maximum in the interval (½, 1] (see Figure 10). 
 For Γ > F/(μρԟ  r2), μW1D(ϕ) has a maximum at ϕ =1. The power curve ࣝ(ϕ) 
has a maximum throughout the whole interval (½, 1]. Hence, the aggregate 
curve μW1D(ϕ) + ࣝ(ϕ) has a unique maximum at ϕ =1 (see Figure 12). 
 For Γ = F/(μρԟ  r2), μW1D(ϕ) is flat. The power curve ࣝ(ϕ) has a maximum 
throughout the whole interval (½, 1]. Hence, the aggregate curve 
μW1D(ϕ) + ࣝ(ϕ) is also maximized throughout the whole interval (½, 1] (see 
Figure 11).                                                                                  ■ 
q.e.d. 
 Figure 10 gives a graphical representation of this trade-off and discloses ϕכ 
as the point where the decision maker’s aggregate benefit from wealth and con-
trol is maximized. 
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Figure 10: Trade-off wealth vs. power sharing for Γ < F/(μρԟ  r2). 
D’s personal marginal return of outside equity decreases in Γ and increases 
in F (since ∂μW1D/∂ϕ increases in Γ and decreases in F). With regard to Figure 
10, this means that a higher debt capacity (Γ ՛) rotates the wealth curve (since 
the slope ∂μW1D/∂ϕ becomes less negative, i.e., tends towards zero). Consequent-
ly, the solution ϕכ (i.e., the maximum of the aggregate curve) is gradually 
shifted to the right, i.e., the optimal amount of outside equity is gradually re-
duced. 
As soon as the wealth curve becomes horizontal (if the available amount of 
debt is high enough to guarantee that ∂μW1D/∂ϕ = 0), the indifference result 
concerning ϕכ is restored. This is depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
ϕכ ½
wealth,  
power 
ϕ 
μW1D(ϕ) 
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Figure 11: Trade-off wealth vs. power sharing for Γ = F/(μρԟ  r2). 
It is worth examining the limiting case of no fixed costs (Chapter 4) by 
means of the above figure. If F=0, the wealth curve is a constant of value zero, 
and the aggregate curve is equal to the power curve. Consequently, it is also 
maximized throughout the whole interval (½, 1], and the decision maker is 
completely indifferent concerning ϕכ in this interval – exactly as shown in 
Chapter 4. 
If the available debt capacity Γ gets even higher, the slope of the wealth 
curve becomes positive and the optimal solution of ϕ jumps to 1, which is now 
the unique maximum of the aggregate curve. This is depicted in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Trade-off wealth vs. power sharing for Γ > F/(μρԟ  r2). 
5.2.3 The Decision Maker’s Investment Objectives 
Conform to the previous chapter, we now examine D’s actual corporate invest-
ment objectives, i.e., her target levels of corporate investment.  
Cases i) and ii) 
We begin by treating the first two cases, where Γכ=0. As shown in these parts 
of Lemma 4.1 (Chapter 4), W0
D is sufficiently large to meet D’s corporate in-
vestment objectives without calling for any corporate debt. The proof of the 
first two cases in Lemma 4.1 has further disclosed that with 
i) λ5=(r2  ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT ר λ3=λ4=λ6=0, or with 
ii) λ3+λ5W0
D/ϕ =(r2ԟr1/T)ΩW0DT ר λ4=λ6=0, 
FOC.2 and FOC.3 simultaneously hold. Thus, in both cases, we are facing a 
system of only two equations. 
ϕכ=1 
wealth,  
power 
ϕ 
 
μW1D(ϕ)
ࣝ(ϕ)
ࣝ(ϕ) + μW1D(ϕ)
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Scrutinizing case i), where 0 < αכ < α and Γכ=0, we have  
FOC.1:  
ԟ F + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/ΩT = 0, and 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0DϕכT2σρ2K = 0. 
With ϕכK=(1ԟα*)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and Γכ=0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(27) (1ԟαכ)W0D = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2,  
which discloses the optimal amount of D’s personal wealth invested into the 
firm (LHS of the equation) and her maximum target level of corporate invest-
ment (RHS of the equation). D’s initial wealth W0
D is largely sufficient to reach 
this maximum target and allows for an investment of the excess amount αכW0D 
into the riskless alternative. 
Scrutinizing case ii), where αכ=Γכ= 0, we have  
FOC.1:  
ԟF+(v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0Dϕ*T2σρ2K ԟ λ3/Ω = 0. 
With ϕ*K=(1ԟαכ)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and αכ=Γכ=0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(28) W0
D = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2 ԟ λ3/ΩηW0DTσρ2, 
which discloses that D does not reach her target level, despite investing her 
full wealth into the firm in order to approach the maximum target as near as 
possible. The remaining difference between the maximum target level and D’s 
wealth endowment is given by λ3/ΩW0
DηT2g2σQ
2 , which evidently decreases if 
W0
D increases to approach the maximum target level from below. 
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In both case i) and ii), FOC.1 displays as ԟF+(v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0, 
which, as demonstrated by Proposition 5.1, implies 
ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½ 
for both cases. Hence, the decision maker raises outside equity until her 
utility gain from the corresponding wealth effect is exactly outweighed by her 
utility loss from the corresponding power sharing effect.  
Cases iii) and iv) 
We now treat the last two cases, where Γכ> 0. As shown in these parts of Lem-
ma 4.1, W0
D is not sufficiently large to meet D’s corporate investment objectives 
without calling for additional debt. The proof of the last two cases in Lemma 
4.1 has further disclosed that with 
iii) λ3=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D  ר λ4=λ5=λ6=0, or with 
iv) λ3ԟλ6W0D/ϕT=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D ר λ4=λ5=0, 
FOC.2 and FOC.3 simultaneously hold. Thus, we are again facing a system 
of only two equations. 
Scrutinizing case iii), where αכ= 0 and Γ > Γכ> 0, we have 
FOC.1:  
ԟFT + (μρԟ r2)ΓכT ԟ ηΓכϕכT2σρ2K + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
(μρԟ r2)ϕכT ԟ ηϕ*2T2σρ2K = 0.  
Knowing that ϕכK=(1ԟαכ)W0D+ϕכΓכ and αכ=0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(29) W0
D + ϕכΓכ = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2,  
which, considering that W0
D is fully invested into the firm, discloses the in-
curred level of corporate debt (Γ) in order to reach the minimum target level of 
corporate investment (RHS of the equation). 
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Substituting FOC.2/3 into FOC.1 yields the well-known expression 
ԟF +(v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/ΩT = 0, which implies that the unique solution value of 
ϕ must satisfy  
ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½. 
Contrary to the previous simplified analysis, the presence of fixed costs en-
sures that there now is a unique pair of values (ϕכ, Γכ) which satisfies the two 
optimality conditions. Similar to the former results, the financing gap is accor-
dingly filled by ϕכΓכ. Hence, as long as the debt capacity Γ is sufficiently great 
to guarantee Γ > Γכ> 0, the disclosed result holds.  
Scrutinizing case iv), where αכ= 0 and Γ*= Γ, we have 
FOC.1:  
ԟFT + (μρԟ r2)ΓכT ԟ ηΓכϕכT2σρ2K + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
 (μρԟ r2)ϕכT ԟ ηϕכ2T2σρ2K ԟ λ6/Ω = 0.  
Knowing that ϕכK=(1ԟα)W0D+ϕכΓכ, αכ=0, and Γכ=Γ, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(30) W0
D + ϕכΓ = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2 ԟ λ6/ΩϕכηT2σρ2.  
which discloses that D invests her full wealth into the firm and uses the full 
debt capacity in order to either reach her minimum target or to approach it as 
near as possible. However, for Γכ=Γ, Proposition 5.1 has shown that ϕכ can be 
both lower or higher than ½ in the optimum. It has further been shown that 
the value of ϕכ crucially depends on the relative size of the debt capacity com-
pared to the fixed costs. If the debt capacity is relatively low compared to the 
fixed costs (i.e., if Γ < F/(μρԟ  r2) holds), the decision maker raises considerable 
amounts of outside equity (ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½) in order to fill the financing gap and to 
balance her utility gains from its corresponding positive wealth effect against 
her utility losses from its corresponding negative power sharing effect (see Fig-
ure 10). If the debt capacity is relatively high compared to the fixed costs 
(Γ > F/(μρԟ  r2)), she raises no outside equity (ϕכ= 1) in order to avoid its neg-
ative wealth effect (see Figure 12). Values of ϕכ between ½ and 1 are only poss-
ible in the very special case where Γ = F/(μρԟ  r2) holds (see Figure 11). 
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Generally encompassing all four basic cases, the decision maker’s target levels 
(as given by the right-hand sides of the equations (27) and (29)) are increasing 
in μρ and decreasing in both σQ
2  and η. Hence, the comparative statics results as 
derived from the simplified profit function still hold when assuming fixed costs. 
The decision maker’s investment objectives still become more ambitious with 
improving average environmental states, decreasing demand volatility, and de-
creasing risk aversion.  
5.2.4 The summarized Pattern of Investing and Financing 
As has been shown, in the presence of fixed costs the minimum and maximum 
target level of corporate investment are still given by 
 TLMax = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2 , and 
 TLMin = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2. 
There are again four possible cases. 
i)  if  W0
D > TLMax,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½ , satisfying ԟF+ (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0, 
  αכ> 0, satisfying (1ԟαכ)W0D = TLMax, 
  Γכ = 0 ,  
  Kכ = TLMax/ϕכ.  
D’s private wealth is sufficiently large to meet her corporate investment ob-
jectives, i.e., it exceeds her maximum target level of corporate investment. 
Hence, she incurs no corporate debt and divides her personal investment be-
tween the firm’s stock of capital and the riskless alternative. The decision mak-
er raises outside equity in order to balance her utility gains from the corres-
ponding wealth effect against her utility losses from the corresponding power 
sharing effect. 
ii)  if  TLMin < W0D ≤ TLMax, 
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½ , satisfying ԟF+ (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0, 
  αכ= 0, 
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  Γכ= 0 , 
  Kכ= (TLMax ԟ λ3/ΩηW0DTσρ2)/ϕכ. 
D’s private wealth is sufficiently large to meet her minimum target level of 
corporate investment, but smaller than her maximum target level. Hence, she 
incurs no corporate debt and invests her full personal wealth into the firm in 
order to reach the best possible rapprochement towards her maximum target 
level. The decision maker raises outside equity in order to balance her utility 
gains from the corresponding wealth effect against her utility losses from the 
corresponding power sharing effect. 
iii)  if  W0
D ≤ TLMin ≤ W0D + Γ ,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ≤ ½, satisfying ԟF+(v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
  αכ= 0,  
  Γ ≥ Γכ= (TLMin ԟW0D)/ϕכ,  
  Kכ= TLMin/ϕכ.  
D’s private wealth is too small to meet her minimum target level of corpo-
rate investment. Hence, she invests her full personal wealth into the firm’s stock 
of capital and incurs supplementary corporate debt in order to reach this mini-
mum target level (filling the financing gap). The decision maker raises outside 
equity in order to balance her utility gains from the corresponding wealth effect 
against her utility losses from the corresponding power sharing effect. 
iv)  if  W0
D + Γ < TLMin,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½ if  Γ < F/(μρԟ  r2), 
ϕכ= 1 if Γ > F/(μρԟ  r2), 
½ < ϕכ ≤ 1 if Γ = F/(μρԟ  r2), 
  satisfying  ԟF + (μρԟ r2)Γכ ԟ ηΓכϕכTσρ2K + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0. 
  αכ= 0, 
  Γכ = Γ, 
  Kכ= (TLMin ԟ λ6/ΩϕכηT2σρ2)/ϕכ.  
The sum of D’s private wealth and the debt capacity is not sufficient to 
meet her minimum target level of corporate investment. Hence, the decision 
maker invests her full personal wealth into the firm’s stock of capital and incurs 
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the maximum amount of corporate debt in order to approach the minimum 
target as near as possible. If the debt capacity is relatively low compared to the 
fixed costs, D raises considerable amounts of outside equity (ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½) in 
order to balance her utility gains from its (correspondingly positive) wealth ef-
fect against her utility losses from its negative power sharing effect. If the debt 
capacity is relatively high compared to the fixed costs, she raises no outside 
equity (ϕכ= 1) in order to avoid its (correspondingly negative) wealth effect. 
Similar to the previous chapter, Figure 13 depicts the properties of (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) 
throughout the four cases. It gives a graphical representation of the three deci-
sion variables’ possible values in the optimum, contingent on the level of the 
decision maker’s initial wealth W0
D. 
 
Figure 13: Properties of (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) in the presence of fixed costs. 
The right solid vertical line which separates the cases i) and ii) represents 
the decision maker’s maximum target level TLMax = (μρԟ r1/T)/ηTσρ2. For all 
values of W0
D which exceed this level, D’s private wealth is sufficient to meet 
her corporate investment objectives. Hence, case i) holds.  
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The central solid vertical line which separates the cases ii) and iii) 
represents the minimum target level TLMin = (μρԟ r2)/ηTσρ2. For all values of 
W0
D which lie between both target levels, D’s private wealth is only sufficient to 
meet her minimum, but not her maximum target level of corporate investment. 
Hence, case ii) holds. 
The left solid vertical line which separates the cases iii) and iv) represents 
the wealth level TLMin ԟ ߁, from where on the given debt capacity ߁ is sufficient 
to close the financing gap. For all values of W0
D which exceed this level, her 
wealth allows for a complete filling of the financing gap by taking on debt to 
satisfy Equation (29). Hence, case iii) holds. For all values of W0
D which fall 
short of this level, D exhausts the full debt capacity in order to approach her 
minimum target level as good as possible. Hence, case iv) holds.  
As a major deviation from our findings in the previous Chapter, the value 
of ϕכ is now independent from the decision maker’s initial wealth. Propositions 
5.1 and 5.3, have disclosed that ϕכ has an identical value somewhere between ϕ 
and ½ in the cases i), ii), and iii), while it depends on the size of available debt 
capacity in case iv). This dependence is quite sophisticated and does not allow 
for a comprehensive depiction of ϕכ in case iv) in the above Figure 13. It is 
therefore illustrated by means of the separate Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14: Relationship between ϕכ and Γ in case iv). 
 
Γ 
0
ϕ* 
½ 
ϕ
1 
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Figure 14 illustrates that ϕכ gradually approaches ½ as long as the debt 
capacity is relatively low (i.e., below F/(μρԟ  r2)). For a higher debt capacity, ϕכ 
is strictly equal to unity and D holds full ownership. The very special case 
where the debt capacity exactly equals F/(μρԟ  r2) induces an ambiguous value 
of ϕכ between ½ and unity.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In order to account for the effects of fixed charges besides the due interest pay-
ments on the corporate debt, this chapter introduced operative fixed costs into 
the profit function. The disclosed pattern of investing and financing is largely 
conform to the simplified scenario examined in the previous chapter. Again, 
case-contingent interior solutions were obtained so that marginal costs and 
marginal benefits are balanced.  
The main deviation induced by the introduction of fixed costs is the fact 
that, except for the very special case Γ = F/(μρԟ  r2), ϕכ now has a strictly 
unique value throughout the four cases. The interior solution ϕכ (where the 
positive wealth effect and the negative power sharing effect of outside equity are 
balanced) has a unique value somewhere in the domain [ϕ, ½] for cases i), ii), 
and iii)). For case iv), ϕכ lies either in the interval ( ϕ, ½) or is strictly equal to 
unity, contingent on whether the debt capacity is lower or higher than 
F/(μρԟ  r2), In the absence of fixed costs (F=0), the indifference result of the 
previous chapter is restored. 
Compared to the previous chapter, the corporate investment objectives are 
not only contingent on the decision maker’s subjective beliefs (via μρ and σρ
2), 
her risk sensitivity (via η), and exogenous institutional parameters (via r1, r2, 
and T), but also on the actual characteristics of her utility component v(ϕ) 
(since, v'(ϕכ) can now become different from zero). The stronger the curvature 
of v(ϕ) (i.e, the lower v''(ϕ)), the higher will be the ownership concentration and 
the lower will be the amount of outside equity in the firm’s stock of capital.  
Given that the decision maker’s investment objectives remain substantially 
unchanged, the comparative statics results as deduced in Chapter 4 also remain 
valid. The general results of this chapter reinforce the claim that our findings 
differ from the POT’s assertions in that they allow for an explanation of syste-
matic incurring of outside equity besides or even before debt, which is largely 
supported by empirical observations. In this respect, the incremental contribu-
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tion of the present chapter consists in the precise outline of the conditions un-
der which outside equity is incurred (or not), and the disclosure of the non-
trivial driving mechanism that underlies the resulting ownership concentration 
in the optimum. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
A 5.1: Solving the differential terms in the three FOCs 
The FOCs are given by 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0. 
Since σW1D  = ϕTσ∏ , σΠؠσΠ(K), and KؠK(ϕ,α,Γ), we can rewrite FOC.1 as 
Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(TσΠ+ϕT(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂ϕ)) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ηϕT2σΠ2  ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂ϕ) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0  
Treating FOC.2 and FOC.3 analogously yields 
Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂α ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(ϕT(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂α)) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂α) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0  
Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ η(ϕTσΠ)(ϕT(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂Γ)) + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0  
⇔  ∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂Γ)) + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0  
Thereby, we now have 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = ∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ηϕT2σΠ2  ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂ϕ)  
+ (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0, 
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∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂α) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = ∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂K)(∂K/∂Γ) + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
To rewrite these three equations as explicit functions of the decision variables, 
we need to solve the differential terms. We tackle this problem by first compu-
ting the three derivatives ∂μW1D/∂ϕ, ∂μW1D/∂α, and ∂μW1D/∂Γ.  
From (11), we have μW1D  = W0D + αW0Dr1 + (ϕ(μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ) ԟ (1ԟα)W0D)T 
and σW1D  = ϕTσ∏ . Hence, 
∂μW1D/∂ϕ  = (μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ + ϕ(∂μ∏/∂ϕ))T  
=  (μ∏ ԟ (1+r2)Γ + ϕ(∂K/∂ϕ)(∂μ∏/∂K))T, 
∂μW1D/∂α  = (r1+T)W0
D + ϕ(∂μ∏/∂α)T  
= (r1+T)W0
D + (∂K/∂α)(∂μ∏/∂K)ϕT, 
∂μW1D/∂Γ  =  (ԟ ϕ(1+r2) + ϕ(∂μ∏/∂Γ))T  
=  (ԟ (1+r2) + (∂K/∂Γ)(∂μ∏/∂K))ϕT.  
From (6), we can infer K = (1ԟα)W0D + Eex+ Γ = E + Γ= (1ԟα)W0D/ϕ + Γ. 
Hence,  
∂K/∂ϕ  =  (αԟ1)W0D/ϕ2 = ԟ(1ԟα)W0D/ϕ2 = ԟE/ϕ , 
∂K/∂α  =  ԟW0D/ϕ ,  
∂K/∂Γ  =  1. 
Further recalling the functional forms of μ∏ and  σ∏ as given by (25), i.e., 
μ∏=(1+μρ)K ԟ F and  σ∏=σρK, the three focal derivatives display as 
∂μW1D/∂ϕ  = ((1+μρ)K ԟ F ԟ (1+r2)Γ + ϕ(ԟE/ϕ)(1+μρ))T  
=  ((μρԟ r2)Γ ԟ F + (1+μρ)E ԟ (1+μρ)E)T  
=  ((μρԟ r2)Γ ԟ F)T. 
∂μW1D/∂α  = (r1+T)W0
D + (1+μρ)(ԟW0D/ϕ)ϕT 
= ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT. 
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∂μW1D/∂Γ  =  (ԟ(1+r2) + (1+μρ))ϕT  
=  (μρԟ r2)ϕT. 
Solving the remaining differential terms in the FOCs then yields 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = ((μρԟ r2)Γ ԟ F)T ԟ ηϕT2(σρK)2 ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K(ԟE/ϕ) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0 
= ԟ FT + (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηϕT2(σρK)2 + ηϕT2σρ2KE) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0 
= ԟ FT + (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηϕT2(σρK)2 + ηϕT2σρ2K(KԟΓ)) + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0 
= ԟ FT + (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηΓϕT2σρ2K + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/Ω = 0.  
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K (ԟW0D/ϕ) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0 
= ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT + ηW0DϕT2σρ2K + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0. 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηϕ2T2(σρK)σρ + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0 
= (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
Hence, from the nature of μW1D, σW1D, μ∏, and σ∏, the three FOCs indeed 
display as  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = ԟ FT + (μρԟ r2)ΓT ԟ ηΓϕT2σρ2K +(v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2)/Ω = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = ԟ(μρԟ r1/T)W0DT ԟ ηW0DϕT2σρ2K + ( λ3 ԟ λ4)/Ω = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = (μρԟ r2)ϕT ԟ ηϕ2T2σρ2K + ( λ5 ԟ λ6)/Ω = 0. 
FOC.1:  
FOC.2:  
FOC.3:  
 SIX 
THE FIRM AS A MONOPOLIST 
 
 
6 The Firm as a Monopolist 
6.1 Preface  
This chapter aims at transferring the analytical frame into the market con-
text, and to delineate the focal firm’s investment and financing decisions in the 
monopoly case. This aim necessitates a more sophisticated definition of the 
firm’s profit as a function of costs, demand and price. Our basic model premises 
(A1) ԟ (A5) still hold. 
An augmentation in the firm’s stock of capital is supposed to diminish mar-
ginal costs. Hence, the adopted financial structure exhibits a direct relation 
with the firm’s capacities of producing and operating on the market.  
We continue supposing that D has subjective beliefs regarding the probabil-
ity distribution of future firm profits. In this respect, we presume that D’s ma-
jor difficulty resides in her endeavor to accurately estimate the demand charac-
teristics. Hence, rather than being interpreted as an unspecified environmental 
parameter, the stochastic variable which enters the model is now explicitly de-
fined as the demand.  
The firm has monopolistic price-setting power. Consequently, the decision 
maker is able to influence the demand by virtue of her pricing decision. Hence, 
our model is extended by means of an additional decision variable that D has at 
her disposal. End-of-period cash flows are now not only governed by the well-
known vector (ϕ, α, Γ), but additionally by the market price, denoted by the 
new decision variable p. 
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6.2 Analysis 
We consider the case where firm profit is given as an explicit function of the 
corresponding revenue and cost structure. The firm conducts monopolistic pric-
ing decisions. Hence, price is now transformed into an endogenous variable 
which enters the profit function.  
We adopt a classic model of uniform pricing, where the firm faces a stan-
dard downward-sloping linear demand curve. The firm charges one identical 
price to all customers and allows them to order any amounts at this price. Pro-
duction then takes place according to the actual demand induced by the an-
nounced price. From our general model setup, D’s final wealth and utility func-
tion are still given by (9) and (13) respectively. 
6.2.1 The Solution Approach 
Having price setting power, the decision maker’s optimization problem is ex-
panded by one additional decision variable, namely the price p. Hence, the new 
Lagrangean exhibits an additional set of constraints concerning p and now dis-
plays as  
ࣦ = U(CE) + v(ϕ)+ λ1(ϕ ԟ ϕ) + λ2(1 ԟ ϕ) + λ3α + λ4(α ԟ α) + λ5Γ + λ6(Γ ԟ Γ) 
+ λ7(p ԟ p ), 
subject to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions  
λ1(ϕ ԟ ϕ) = 0, (KT.01)  
λ2(1 ԟ ϕ) = 0, (KT.02)  
λ3α = 0, (KT.03)  
λ4(α ԟ α) = 0, (KT.04)  
λ5Γ = 0, (KT.05)  
λ6(Γ ԟ Γ) = 0, (KT.06)  
λ7(p ԟ p ) = 0, (KT.07)  
(ϕ ԟ ϕ) ≥ 0, (KT.08)  
(1 ԟ ϕ) ≥ 0, (KT.09)  
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α ≥ 0, (KT.10)  
(α ԟ α) ≥ 0, (KT.11)  
Γ ≥ 0, (KT.12)  
(Γ ԟ Γ) ≥ 0, (KT.13)  
(p ԟ p) ≥ 0, (KT.14)  
λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6, λ7 ≥ 0. (NNC)   
We suppose p = c to exclude negative marginal returns, i.e., to make sure 
that (p ԟ c)≥ 0  ∀K.  
Partially differentiating ࣦ with respect to (ϕ, α, Γ, p) yields the same three 
FOCs as in the previous chapter, but supplemented by a fourth one: 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂p
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂p ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂p)) + λ7 = 0. 
6.2.2 The Profit Function 
Since W1
D is a function of ∏, we need to make explicit the new profit function 
in order to proceed further. As stressed above, firm profit now depends on the 
exogenous market price p, the stochastic demand Q, and on the cost function 
C. Costs are in turn depending on Q and on the investment level K, i.e.,  
C(Q, K) = F + c(K)Q, 
where F and c(K) represent fixed costs and marginal costs respectively. Hence, 
the firm’s profit function is given by 
∏ = (pԟc)Q ԟ F, 
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where the demand Q ׽ ࣨ(μQ,σQ2 ) is a Gaussian random variable which can 
accordingly be expressed as  
Q = μQ + σQz. 
Thereby, its linear transformation ∏ is also a Gaussian random variable 
with μ∏ = (pԟc)μQ  ԟ F and σ∏ =(pԟc)σQ. By substituting both into (10), firm 
profit displays as 
(31)  ∏ = μ∏ + σ∏z = (pԟc)μQ ԟ F + ((pԟc)σQ)z.  
6.2.3 The Marginal Cost Function  
With c merely depending on the investment level K and constant F, the cost 
function C(Q, K) = F + c(K)Q discloses that marginal costs are constant in 
quantity. Hence, marginal costs constitute a limit which the unit costs 
AC = C/Q asymptotically approach from above, i.e.,  
lim
Q→∞
AC  = c(K). 
By adjusting the investment level K via (ϕ, α, Γ), the decision maker is able 
to determine the actual value of this limit, i.e., an augmentation in the firm’s 
stock of capital diminishes marginal costs.  
Considering that K ∈ [K, K],96 and supposing that the corresponding upper 
bound K is sufficiently small,97 the marginal cost function can be linearly ap-
proximated by 
c(K) = f ԟ gK.  
6.2.4 The Demand Function  
∏ is a function of the demand Q, which in turn is a function of the market price 
p. Since p is an endogenous variable, we need to make explicit Q(p) in order to 
proceed further. Q is a Gaussian random variable which can be expressed as 
                                         
96  We know that K=(1ԟα)W0D/ϕ +Γ. Hence, K ∈ [K, K]ؠ[(1ԟα)W0D, W0D/ϕ+Γ ]. 
97  To exclude negative marginal costs, we assume the relation K < f/g  to be fulfilled. 
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Q = μQ + σQz. 
As it is standard in the pertinent literature, we assume μQ to linearly de-
crease in the market price, i.e.,  
(32)  μQ= a ԟ bp , 
with a, b > 0. The dispersion parameter σQ in contrast is supposed to be in-
dependent from p. Hence, the demand function displays as 
(33)  Q(p) = a ԟ bp + σQz . 
It is easy to see that the stochastic nature of the market demand is modeled 
by means of (a + σQz), which indicates the demand that realizes for p=0 and 
which will be henceforth tagged as the potential demand. Hence, the random 
component within the demand function is additive and merely affects the po-
tential demand (which deviates from its mean value a by the normally distri-
buted offset σQz). In contrast, the price-sensitivity of the demand function (as 
measured by the slope b) is unaffected by risk. 
 
Figure 15: Properties of the demand curve. 
a + σQz ԟ bp   
(for a realiza-
tion z''' < 0) 
a + σQz ԟ bp
(for a realization z'' > 0) 
a + σQz ԟ bp 
(for the realization z' = 0) 
Q 
p 
a  
σQz'' 
σQz''' 
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Similar to the preceding two chapters, we can now solve98 the differential terms 
in the four FOCs to obtain 
FOC.1:  
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = (pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ (1+r2)Γ ԟ E((gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g) 
 + ( v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2:  
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = (1+r1/T) ԟ (gμQ) + ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/ΩW0DT = 0, 
FOC.3:  
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = ԟ(1+r2) + (gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/ΩϕT = 0, 
FOC.4:  
∂ࣦ
∂p
 = ԟb(pԟc) + μQ ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) + λ7/ΩϕT = 0. 
6.2.5 The Decision Maker’s Preference Structure of Financing 
Similar to the preceding chapters, this subsection aims at examining the deci-
sion maker’s arbitration between inside equity (i.e., her personal investment 
into the firm) and the incurred level of corporate debt. 
We continue supposing r2T > r1, hence the effective costs of debt are higher 
than D’s opportunity costs of personally investing into the firm. The expected 
profit per unit of capital employed is also assumed to exceed the due reim-
bursement per unit of debt employed. Thereby, our basic assumptions display 
as  
μ∏/K > 1+r2 > 1+r1/T. 
Most notably, the satisfaction of these basic conditions assures the decision 
maker’s participation in the firm (since returns generated by the firm exceed 
the riskless asset’s return) and gives rise to the leverage effect (since the firm’s 
return on capital exceeds the due coupon payment). 
                                         
98  See the appendix to this chapter (Appendix A 6.1) for the calculus. 
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To explore D’s arbitration between inside equity (governed by α) and the 
incurred level of corporate debt (governed by Γ), we have to examine the condi-
tions under which FOC.2 and FOC.3 hold simultaneously. Adding up both equ-
ations yields the reduced condition  
(34) ԟ(r2 ԟ r1/T) + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/ΩW0D + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/ΩϕT = 0.  
By means of this reduced condition (for which both α and Γ are optimized), 
Lemma 6.1 is presented in order to facilitate the subsequent proof of Proposi-
tion 6.1. 
Lemma 6.1: For μ∏/K > 1+r2 > 1+r1/T , optimal solutions for α and Γ must 
fulfill  
i)  0 < αכ < α ר Γכ= 0 ,  or  
ii)  αכ = 0 ר Γכ= 0 , or 
iii)  αכ = 0 ר 0 < Γכ< Γ , or 
iv)  αכ = 0 ר Γכ= Γ .  
Proof: The four cases are proved consecutively.  
i)  From KT.3 and KT.4, 0 < α < α implies λ3=λ4=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ5=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT>0 and λ6=0. From 
KT.5, a positive value of λ5 necessitates Γ=0, which proves case i). 
ii)  From KT.5 and KT.6, Γ=0 implies λ5≥0 and λ6=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold in two cases, namely if either  
 λ5=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT>0 and λ3=λ4=0 (which constitutes the case 
covered by the first part of Lemma 6.1), or if  
 λ3+λ5W0D/ϕT = (r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D > 0 and λ4=0 (which, from 
KT.3, implies α=0, thus proving case ii).  
iii)  From KT.5 and KT.6, 0 < Γ < Γ implies λ5=λ6=0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ3=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D > 0 and λ4=0. From 
KT.3, a positive value of λ3 necessitates α=0, which proves case iii). 
iv)  From KT.5 and KT.6, Γ=Γ implies λ5=0 and λ6≥0. Hence, the reduced 
condition (19) can only hold if λ3ԟλ6W0D/ϕT=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D > 0. Thus, 
λ3 can only be positive, which, from KT.3, implies α=0. This proves case 
iv).                                                                                         ■ 
q.e.d. 
The decision maker’s preference structure regarding inside equity and debt 
directly follows from Lemma 6.1. 
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Proposition 6.1: For μ∏/K > 1+r2 > 1+r1/T, the decision maker firstly in-
vests her personal wealth into the firm before calling for corporate debt.  
Proof: D only invests into the risk-free asset if no corporate debt is incurred (positive 
α* necessitates Γכ=0). Furthermore, corporate debt is only incurred if D’s personal in-
vestment into the firm is maximized (positive Γכ necessitates α*=0). This structure can 
only exist if the decision maker firstly invests her personal wealth into the firm before 
calling for debt (which is only incurred if D’s personal wealth is not sufficient to meet 
her corporate investment objectives).                                                          ■ 
q.e.d. 
Hence, the new profit function has no impact on D’s preference hierarchy 
concerning inside equity and corporate debt. With r2T > r1, the effective costs 
of debt are higher than D’s opportunity costs of personally investing her private 
wealth into the firm.  
Since the new decision variable p has to be considered in this chapter, we pro-
ceed by first examining D’s behavior in terms of pricing (section 6.2.6). We 
then scrutinize the raising of outside equity and the resulting ownership concen-
tration (section 6.2.7). The decision maker’s corporate investment objectives are 
examined in section 6.2.8. 
6.2.6 The Decision Maker’s Pricing Behavior 
To explore D’s behavior in terms of pricing, we scrutinize the new FOC.4, 
which displays as  
FOC.4: 
ԟb(pԟc) + μQ ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) + λ7/ΩϕT = 0. 
By inspecting the case-contingent basic shape of the FOCs,99 we infer that, 
in the optimum,  
(35)  μQԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) = 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ݅݅݅
݅݅݅
݅ݒ
                                                                                         ..    
In order to condense the subsequent analytical procedure and to ease the 
algebraical exposure, we make use of the following definition. 
                                         
99  See subsection 6.2.8 with the respective derivation of FOC.2/3 throughout the corres-
ponding appendices (A 6.3 and A 6.4). 
(1+r1/T)/g, if case i) holds 
((1+r1/T) + λ3/ΩW0
DT)/g,  if case ii) holds 
(1+r2)/g, if case iii) holds 
((1+r2) +λ6/ΩϕT )/g, if case iv) holds 
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Definition 6.1: Denote by (ं, ℓ) the two values which satisfy 
ं =  ൜ r1/T    in cases i) and ii)      r2        in cases iii) and iv)     and   ℓ = ቐ
 0                      in case i) and iii) 
λ3/ΩW0
DT    in case ii)                
λ6/ΩϕT        in case iv)               
. 
By virtue of (35) and Definition 6.1, we can generally state that, in the op-
timum, 
(36)   μQԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) = ((1+ं)+ℓ)/g , 
and we can further express FOC.4 in its general form which covers all four 
cases, i.e.,  
(37)  ԟb(pԟc) + ((1+ं)+ℓ)/g + λ7/ΩϕT = 0. 
Lemma 6.1: In the optimum, the price strictly exceeds its lower bound, i.e., 
pכ > p = c. 
Proof: In order to fulfill FOC.4, the first term in (37) must be negative. With p = p, 
Equation (37) displays as 
ԟb(pԟc) + ((1+ं)+ℓ)/g + λ7/ΩϕT = 0. 
Since (pԟc) ≤ 0 , the first term of the above equation can only be positive or zero. 
Hence, (37) cannot be fulfilled for p = p but instead requires p > p.                    ■ 
q.e.d. 
It is easy to understand that, since there are fixed costs to be recovered, the 
contribution margin has to be strictly positive in order to avoid negative prof-
its. As a consequence, given that pכ>p, KT.7 implies λ7=0 in the optimum. 
Hence, the general form of FOC.4 simplifies to 
(38) ԟb(pԟc) + ((1+ं)+ℓ)/g = 0.  
By means of (38), the actual price in the optimum expressed as the sum of 
the marginal costs and the contribution margin can now be easily determined. 
Proposition 6.2: In the optimum, the price and marginal costs must fulfill 
(39)  pכ = cכ + (1+ं+ℓ)/bg  
Proof: Algebraically solving (38) for p yields the above expression.                   ■ 
q.e.d. 
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The contribution margin is given by (1+ं+ℓ)/bg. It decreases in both the 
price-sensitivity of the demand (measured by the parameter b) and the capital-
sensitivity of the marginal costs (measured by the parameter g). The signific-
ance of b proves to be particularly interesting. As b increases, consumers react 
more sensitive to price changes and the optimal price accordingly decreases to 
finally converge against the marginal cost level for b → ∞.100 This result yields 
a valuable insight into the decision maker’s pricing decision, since it shows how 
the mark-up chosen in the optimum is crucially depending on the exogenous 
parameter b. Further inspection of (35) and Definition 6.1 reveals that the op-
timal price negatively depends on the demand volatility and on the degree of 
D’s risk aversion. Evidently, this effect of σQ
2  and η strictly decreases in b.  
Moreover, Equation (38) also allows the deduction of the demand as ex-
pected by the decision maker in the optimum.  
Proposition 6.3: The decision maker’s expected demand in the optimum is 
given by 
(40) μQ
כ = (1 + ηϕכTσQ2 /b) ((1+ं+ℓ)/g). 
Proof: Consider the decision maker’s choices in the optimum. From Equation (36), we 
know that ((1+ं)+ℓ)/g = μQԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc). From Equation (38), we further infer that 
(pԟc) = ԟ((1+ं)+ℓ)/bg . Substituting these two equations into (38) and subsequently 
solving for μQ then yields μQ = (1 + ηϕTσQ2 /b) ((1+ं+ℓ)/g).                            ■ 
q.e.d. 
Evidently, the expected demand as disclosed by (40) is induced by D’s op-
timal choices concerning her decision variables (which are of course interdepen-
dent). Hence, since the expected demand in the optimum depends on the chosen 
investment level Kכ,101 the decision maker adjusts her decision variables to cali-
brate her expected demand according to Equation (40). 
Moreover, similar to Proposition 6.2, the above-stated Proposition 6.3 
plainly reveals the significance of the price-sensitivity of the consumer demand. 
If the demand becomes steeper (the slope b increases), the expected demand in 
the optimum accordingly decreases and converges against (1+ं+ℓ)/g for 
b → ∞.  
Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 give rise to an interesting corollary:  
                                         
100  Correspondingly, the optimality condition (39) would change to pכ؄ cכ. 
101  The higher the overall firm investment K, the lower the marginal cost level. The lower 
marginal costs, the lower the optimal monopoly price (for a given corresponding mark-
up). Consequently, given that demand is downward sloping in p, the expected demand in 
the optimum positively depends on the chosen investment level. 
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Corollary 6.1: The greater the price-sensitivity of the consumers, the lower will 
be the general impact of  
 the decision maker’s risk aversion, 
 the demand volatility that the decision maker anticipates ex ante. 
Hence, a high price sensitivity of demand interestingly reduces the impact 
of risk on D’s optimal choices. In the limit, the impact of risk is totally neutra-
lized, i.e., b → ∞ has the same effect as if D would approach risk-neutrality 
(η → 0).102  
This observation constitutes an important deviation from the results de-
rived in Chapter 5. It obtains as a direct consequence of monopoly case, i.e., the 
decision maker’s ability to freely determine the market price. It is a well estab-
lished finding, that the size of a monopolist’s optimal contribution margin nega-
tively depends on the price-sensitivity of the demand curve.103 The more sensi-
tive demand is reacting to price changes, the greater is the relative size of the 
volume effect compared to the price effect. 
The decision maker faces the following trade-off. By decreasing price and, 
thereby, increasing the quantity sold, firm revenue is augmented due to addi-
tional sales (positive volume effect), but also diminished due to the lower price 
paid by already existing buyers (negative price effect). This trade-off induces 
the decision maker to choose a price level that maximizes the sum of both ef-
fects. This maximum is crucially depending on the slope of the demand curve, 
i.e., it strictly decreases in b. The classical way to formally operationalize this 
relationship is to examine the Lerner Index as a measure of the contribution 
margin in the optimum (relative to the price). In fact, it is straightforward to 
show that the Lerner Index indeed negatively depends on the slope of the de-
mand curve.104 Since, contrary to the scenarios examined in the previous chap-
ters, the decision maker can now adapt the firm’s contribution margin to her 
expected demand curve, the announced importance of b emerges.  
6.2.7 Outside Equity and Ownership Concentration 
Similar to the preceding chapters, the decision maker’s behavior with respect to 
the raising of outside equity remains to be scrutinized. In order to examine out-
                                         
102  Correspondingly, the optimality condition (40) would change to μQ
כ ؄ (1+ं+ℓ)/g. 
103  See Pfähler/Wiese (1998). 
104  A formal derivation of the Lerner Index is given in the appendix to this chapter (see 
Appendix A 6.2). 
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side equity and, thereby, ownership concentration, we again explore the possible 
values of ϕ in the optimum. By substituting (39) and (40) into FOC.1 we ob-
tain 
(41) (1+ं+ℓ) [ԟ(bf ԟ a + ((1+ं+ℓ)/g)(1 + ηϕTσQ2 /b))]ԟ bgF  
 + (v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)bg/ΩT = 0. 
By means of the reduced optimality condition (41), Proposition 6.4 is pre-
sented.  
Proposition 6.4: In the optimum, there exists a unique solution for ϕ, which 
satisfies: 
ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½. 
Proof: Consider the reduced condition (41). The term in square brackets is clearly 
negative. Thus, the term (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)bg/ΩT has to be positive to satisfy the condi-
tion. Moreover, ϕ can evidently only take the unique value that satisfies 
(v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)bg/ΩT = ԟ(1+ं+ℓ) [ԟ(bf ԟ a + ((1+ं+ℓ)/g)(1 + ηϕTσQ2 /b))]+ bgF. 
This unique value of ϕ must ensure that the expression (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2) is positive, which, 
from KT.1, KT.2, and the properties of v(ϕ), implies ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½.                     ■ 
q.e.d. 
Like in the previous scenario (Chapter 5), the decision maker is not indiffe-
rent regarding outside equity. In the optimum, D trades off the marginal utility 
gain of the wealth effect of outside equity against the marginal utility loss of its 
power sharing effect to attain a unique interior solution ϕכ for her optimal share 
of the firm’s total equity. But unlike our previous findings, ϕכ can never exceed 
½. In contrary, exogenously decreasing D’s initial wealth (W0
D՝) shifts down-
wards the solution ϕכ, i.e., the optimal amount of outside equity is gradually 
increased (the mechanism which underlies this effect is discussed in the next 
subsection). Hence, the pricing power of the monopolist causes ϕכ to actually 
tend towards zero, rather than unity in case iv). 
6.2.8 The Decision Maker’s Corporate Investment Objectives 
Similar to the previous chapters, this subsection examines D’s target levels of 
corporate investment.  
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Cases i) and ii) 
We begin by treating the first two cases, where Γכ= 0. As shown in these parts 
of Lemma 6.1, W0
D is sufficiently large to meet D’s corporate investment objec-
tives without calling for any debt. The proof of the first two cases in Lemma 6.1 
has further disclosed that with 
i) λ5=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩϕT  ר λ3=λ4=λ6=0, or with 
ii) λ3+λ5W0D/ϕT=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D ר λ4=λ6=0, 
FOC.2 and FOC.3 simultaneously hold. Thus, in both cases, we are facing a 
system of only two equations. 
Scrutinizing case i), where 0 < αכ < α and Γכ= 0, we have  
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕכT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ K((gμQ) ԟ ηϕכTσQ2 g(pԟc)) 
+ (v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
(1+r1/T) ԟ gμQ + ηϕכTσQ2 g(pԟc) = 0. 
By adequate substitution,105 we can rewrite this system in its equivalent 
form  
FOC.1:  
ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r1/T))/g + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ϕכK = (μQ ԟ (1+r1/T)/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p)/g. 
With ϕכK = (1ԟαכ)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and Γכ= 0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(42) (1ԟαכ)W0D = (μQ ԟ (1+r1/T)/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p)/g.  
which discloses the amount of D’s personal wealth invested into the firm 
(LHS of the equation) and her maximum target level of corporate investment 
                                         
105  See the appendix to this chapter (A 6.3) for the detailed calculus. 
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(RHS of the equation). D’s initial wealth is largely sufficient to reach this max-
imum target and allows for an investment of the excess amount into the riskless 
alternative.  
Scrutinizing case ii), where αכ=Γכ= 0, we have  
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ K((gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 g(pԟc)) 
+ (v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
(1+r1/T) ԟ gμQ + ηϕכTσQ2 g(pԟc) + λ3/ΩW0DT = 0.  
This system differs from case i) only in that the second equation exhibits an 
additional term, i.e.,  λ3/ΩW0DT . Hence, solving in a similar manner as in case 
i) yields the equivalent form 
FOC.1:  
ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r1/T))/g + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ϕכK = (μQ ԟ ((1+r1/T) + λ3/ΩW0DT )/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p)/g. 
With ϕכK = (1ԟαכ)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and αכ= Γכ= 0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
(43) W0
D = ((μQ ԟ (1+r1/T) /g)/ηTσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p))/g ԟ λ3/ΩW0DηT2g2σQ2 , 
which discloses that D invests her full wealth into the firm in order to ap-
proach her maximum target as near as possible. The remaining difference be-
tween the maximum target level and D’s wealth endowment is given by 
λ3/ΩW0
DηT2g2σQ
2 , which evidently decreases if W0
D increases to approach the 
maximum target level from below. 
In both case i) and ii), the respective form of FOC.1 is identical and dis-
plays as ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r1/T))/g + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0, which, from the 
properties of v'(ϕכ), implies 
ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½  
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for both cases. Hence, the decision maker raises outside equity until her 
utility gain from the corresponding income effect is exactly outweighed by her 
utility loss from the corresponding power sharing effect.  
Cases iii) and iv) 
We now treat the last two cases, where Γכ> 0. As shown in these parts of Lem-
ma 6.1, W0
D is not sufficiently large to meet D’s corporate investment objectives 
without calling for additional debt. The proof of the last two cases in Lemma 
6.1 has further disclosed that with 
iii) λ3=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D  ר λ4=λ5=λ6=0, or with 
iv) λ3ԟλ6W0D/ϕT=(r2 ԟ r1/T)ΩW0D ר λ4=λ5=0, 
FOC.2 and FOC.3 simultaneously hold. Thus, we are again facing a system 
of only two equations. 
Scrutinizing case iii), where αכ= 0 and Γ > Γכ> 0, we have 
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕכT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ (1+r2)Γכ ԟ E((gμQ) ԟ ηϕכTσQ2 (pԟc)g) 
 + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(1+r2) + gμQ ԟ ηϕכTσQ2 (pԟc)g = 0. 
By adequate substitution,106 we can again rewrite this system in its equiva-
lent form 
FOC.1:  
ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r2))/g + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ϕכK = (μQ ԟ (1+r2)/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p)/g. 
With ϕ*K = (1ԟαכ)W0D  + ϕכΓכ and αכ= 0, FOC.2/3 displays as  
                                         
106  See the appendix to this chapter (A 6.4) for the detailed calculus. 
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 (44) W0
D + ϕכΓכ = (μQ ԟ (1+r2)/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p)/g,  
which, considering that W0
D is fully invested into the firm, discloses the in-
curred level of corporate debt (Γ) in order to reach the minimum target level of 
corporate investment (RHS of the equation). 
FOC.1 discloses again that the unique solution value of ϕ satisfies 
ϕ ≤ ϕכ ≤ ½. 
There is a unique pair of values (ϕכ, Γכ) which satisfies the two optimality 
conditions. The financing gap is accordingly filled by ϕכΓכ. Hence, as long as 
the debt capacity Γ is sufficiently large to guarantee Γ > Γכ> 0, the disclosed 
result holds.  
Scrutinizing case iv), where αכ= 0 and Γ*= Γ, we have 
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕכT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ (1+r2)Γ ԟ E((gμQ) ԟ ηϕכTσQ2 (pԟc)g) 
 + (v'(ϕכ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(1+r2) ԟ λ6/ΩϕכT + gμQ ԟ ηϕכTσQ2 (pԟc)g = 0. 
This system differs from case iii) only in that the second equation exhibits 
an additional term, i.e., ԟλ6/ΩϕכT. Hence, solving in a similar manner as in 
case iii) yields the equivalent form 
FOC.1:  
ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r2)/g + λ6/Ωϕ*T) + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ϕכK = (μQ ԟ ((1+r2) + λ6/ΩϕכT )/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p)/g.  
Knowing that ϕכK = (1ԟαכ)W0D+ ϕכΓכ, α*= 0, and Γ*=Γ, FOC.2/3 displays 
as  
(45) W0
D
 + ϕכΓ = ((μQ ԟ (1+r2) /g)/ηTσQ2  + ϕכ(f-p))/g ԟ λ6/ΩϕכηT2g2σQ2 .  
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which discloses that D invests her full wealth into the firm and uses the full 
debt capacity in order to either reach her minimum target or to approach it as 
near as possible. The remaining difference between the minimum target level 
and D’s wealth endowment is given by λ6/Ωϕ
כηT2g2σQ2 , which evidently de-
pends on ϕכ. If W0D exogenously decreases (i.e., the decision maker’s liquidity 
constraint is sharpened and the financing gap becomes larger), ϕכ decreases to 
close the gap. Hence, contrary to our previous findings, ownership becomes less 
concentrated when moving deeper into case iv). 
Generally encompassing all four basic cases, the decision maker’s target levels 
(as given by the right-hand sides of equations (42) and (44)) are increasing in 
μQ and decreasing in both σQ
2  and η. Hence, similar to the simplified “profit 
machine” setting, the decision maker’s corporate investment objectives become 
more ambitious with improving average environmental states (operationalized 
via the stochastic demand), decreasing demand volatility, and decreasing risk 
aversion of the decision maker. However, with the new profit function, the pa-
rameter g now additionally enters the investment objectives. It is straightfor-
ward to see that the decision maker’s target levels are decreasing in g. The in-
tuition behind this result is that g can be interpreted as a direct measurement 
for the marginal effectiveness of capital in terms of reducing marginal costs. 
Thereby, the immediate intuition bleeds off is as follows: the stronger the cost-
reducing effect of capital, the lower is the actual capital requirement of the 
firm. 
6.2.9 The summarized Pattern of Investing and Financing 
The decision maker’s behavioral pattern in terms of investing and financing can 
be summarized similar to the previous chapters. The respective minimum and 
maximum target level of corporate investment are given by 
(46)  
 
The disclosure makes use of the two below-stated definitions. 
Definition 6.2: Denote by ϕ෡ < ½ the largest value of ϕ for which the optimality 
condition (41) is fulfilled if α=0. 
TLMax = ((μQ ԟ (1+r1/T)/g)/ηTσQ2 + ϕכ(f-p))/g,  and 
TLMin = ((μQ ԟ (1+r2)/g)/ηTσQ2 + ϕכ(f-p))/g. 
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Definition 6.3: Denote by ϕ෡෡ (with ϕ < ϕ෡෡ < ϕ෡ ) the largest value of ϕ for which 
the optimality condition (41) is fulfilled if Γ= Γ. 
Further considering the case contingent shape of (1+ं+ℓ) as given in Defi-
nition 6.1, we are once again taken back to our acquainted four cases. 
i)  if  W0
D > TLMax,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ= ϕ෡ < ½ ,  satisfying  ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r1/T))/g  
   + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
  αכ> 0, satisfying (1 ԟ αכ)W0D = TLMax, 
  Γכ = 0 ,  
  Kכ = TLMax/ϕכ,  
  pכ= cכ + (1 + r1/T)/bg. 
D’s private wealth is sufficiently large to meet her corporate investment ob-
jectives, i.e., it exceeds her maximum target level of corporate investment. 
Hence, she incurs no corporate debt and divides her personal investment be-
tween the firm’s capital stock and the riskless alternative. The decision maker 
raises outside equity in order to balance her utility gains from the corresponding 
income effect against her utility losses from the corresponding power sharing 
effect. 
ii)  if  TLMin < W0D ≤ TLMax, 
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ< ϕ෡ < ½ ,  satisfying  ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r1/T))/g  
   + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
  αכ= 0, 
  Γכ= 0 , 
  Kכ= (TLMax ԟ λ3/ΩW0DηT2g2σQ2 )/ϕכ, 
  pכ= cכ + ((1+r1/T) + λ3/ΩW0DT)/bg. 
D’s private wealth is sufficiently large to meet her minimum target level of 
corporate investment, but not her maximum target level. Hence, she incurs no 
corporate debt and invests her full personal wealth into the firm in order to 
reach the best possible rapprochement towards her maximum target level. The 
decision maker raises outside equity in order to balance her utility gains from 
the corresponding wealth effect against her utility losses from the corresponding 
power sharing effect. 
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iii)  if  W0
D ≤ TLMin < W0D + ϕ෡෡ Γ ,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕ෡෡ < ϕכ< ϕ෡ < ½ ,  satisfying  ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r2))/g  
      + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
  αכ= 0,  
  Γ > Γכ= (TLMin ԟW0D)/ϕכ, 
  Kכ= TLMin/ϕכ, 
  pכ= cכ + (1+r2)/bg. 
D’s private wealth is too small to single-handedly meet her minimum target 
level of corporate investment. Hence, she invests her full personal wealth into 
the firm’s stock of capital and incurs supplementary corporate debt in order to 
reach this minimum target level (filling the financing gap). The decision maker 
raises outside equity in order to fill the financing gap and to balance her utility 
gains from the corresponding wealth effect against her utility losses from the 
corresponding power sharing effect. 
iv)  if  W0
D
 + ϕ෡෡ Γ ≤ TLMin,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ≤ ϕ෡෡ < ½ ,  satisfying  ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r2)/g + λ6/Ωϕ*T)  
    + (v'(ϕכ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
  αכ= 0, 
  Γכ = Γ, 
  Kכ= (TLMin ԟ λ6/ΩϕכηT2g2σQ2  )/ϕכ 
  pכ= cכ + ((1+r2) + λ6/ΩϕכT)/bg. 
D invests her full personal wealth into the firm’s stock of capital and incurs 
as much corporate debt as possible in order to approach her minimum target of 
corporate investment as near as possible. She raises outside equity in order to 
balance her utility gains from its corresponding wealth effect against her utility 
losses from its corresponding power sharing effect.  
Figure 16 depicts the properties of (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) throughout the four cases, con-
tingent on the level of the decision maker’s initial wealth W0
D. 
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Figure 16: Properties of (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) in the monopoly case. 
As in the corresponding figures in the previous chapters, the vertical lines 
in Figure 16 separate our acquainted four cases. The above figure shows that 
the decision maker’s behavior in terms of investing and financing remains simi-
lar to the previous chapter, except for one important deviation. Compared to 
the previous chapter, the pricing power of the monopolist causes ϕכ to actually 
tend towards zero when exogenously decreasing W0
D in case iv) to widen the 
financing gap. Thereby, a lower ownership concentration results in the opti-
mum, and the monopolistic firm’s stock of capital is larger compared to the 
previous chapter.  
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the scenario with monopolistic pricing power. The deci-
sion maker’s investment and financing decisions were connected to both the 
firm’s cost and revenue structure and its pricing behavior. Again, case-
contingent interior solutions were obtained so that marginal costs and marginal 
benefits are balanced. D’s pattern of investing and financing is still largely con-
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form to our previous findings (Chapter 5). Similar to Chapter 5, the decision 
maker’s corporate investment objectives are again contingent on her subjective 
beliefs (via μQ and σQ
2 ), her risk sensitivity (via η), exogenous institutional pa-
rameters (via r1, r2, and T), and on the characteristics of the power-related util-
ity component v(ϕ). But with the newly introduced profit function of this chap-
ter, D’s corporate investment objectives now also crucially depend on the para-
meter g. More precisely, they are decreasing in g, since an increase in the effec-
tiveness of capital in terms of reducing marginal costs obviously diminishes the 
firm’s actual capital requirements. 
Moreover, the decision maker’s ability to single-handedly determine the 
market price yields some interesting additional insight. Despite the fact that her 
general preference structure of financing remains substantially unchanged, the 
optimal value of ϕ now tends towards zero, rather than unity when gradually 
sharpening the decision maker’s personal liquidity constraint (i.e., exogenously 
increasing the financing gap to get deeper into case iv)). Hence, compared to 
the previous chapter, our analysis postulates a larger fraction of outside equity 
in the firm’s stock of capital and, thereby, a lower ownership concentration in 
the monopoly case. Interestingly, this seems to be indeed a typical feature of 
large global corporations which enjoy massive market power and often exhibit a 
massive stock exchange capitalization.107 Since ϕכ tends towards zero, the op-
timal overall firm investment Kכ is accordingly greater than in the previous 
chapters.  
  
                                         
107  See, for example, Kale/Yee (2010) and MacKay/Phillips (2005). 
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
A 6.1: Solving the differential terms in the four FOCs 
The four FOCs are given by 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂ϕ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂ϕ)) + v'(ϕ) + λ1 ԟ λ2 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂α ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂α)) + λ3 ԟ λ4 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂Γ ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂Γ)) + λ5 ԟ λ6 = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂p
 = Ω(∂μW1D/∂p ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂p)) + λ7 = 0. 
Since the first three FOCs are identical to the previous chapter, the corres-
ponding derivation takes place by the same token as in Appendix A 5.1 and 
yields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∂ࣦ
∂ϕ
 = (pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ (1+r2)Γ ԟ E((gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g) 
∂ࣦ
∂α
 = (1+r1/T) ԟ gμQ + ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g + (λ3 ԟ λ4)/ΩW0DT = 0, 
∂ࣦ
∂Γ
 = ԟ (1+r2) + gμQ ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g + (λ5 ԟ λ6)/ΩϕT = 0. 
FOC.1:  
 + (v'(ϕ)+λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2:  
FOC.3:  
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FOC.4 is given by  
Ω(∂μW1D/∂p ԟ ησW1D(∂σW1D/∂p)) + λ7 = 0, 
which, since σW1D=ϕTσ∏ and σΠؠσΠ(p), can be expressed as 
∂μW1D/∂p ԟ ηϕ
2T2σΠ(∂σΠ/∂p) + λ7/Ω = 0. 
From the functional form of μW1D as disclosed by Equation (11), we can in-
fer ∂μW1D/∂p =(∂μ∏/∂p)ϕT. By substituting this expression into FOC.4 and 
subsequently dividing by ϕT we obtain 
∂μ∏/∂p ԟ ηϕTσΠ(∂σΠ/∂p) + λ7/ΩϕT = 0. 
From (31), we know that μ∏=(pԟc)μQԟF and σ∏=(pԟc)σQ. From (32), we 
know that μQ= a ԟ bp. Hence  
∂μ∏/∂p = ԟb(pԟc) + μQ and  ∂σΠ/∂p = σQ. 
Substituting both into FOC.4 then yields 
 
 
 
 
 
A 6.2: Formal derivation of the Lerner Index 
Consider the Lerner Index as a measure for the size of contribution margin (rel-
ative to the price) in the optimum. Denote it by  
(47) LI = (pԟc)/p. 
Considering that, from (38),  
(48) (pԟc) = ((1+ं)+ℓ)/bg , 
∂ࣦ
∂p
 = ԟb(pԟc) + μQ ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) + λ7/ΩϕT = 0. 
FOC.4:  
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and substituting (48) into (47), we obtain 
(49) LI = ((1+ं)+ℓ)/bgp.  
Further denote by ε the price elasticity of the demand. It is defined by 
(50) ε = μQ’ p / μQ < 0.  
Solving (50) for p and subsequently substituting into (49) then yields 
(51) LI = ((1+ं+ℓ)/gμQ) (ԟ1/ε) = (pԟc)/p. 
Hence, we obtain the classical postulate of a negative relation of the Lerner 
Index with the inverse price elasticity of demand. However, interestingly, this 
effect is weighted by the term (1+ं+ℓ)/gμQ, which is reflecting D’s investment 
and financing choices and her environmental constraints. From (50), we can 
further infer that, since μQ’ = ԟb, LI indeed negatively depends on the slope of 
the demand curve, i.e., the greater the slope b, the smaller LI and, consequent-
ly, the smaller the markup that D chooses in the optimum.  
A 6.3: Simplifying the system of equations for case i) 
We have  
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ K((gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 g(pԟc)) 
+ (v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2/3:  
(1+r1/T) ԟ (gμQ) + ηϕTσQ2 g(pԟc) = 0, 
Substituting FOC.2/3 into FOC.1 yields 
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)(μQ  ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)) ԟ F ԟ K(1+r1/T) + (v'(ϕ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
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FOC.2/3:  
 μQ ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) = (1+r1/T)/g, 
which, by repeating the previous substitution and slightly rearranging, dis-
plays as 
FOC.1:  
((pԟc)/g ԟ K)(1+r1/T) ԟ F + (v'(ϕ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2/3:  
ϕ(pԟc) = (μQ ԟ (1+r1/T)/g)/ηTσQ2 .  
Considering that c = f ԟ gK, we obtain 
FOC.1:  
((pԟf)/g)(1+r1/T) ԟ F + (v'(ϕ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2/3:  
ϕ(pԟf + gK) = (μQ ԟ (1+r1/T)/g)/ηTσQ2 .  
By slight rearrangement, these two expressions indeed display as 
FOC.1:  
ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r1/T))/g + (v'(ϕ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ϕK = (μQ ԟ (1+r1/T)/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕ(f-p)/g.  
A 6.4: Simplifying the system of equations for case iii) 
We have  
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)μQ  ԟ F ԟ ηϕT((pԟc)σQ)2  ԟ (1+r2)Γ ԟ E((gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g) 
 + (v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
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FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
ԟ(1+r2) + (gμQ) ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)g = 0. 
Substituting FOC.2/3 into FOC.1 yields 
FOC.1:  
(pԟc)(μQ  ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc)) ԟ F ԟ (1+r2)K + (v'(ϕ) + λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2 ؠ FOC.3:  
μQ ԟ ηϕTσQ2 (pԟc) = (1+r2)/g, 
which differs from case i) only in that the term (1+r1/T) has been replaced 
by (1+r2) (see previous derivation in A 6.3). Hence, these two expressions are 
indeed equivalent to 
FOC.1:  
ԟF ԟ ((f-p)(1+r2))/g + (v'(ϕ) +λ1ԟλ2)/ΩT = 0,  
FOC.2/3: 
ϕK = (μQ ԟ (1+r2)/g)/ηTgσQ2  + ϕ(f-p)/g.  
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7 Strategic Interaction: The Duopoly Case 
7.1 Preface 
Contrary to the preceding chapters, strategic choices in this final analytical 
stage are not solely influenced by the interplay of market structure and con-
sumer demand properties. This chapter endogenizes the influence of competi-
tors, which allows for a disclosure of the interrelations between the firms’ stra-
tegic investment, financing, and pricing choices108 and the resulting competitive 
outcome.  
In a context of imperfect competition, strategic interaction brings about the 
notion that the outcome depends on the decisions of more than one single play-
er. Hence, the decision maker no longer faces a passive market environment. 
The possible choices of one firm’s decision maker have a direct influence on the 
behavior of the rival firm’s decision maker. Presuming that both are fully aware 
of this interdependency, an elicitation of the reactive relatedness of competing 
enterprises’ strategic choices necessitates a game theoretical analysis to describe, 
explain, and predict the outcome of this interactive decision problem. Given the 
fact that firms’ decision makers only have subjective beliefs about the demand 
properties, the price appears to be the feasible parameter of interaction in this 
market game. 
The investigation of strategic firm interaction in imperfect product market 
competition constitutes a major domain covered by the academic field of indus-
trial organization. The first conclusive analysis of such oligopolistic market inte-
raction was provided by Cournot (1838) and taken on by Bertrand (1883). In 
                                         
108  In a slight abuse of formal accurateness and in order to ease the verbal exposition, this 
chapter will sporadically refer to “firms” when speaking of their respective decision mak-
ers. 
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the standard Bertrand framework, two symmetric firms produce a homogeneous 
good at constant marginal costs and are competing in prices. Each firm is get-
ting half of the market if it matches the price of the rival firm, and the whole 
market if it undercuts its rival’s price. As a result, both firms eventually set the 
competitive price which is equal to marginal costs, hence leading to zero profits. 
Therefrom originates the so-called Bertrand ‘paradox’: two market suppliers are 
sufficient to ensure the perfectly competitive outcome. It may well be argued 
that the word “paradox” is particularly inappropriate in this context. Given 
that the Bertrand frame yields a result which blatantly contradicts real world 
observations. Contrarily to the Bertrand prediction, firms are typically compet-
ing in prices and still make profits. Moreover, the Bertrand result renders ob-
scure why firms should even bother to enter a non-monopolistic market at all, 
given that no profit can be made. This is especially true when supposing fixed 
costs of entry or production (even if supposed extremely small). Hence, even for 
minimal costs of entry or production, (imperfectly) competitive markets 
shouldn’t even exist. These considerations rather suggest that the Bertrand 
result is not a “paradox”, but simply the logical consequence of a wrong model 
that inadequately represents the real world. 
A first (non-formalized) approach to iron out the dissatisfying result of the 
original Bertrand frame was given by Edgeworth (1897, 1925), who introduced 
capacity constraints exogenously imposed onto the firms. If production capacity 
is lower than the demand at the competitive price (Q(p=c)), the Bertrand equi-
librium can no longer sustain. This result obtains because if one firm charges a 
price above the competitive level, the rival firm cannot meet all the demand. So 
the first firm can cover the residual demand and enjoys positive profit. A rigo-
rously formalized advancement of this idea was developed in the capacity pre-
commitment model of Kreps/Scheinkman (1983). By endogenously precommit-
ting to a certain production capacity before competing in prices, firms are able 
to extract Cournot profits. 
A number of further well-established studies have proposed various alterna-
tive refinements: product differentiation (Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 
1979; Shaked/Sutton, 1982), tacit collusion (Chamberlin, 1929, 1933), repeated 
interaction (Friedman, 1971, 1977), consumer switching costs (Klemperer, 
1987), consumer neglect of small price changes (Allen/Thisse, 1992), or market 
segmentation (Roy, 2000; Galeotti/Moraga-González, 2008). These models in-
troduce substantial refinements to the original Bertrand framework, which cru-
cially rests upon the notions of symmetry between competitors and the homo-
geneous nature of their products. 
A particularly interesting class of pricing games was developed by Stahl 
(1986), Farm/Weibull (1987), and Maskin/Tirole (1988). These authors keep 
the symmetric Bertrand-Nash concept, but introduce the possibility of imme-
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diate price-responses for competing firms. By doing so, they show that equili-
brium prices above the Bertrand outcome are possible without explicit collusion 
or commitment to trigger strategies.  
Hence, a wide variety of alternative approaches has been accumulated in 
the pertinent literature, correspondingly leading to a similarly wide variety of 
equilibrium solutions of the pricing game between the scrutinized market com-
petitors. Therefore, it feels inadequate to single out one definitive model variant 
in order to connect it to our financial structure model. Exhaustive examination 
and rigorous evaluation of price competition would by itself constitute a consi-
derable research program and lies well outside the scope of the present thesis. 
We will rather rely on the field of industrial organization and outline the prop-
erties (and preconditions) of several prominent equilibrium solutions of the pric-
ing game which can be inferred from the pertinent publications in this literature 
(Section 7.2). We will then subsequently examine how these price equilibria 
respectively influences and change the decision makers’ financial structure 
choices (Section 7.3).  
We consider a two-stage setting as depicted in Figure 17. In Stage 1, the 
firms simultaneously choose their financial structure according to the model 
developed in the preceding chapters. The pricing game then follows in Stage 2. 
In order to determine the optimal behavior of the firms in the first and second 
stage, the notion of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is applied. 
Hence, the game is solved via backward induction, starting with the derivation 
of the optimal firm behavior at Stage 2. Firstly, the equilibrium in terms of 
pricing is determined for given, but arbitrary financial structure choices. Subse-
quently, the first-stage financial structure equilibrium is derived by assuming 
that firms correctly anticipate the second-stage pricing-behavior. 
 
Figure 17: Time line and stages of the game. 
firms set their financial 
structure (ϕi, αi, Γi) 
firms set prices and attain the 
equilibrium outcome (p1*, p2*) 
that corresponds to the prevalent 
competitive context 
⇒ market demand Q(p*) 
⇒ production 
⇒ profits 
Stage 1 Stage 2
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses ma-
jor refinements to the original Bertrand frame and outlines the respective possi-
ble equilibrium outcomes of the second-stage pricing game. Section 7.3 then 
connects these outcomes with the firms’ first-stage financial structure decisions. 
The chapter concludes with Section 7.4, where the obtained results are dis-
cussed. 
7.2 Stage Two: Optimal Pricing 
In the second stage of the game, financial structure is taken as given. For a 
given financial structure, the decision maker’s utility function U(W1
D) strictly 
increases in her final wealth W1
D, which in turn (being a linear transformation 
of the profit function) strictly increases in ∏ (see Chapter 3). Hence, we are 
able to directly base our argument on the firm’s profit function. 
As indicated above, a vast number of model frames exists in the pertinent 
literature, each of them relaxing or refining one or several crucial assumptions 
of the original Bertrand setting. These refined models typically circumvent the 
problematic Bertrand result of zero firm profits and, hence, yield predictions 
which appear to be far closer to what can be empirically observed. We will dis-
tinctly discuss the properties and outcomes of three major classes of such re-
finements in order to craft a solid basis for the subsequent examination of the 
first-stage financial structure decision, which depends on the actual equilibrium 
that decision makers expect in the second-stage pricing game. 
7.2.1 Capacity Constraints 
Edgeworth (1897, 1925) identified capacity constraints as a potential property 
of oligopolistic firms which would allow them to eventually sustain equilibrium 
prices above the marginal cost level and, hence, make positive profits. If a firm 
has a production capacity smaller than Q(p=c), it cannot meet all the market 
demand. The price pair  
(p1*, p2*) = (c, c) 
can no longer be an equilibrium, because an upward deviation by one of the 
firms would endow this firm with a residual demand of those customers, which 
cannot be served by the other firm. Hence, the deviating firm faces a positive 
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demand at a positive markup price and, thus, makes a profit. Consequently, the 
Bertrand solution can no longer be an equilibrium.  
The actual equilibrium solution requires an explicit assumption concerning 
the rationing scheme. Two rationing schemes are particularly pertinent in the 
literature, namely efficient rationing and proportional rationing. Efficient ra-
tioning supposes that the most “eager” consumers (i.e., those with the highest 
willingness to pay) buy from firm 1. Firm 2 then faces the residual demand of 
the remaining customers. Suchlike ordering of customers according to their wil-
lingness to pay leads to a maximized consumer surplus, hence the name “effi-
cient rationing”. In contrast, proportional rationing rather supposes that cus-
tomers are uniformly distributed. Hence, all customers have the same probabili-
ty of being served by a given firm.  
For small capacities, Beckman (1967) assumed proportional rationing and 
showed that firms’ reduced-form profit functions109 have the exact Cournot 
shape. The same result was obtained by Levitan/Shubik (1972) for the case of 
efficient rationing. For larger capacities, only a mixed-strategy equilibrium ex-
ists. This mixed-strategy equilibrium was identified by Kreps/Scheinkman 
(1983) for the case of efficient rationing and symmetric capacities. Al-
len/Hellwig (1986) then showed that as the number of firms increases, equilibria 
converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price, while the monopoly 
prices persist with decreasing but positive probability. 
To sum up, all these authors showed that equilibrium price pairs between 
the marginal cost level and the monopoly price may hold for capacity con-
strained firms competing in prices. 
7.2.2 Product Differentiation 
The second crucial assumption in the original Bertrand frame is the perfect 
substitutability of the firm’s products. Consumers are indifferent between goods 
at an equal price and they buy from the lowest priced producer.  
Against the backdrop of real world observations, this assumption is of 
course very questionable. At least part of the customers are arguably willing to 
pay a premium in order to purchase a product with a certain attribute, like for 
example brand name or provenience. Such attributes are differentiators among 
competing firms’ products and may substantiate in a multitude of further di-
                                         
109  Reduced-form profit functions are  
“(…) profit functions that would obtain if the firms produced quantities (…) and 
an auctioneer picked the price so as to clear the market.” (Tirole, 1993, p. 216.) 
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mensions, such as sales point location, delivery time, subjective quality percep-
tions, availability, consumers’ information etc.  
If the assumption of perfectly homogeneous products is relaxed, the demand 
for each firm’s product positively depends on the price charged for the competi-
tor’s product. Technically speaking, the cross-elasticity of the demand is finite. 
The outcome of such price competition with differentiated products differs from 
the Bertrand conclusions. The firms charge prices above the marginal cost level 
and, consequently, reap positive profits.  
To exemplify this, one may think of two symmetric firms located at differ-
ent places.110 Customers are geographically dispersed and uniformly distributed. 
Travelling to the firms’ sales points entails positive costs for the customers. If 
Firm 1 charges p1 = c, Firm 2 can still keep at least a few customers who are 
located nearby if it charges a higher price p2 = c + x (where x is a small mar-
kup). For these customers, the travelling costs are lower than the price differen-
tial x. Hence, the competitive price pair (p1, p2) = (c, c) is no equilibrium any-
more.  
Hotelling (1929) showed that the equilibrium price pair of such a game in-
deed lies above marginal costs. The actual value of the equilibrium price posi-
tively directly depends on the degree of differentiation.111 Hence, the two ex-
tremes cases of  
 no differentiation (both firms are located in the same spot), or  
 total differentiation (firms serve mutually exclusive geographical 
areas) 
yield exactly the two polar equilibrium solutions: the original Bertrand out-
come for the case of no differentiation, and the monopoly price pair for the case 
of total differentiation). The basic relation between the degree of differentiation 
and the resulting equilibrium market price p* is depicted in Figure 18. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
110  Example adapted from Tirole (1993), p. 212. 
111  See Tirole (1993), p.212. A general outline on how to measure the degree of product 
differentiation is provided by, for example, Pfähler/Wiese (1998). 
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Figure 18: Equilibrium Price with Product Differentiation 
7.2.3 Dynamic Price Competition and Flexibilized Pricing 
The Bertrand frame assumes irrevocable price announcements. Firms are rigidly 
committed to their announced price with no possibility for later changes. This 
may be criticized on two major grounds.  
Firstly, competing firms are likely to interact more than once. Consequent-
ly, pricing decisions should be at least possible before each iteration. Chamber-
lin (1929) was the first to suggest that such repeated interaction may annul the 
Bertrand outcome, since the threat of a vigorous price war deters the firms’ 
seduction to undercut their respective rival. Hence, the competitors may tacitly 
collude in a completely non-cooperative manner. 
Secondly, one may wonder why firms should not be able to instantly react 
to the price announcement of their competitor. Admittedly, detection lags such 
as sealed-bid proposals in markets with a monopsonist buyer may justify the 
original Bertrand assumptions.112 However, such detection lags are far from fre-
quent. Major industries, especially markets for commodities like gasoline or 
markets for capital equipment, are characterized by very open and flexible pric-
ing behavior. Stahl (1986) and Farm/Weibull (1987) crafted model frames 
where firms can immediately respond to prices announced by their competitors. 
These authors assumed (small) costs of such immediate price changes and ar-
                                         
112  Professional services industries such as top management consulting may serve as an ex-
ample here. 
degree of  
differentiation 
pM 
total 
differentiation 
p* 
no 
differentiation 
c
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rive at the conclusion that a positive price-cost margin obtains as equilibrium 
result.  
Both notions share the common property that the threat of retaliatory price 
cuts triggers a implicitly collusive equilibrium situation. However, the underly-
ing motives for “retaliation” differ in the two approaches. Given our basic as-
sumptions concerning the time frame of the model, repeated interaction does 
not seem to fit well into the overall frame set up throughout the present thesis. 
Hence, we will rather rely on the notion of flexibilized pricing in one-shot games 
in order to present a consistent argument for the decision maker’s eventual 
price expectations.  
Stahl (1986) studies price competition for a setting where prices are revoca-
ble, but at the cost of delaying sales. He shows that any price between the mar-
ginal cost level and the monopoly price can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
Admittedly, the resulting large set of possible equilibrium price pairs may be 
seen as an embarrassment of riches. Yet, Stahl (1986) argues that the monopoly 
price pair obtains as what he calls the “natural focal equilibrium” (Stahl, 1986, 
p.89). This means that the monopoly price pair exhibits the property that the 
resulting firm returns  
 are symmetric, and  
 are Pareto optimal from the viewpoint of the two competing firms.  
Hence, again, a multitude of possible equilibrium market prices can potentially 
be expected by the competing firms’ decision makers. The following section 
(7.2.4) takes on the thread of Stahl (1986) and crafts a refined model of revoca-
ble pricing in order to arrive at a stronger equilibrium prediction. 
7.2.4 A Special Case: Equilibrium Analysis for Costlessly Revocable 
Prices 
The previous section has shown that flexibilized pricing games circumvent the 
problematic Bertrand result of zero firm profits. Stahl (1986) shows that mono-
poly price pair obtains as a focal equilibrium among a rich set of candidates. 
However, this shared monopoly outcome may also be derived as a truly unique 
equilibrium if assuming costlessly revocable prices. The present subsection mod-
els this special case in order to enrich the insight with respect to such flexibi-
lized one-shot pricing games and to supplement the findings of Stahl (1986). 
The hurried reader is, however, welcome to skip the present subsection in order 
to proceed to the first-stage analysis. 
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Suppose that there are two identical firms, indexed i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j, produc-
ing a homogeneous good. Sales are shared equally if prices pi and pj are equal, 
resulting in an equal profit of ∏shared for each of the two firms. Otherwise the 
whole market is captured by the firm which has set the lower price and makes a 
profit of ∏full, leaving zero demand for the other firm.  
Firms publicly announce their prices and can immediately and costlessly re-
vise these prices in a sequence of alternating moves, hence mutually responding 
to their rival’s previous price announcement.113 In the resulting adjustment 
process, each firm’s chosen price is a best response to the price the other firm 
chose the move before. This second stage lasts until the adjustment process 
settles down to a “steady state” where the prices are fixed, i.e., none of the 
firms changes its previously announced price anymore. Production and trade 
only start after the prices are fixed. Hence, firms are merely concerned with the 
situation at the end of the second stage, after all price responses have been 
completed and the steady state is reached. Therefore, we are not considering a 
supergame. No payoffs occur before the sequence of price changes ends, and 
these payoffs only and merely depend on the final price pair.114 In this respect, 
the model frame is similar to the approach of Marschak/Selten (1978). 
The firms play a game of complete information. It is assumed that a firm’s 
investment, financing, and pricing choices can be observed by the rival firm’s 
decision maker. Empirical evidence here obviously depends on the specific in-
dustrial context. However, Katz (1991) argues that strategic variables may have 
commitment value despite being unobservable. Hence, our results may still hold 
with incomplete information. 
Since demand is downward sloping, profit ∏ is strictly concave in price with 
a global interior maximum at the monopoly price pM. Due to the positive fixed 
costs which have to be borne by both firms, the profit made by one single firm 
by taking the entire market at a given price exceeds the sum of the profits 
made if the market is shared at that price. With two firms, the difference is 
exactly amounting to F, i.e., ∏full(p) = 2∏shared(p) + F, ∀p (see Figure 19). 
 
                                         
113  Hence, the second stage of the model can be interpreted as a sequential subgame with an 
indefinite number of moves and where each move (i.e., price response) has a negligible 
duration. 
114  A supergame would induce payoffs for each “round” of moves, contingent on the strate-
gies played in that round. Similar to Stahl (1986), the above outlined game absolutely 
has a one-shot nature, hence ruling out the possibility to attribute the attainability of a 
collusive outcome to an application of the Folk theorem. 
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Figure 19: Properties of the firm profits. 
We make use of the following definition in order to alleviate the subsequent 
analysis.  
Definition 7.1: Denote by p෤ the unique price which satisfies 
p෤ < pM ר  ∏full(p෤) = ∏shared(pM).  
As can easily be verified by looking at Figure 19, either firm makes a great-
er profit by sharing the market at the monopoly price pM than by taking the 
whole market at a price below p෤ . 
In Stage 2, the firms make their sequential price announcements, alternat-
ing at each move n ∈ (1, ... , k). Thereby, each price announcement is well-
defined and denoted by pn
i/j. Without loss of generality, assume that Firm 1 
moves first and announces a price p1
1. Firm 2 then responds at move two by 
announcing a price p2
2. Firm 1 can now change its price at move three to p3
1, 
and in this case, Firm 2 has the option to change at move four to p4
2 and so 
forth. This sequential adjustment process ends as soon as any of the two firms 
decides to leave its previously announced price unchanged, yielding the final 
price vector (pkԟ2i , pkԟ1
j ) where both prices are mutual best responses. 
 
∏full(p෥) 
= 
∏shared(pM) 
Profit 
Price pMp෤ 
∏full
∏shared
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Figure 20: Sequence of alternating price adjustments until move k. 
Since all price announcements are observable, all past actions are common 
knowledge, hence yielding a commonly known sequence of previously announced 
prices (p1
i , p2
j , ... , pnԟ1i ) at each move n. Such a sequence up to that move is 
called the history hn. A strategy specifies a price announcement pn
i  for each 
move n, contingent on the history up to that move. Any strategy pair (si, sj) 
induces a well-defined sequence of alternating price announcements which lasts 
until, for any firm, pn
i = pnԟ2i , meaning that this firm keeps its previously 
announced price unchanged. Since trade only starts after the steady state is 
reached, profits only depend on the final price vector (pkԟ2i , pkԟ1
j ) that is 
induced by a strategy pair. 
By means of the following two propositions, we proceed by first identifying 
the equilibrium outcome of the described pricing game and then checking for 
uniqueness.  
Proposition 7.1: The shared monopoly outcome (pM, pM) with both firms 
charging the monopoly price is an equilibrium. 
Proof: Consider the following strategy si *: 
 
 pn
i  = 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
 
pരሬ ԟ ε,     if         pnԟ2i  ∈ [pരሬ; pM]     
pM,        if          pnԟ2i  ∈ [pM; ∞]   
                 or   pnԟ2i  ∈ [-∞; pരሬ)
dummy
                      . 
Basically, the strategy profile si * prescribes either firm to announce pM if the lowest 
currently announced price has fallen to p෤ , and to match the monopoly price if an-
nounced (or exceeded) by the rival. Otherwise, p෤ is announced, which then in turn in-
itiates a consecutive joint move to the monopoly price. If a focal firm’s rival complies 
with si *, the rival’s only possible price announcements are pM and p෤ , for which si * pre-
scribes pM as the focal firm’s reaction in both cases. Hence, only the monopoly price 
can be repeated by a firm in accordance with si *. Since pM maximizes either firm’s 
payoff, no firm can do better by deviating from this strategy profile, given that the 
other complies with it. Thereby, we obtain s1*→ p11 = pM and s2*→ p22 = pM.           ■ 
q.e.d. 
k-2 k-1 k 432 1 …move 
price pkԟ2
i  pkԟ1
j  pk
i  p4
2 p3
1 p2
2 p1
1 
!
=
…
pM, if  n = 1 
 or  pnԟ1
j ≥ pM  
 or  min {pnԟ2
i , pnԟ1
j } ≤ p෤ 
p෤ , otherwise
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Considering the above strategy profile renders evident the fact that actual 
price movements occur only off the equilibrium path. No price adjustment 
process actually takes place in equilibrium, since neither firm has an incentive 
to deviate from the monopoly price, given the pricing strategy of the rival firm. 
Announcing the critical price p෤ can be interpreted as a signal for the intention 
to return to the monopoly price, since repeating p෤ can never be rational, given 
the rival’s compliance with si *.  
Proposition 7.2: Assume that  
(i)  firms do not play (weakly) dominated strategies, 
(ii)  profits are strictly concave in price with an inner maximum at the 
monopoly price. 
Then, the equilibrium outcome (pM, pM) is unique. 
Proof: Denote by ॺכ the set of undominated strategy pairs (si, sj). We need to show 
that all strategy pairs in ॺכ induce the shared monopoly outcome. This is done in three 
consecutive steps: 
(1) Any arbitrary strategy which drives the corresponding firm towards leaving 
the entire market to its rival yields zero profits. Hence, any other strategy that 
prescribes a matching of the rival’s price does at least as good (i.e., it yields ze-
ro profits if the rival firm in turn undercuts the price until marginal cost level, 
or positive profits otherwise). Consequently, any strategy which implies leaving 
the market to the rival firm is dominated and, thus, cannot be part of a strat-
egy pair in ॺכ. Inversely argued, all strategy pairs in ॺכ induce a shared market 
with identical prices. 
(2) Given that all equilibrium outcomes imply a shared market, the maximal equi-
librium profit that a firm can make is the shared monopoly profit ∏shared(pM). 
(3) A strategy pair such as (s1*, s2*) (see proof to Proposition 7.1) which gives rise 
to the outcome (pM, pM) ensures the maximal possible equilibrium profit for 
each firm. Since no firm can do better, any strategy pair in ॺכ must induce the 
outcome (pM, pM). 
Consequently, any subgame perfect equilibrium with undominated strategies must yield 
the price pair (pM, pM) as the unique outcome.                                             ■ 
q.e.d. 
By explicitly allowing for costlessly revocable price announcements before 
the advent of customers, the above analysis shows that, in the second-stage 
pricing subgame, firms share the market equally and charge the monopoly price. 
At first glance, this is an astonishing result in the light of the standard Ber-
trand predictions. However, it only reinforces the well established view that the 
theoretical analysis of market games is heavily sensitive to the commitment of 
players – no matter if voluntary or involuntary. Irrevocable pricing (such as in 
the standard Bertrand framework) can be interpreted as an implicit form of 
involuntary commitment. Hence, it is not very surprising that removing this 
commitment leads to drastically altered results. 
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Given that only the final price pair determines the payoffs to the firms, the 
second stage of the overall game yields a unique, Markov perfect Nash equili-
brium (MPNE) where both firms eventually charge the monopoly price. As Fu-
denberg/Tirole (1991) outline, Markov strategies are generally characterized by 
the common property that  
„(...) the past influences current play only through its effect on a state variable that 
summarizes the direct effect of the past on the current environment. A Markov perfect 
(Nash) equilibrium (...) is a profile of Markov strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium 
in every proper subgame.“ (Fudenberg/Tirole, 1991, p. 501.) 
Obviously, price (more precise: each current pair of prices) is the state vari-
able in the present context. 
The shared monopoly outcome does not obtain as a consequence of explicit 
collusion, since firms are acting independently and do not cooperate in a direct 
sense. It is also not a consequence of mutual punishment strategies of the play-
ers. The collusive outcome is rather driven by the important assumption that 
firms consider the mutual possibility to respond to each price announcement of 
the rival before the advent of customers.  
It is important to note that, ex ante, the number of potential price reac-
tions has to be unlimited. If such a limit would exist, then there would be a last 
round of price revision in which the players would try to outmaneuver each 
other, just as in a finitely iterated prisoners’ dilemma. Consequently, this end 
game effect would bring forth the same outcome as the standard Bertrand pric-
ing game. 
As outlined in the previous subsection (see 7.2.3), flexibilized pricing games 
have firstly been examined by Stahl (1986), Farm/Weibull (1987), and 
Maskin/Tirole (1988). The main difference between Maskin/Tirole (1988) and 
our setting is that the present game is truly one-shot and firms have total free-
dom in adjusting their prices. In Maskin/Tirole (1988), firms sell repeatedly to 
customers, but prices cannot be adjusted at every moment. Sales are hence rea-
lized according to the current price vector in every period. Thereby, the authors 
derive conditions under which Edgeworth price cycles115 are a MPNE. We have 
                                         
115  Edgeworth price cycles are asymmetric price variations and work as follows. If one firm 
undercuts its rival, it will capture all or a very large portion of the market. Beginning 
from an above-marginal-cost price-level, one firm initiates a round of undercutting by 
pricing below the current level. The rival in turn responds with a match or a slight un-
dercut. Undercutting continues until the price equals the marginal cost level. One com-
petitor then restores prices. The rival follows as quickly as possible, and the cycle reite-
rates. See Edgeworth (1925) and Maskin/Tirole (1988). 
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presented a much simpler pricing game. Our analysis underscores that the 
shared monopoly outcome may sustain even if firms only sell once.  
Our setting yields the shared monopoly outcome as the unique equilibrium. 
This result contrasts the findings of Stahl (1986), who considers a revocable 
pricing game with fixed stocks and indirect costs of delayed sales. His setting 
induces a continuum of equilibria, in which the shared monopoly outcome only 
constitutes one possibility. In contrast, with neither fixed stocks nor costs of 
delayed sales being relevant in the present model, we arrive at the clear predic-
tion of pM as the only price that can prevail in equilibrium. 
The stability of the equilibrium solution obtains as a direct consequence of 
the scrutinized pricing game: all price cuts can be immediately met with retalia-
tory price cuts; hence undercutting the rival’s price would be a myopic strategy. 
It is, however, important to understand that the firms are by no means engaged 
in a repeated game. The Bertrand result is circumvented despite keeping the 
one-shot nature of the original game. As pointed out earlier, symmetry of com-
petitors and homogeneity of products is likewise maintained. 
One interesting feature of our setting is that it exhibits a compelling con-
nection to the field of bargaining theory. It may be interpreted as a transfer of 
alternating-offers-bargaining (Rubinstein, 1982; Ståhl, 1972) into a context of 
price competition. In such settings, players bargain over a “pie” of a certain 
size. Players make alternating offers on how to divide the pie, and the respec-
tive other player may accept or reject. For each rejection, the pie “melts” by a 
certain discount rate, which represents rejection costs or probability of breakup. 
With regard to our setting, the maximum pie may be interpreted as the maxi-
mum industry profit Q(pM), and the resulting collusive shared monopoly out-
come resembles a cooperative equilibrium with no discounting. However, the 
solution of our setting is more robust since, as repeatedly stressed, the above-
outlined game requires no explicit cooperation in order to attain the “maximum 
pie”-solution. 
7.2.5 Interim Conclusion 
This section has presented three major classes of pricing games that deviate 
from the original Bertrand frame in one respective crucial characteristic. Be it 
the consideration of capacity constraints, different kinds of product differentia-
tion, or flexibilized pricing – all of these refinements considerably enlarge the set 
of possible equilibrium solutions of the pricing game up to the whole interval 
between the monopoly price and competitive price (i.e., at marginal cost level). 
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Subsection 7.2.4 crafted an exemplifying setting of costlessly revocable pric-
ing decisions which yields the shared monopoly outcome as a unique equili-
brium. Similar to Stahl (1986), we feel the need to underscore that the scarce 
evidence of such alternating price fluctuations should not be seen as a severe 
indication against the relevance of our result. The equilibrium analysis has 
shown that actual price movements occur only off the equilibrium path. There-
by, the general result obtains: allowing for revocable price announcements may 
enable firms to tacitly collude and, hence, reach the shared monopoly outcome – 
despite a formally non-cooperative setting. 
It needs to be stressed that the pertinent literature harbors a multitude of 
further refinements of the original Bertrand pricing game, each of them yielding 
equilibrium prices above marginal costs. Other assumptions that can be relaxed 
include the neglect of possible switching costs (Klemperer 1987), the perfect 
pricing information by consumers (Diamond, 1971), or the absence of institu-
tional facilitators for collusion (Kirstein/Kirstein 2009).  
Hence, we conclude that, in general, the second-stage pricing game may 
yield a multitude of equilibrium price pairs, contingent on the exact properties 
of the firms involved and on the prevalent rules of the game. It was shown that, 
depending on the exact circumstances, price pairs above marginal costs up to 
the shared monopoly outcome are attainable as unique equilibrium solutions of 
the second stage. The analysis of the first stage must therefore disclose, whether 
and how these different potential pricing games (and their respective equili-
brium solutions) influence the decision makers’ financial structure decisions if 
she rationally anticipates the outcome of the prevalent competitive context. 
7.3 Stage One: Optimal Financial Structure Choice 
In the first stage of the overall game, both firms simultaneously conduct their 
financial structure choice. Hence, each firm chooses the vector (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) while 
anticipating the equilibrium outcome of the second-stage pricing subgame.  
As shown in the preceding subsection, a multitude of price pairs may obtain 
as the equilibrium outcome in stage two, contingent on the existence of capacity 
constraints, on the nature of the produced good, and on the exact rules of the 
prevalent pricing game. Therefore, and in order to keep things general, we will 
subsequently examine the firms’ first-stage investment and financing decisions 
for two distinct scenarios, i.e.,  
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(1)  the equilibrium price expected by the decision makers is equal to the 
monopoly price (Section 7.3.1); 
(2) the equilibrium price expected by the decision makers is lower than the 
monopoly price (Section 7.3.2).  
The prevalent competitive context is known in advance. Hence, since the 
competing firms are symmetric, we can suppose homogeneous expectations of 
the decision makers with respect to the outcome of the second-stage pricing 
game. 
7.3.1 Financial Structure Choice for Expected Equilibrium Prices at 
the Monopoly Level 
We have shown that the monopoly price pair obtains as the unique equilibrium 
outcome if prices are costlessly revocable before the advent of customers. Even 
when supposing that these price changes entail costs of delaying sales, the mo-
nopoly price pair still is the natural focal equilibrium in the sense of Stahl 
(1986).  
Thereby, we consider the first scenario where each firm chooses (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) 
while predicting that, eventually, 
pi* = pM  and  QMarket= Q(pM). 
Hence, since the second-stage equilibrium predicts an equally shared mar-
ket, each firm expects to eventually serve only half of the total market demand 
(see Figure 1), i.e.,  
Qi* = Q(p
M)
2
 = (μQ + σQz)/2. 
Hence, the decision maker of a duopolistic firm considers that 
 μQ
i  = μQ/2,  and  σQi  = σQ/2 . 
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Figure 21: The anticipated demand. 
In order to disclose the consequences of a shared market, we examine the 
inverse expected market demand (i.e., the inverse expected demand that a mo-
nopolist would face), which is given by  
(52)  p (μQ) = a/b ԟ (1/b)μQ . 
The ration a/b depicts the prohibitive price from which on no positive de-
mand exists in the market. To accordingly obtain the inverse expected demand 
of the duopolist i (who considers that μQi  = μQ/2 = a/2 ԟ (b/2)p), we have to 
substitute a by a/2 and b by b/2. Thereby, 
(53)  p(μQi) = a/b ԟ (2/b)μQi  .  
Interestingly, this inverse expected demand curve of the duopolist is exactly 
identical to the expected marginal revenue curve (MR) of the monopolist. Fig-
ure 22 gives a graphical representation of the focal situation. 
 
Q 
p 
σQz'' 
σQz''/2 
a/2  
a  
Qi = (a + σQz ԟ bp)/2   
(for a realization z'' > 0) 
Q = a + σQz ԟ bp 
(for a realization z'' > 0) 
Q = a + σQz ԟ bp 
(for the realization z' = 0) 
Qi = (a + σQz ԟ bp)/2  
(for the realization z' = 0) 
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Figure 22: The duopoly case with the monopoly price pair as equilibrium.  
Since the (duopolistic) decision maker now takes the price as given by the 
expected second stage equilibrium outcome, her only remaining possibility to 
calibrate the contribution margin according to her liking is to determine the 
marginal cost level by means increasing or decreasing the corporate investment 
level K. Figure 22 shows that the monopoly price pM induces the same optimal 
marginal cost level for the duopolist as for the monopolist, since in both cases, 
the marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Hence, as a duopolist who expects 
that, eventually, the market price will be pM, the decision maker sets the same 
K as if she was a monopolist. Accordingly, D’s target levels of corporate in-
vestment are completely unaffected by the entrance of a rival firm if the shared 
monopoly outcome is expected in the first stage.116 Thereby, her financial struc-
ture decisions are exactly identical to her choices as disclosed throughout the 
previous chapter. However, due to the shared market demand, firm profits (and 
                                         
116  See Appendix A 7.1 for a formal algebraic proof. 
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D’s return on the firm investment) have accordingly dropped compared to the 
monopoly case. 
Thereby, we are taken back to our well-known four cases which summarize 
the decision maker’s behavioral pattern in terms of investing and financing in 
the optimum. If the decision maker anticipates the monopoly price as the 
second-stage equilibrium outcome, her optimal financial structure choice in 
Stage 1 completely corresponds to the monopoly scenario (see Chapter 6). 
i)  if  W0
D > TLMax,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ= ϕ෡ < ½ ,  
  αכ> 0,  
  Γכ = 0 ,  
  Kכ = TLMax/ϕכ.  
ii)  if  TLMin < W0D ≤ TLMax, 
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ< ϕ෡ < ½ ,  
  αכ= 0, 
  Γכ= 0 , 
  Kכ= (TLMax ԟ λ3/ΩW0DηT2g2σQ2 )/ϕכ. 
iii)  if  W0
D ≤ TLMin < W0D + ϕ෡෡ Γ ,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕ෡෡ < ϕכ< ϕ෡ < ½ , 
  αכ= 0,  
  Γ > Γכ= (TLMin ԟW0D)/ϕכ, 
  Kכ= TLMin/ϕכ. 
iv)  if  W0
D
 + ϕ෡෡ Γ ≤ TLMin,  
 ⇒ ϕ ≤ ϕכ≤ ϕ෡෡ < ½ , 
  αכ= 0, 
  Γכ = Γ, 
  Kכ= (TLMin ԟ λ6/ΩϕכηT2g2σQ2  )/ϕכ. 
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7.3.2 Financial Structure Choice for Expected Equilibrium Prices 
below the Monopoly Level 
Depending on the rules of the second-stage pricing game, a multitude of differ-
ent equilibrium outcomes below the monopoly price level may obtain (see sec-
tion 7.2). Therefore, it feels necessary to examine the impact of such “lower” 
equilibrium outcomes on the decision maker’s first-stage financial structure 
choices.  
From (31) and (32), we know that μ∏
i = (piԟc)μQ ԟ F = (piԟci)(a ԟ bpi) ԟ F. 
By setting the first derivative ∂μ∏
i/∂pi equal to zero and solving for pi, the op-
timal price pi* must satisfy  
(54)  pi* = (a/b + ci*)/2 . 
Equation (54) is in line with the well-established optimal pricing rule which 
characterizes a market with a linear demand function.117 However, since the 
eventual market price is taken as “exogenously” given by the expected second-
stage equilibrium, the marginal cost level has to be adjusted in order to satisfy 
the above optimality condition for different expectations regarding the equili-
brium market price. By solving (54) for ci*, we obtain 
(55)  ci* = 2pi* ԟ a/b .  
The above expression immediately confirms our conclusion from Figure 22: 
the mere entrance of a rival firm without expecting a change in the eventual 
price level (i.e., if pi* = pM) leaves the marginal cost level unchanged (since the 
prohibitive price remains constant, i.e., a/b = (a/2)/(a/2)). Taking the first 
derivative ∂ci* /∂pi* accordingly yields 
(56)  ∂ci*/∂pi* = 2 > 0,  
which discloses that each change of the expected equilibrium price leads to 
a change of the optimal marginal cost level into the same direction. Marginal 
costs do not only follow the price change, but actually amplify it by the factor 
two. Hence, if the decision maker expects the equilibrium price pi*= pM ԟ x 
(where x is an arbitrary positive number), then ci*= cM ԟ 2x. This is illustrated 
by Figure 23. 
 
                                         
117  See Pfähler/Wiese (1998), p.  66. 
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Figure 23: The duopoly case with a lower equilibrium price pair. 
If the decision makers expect a second stage equilibrium price level below 
the monopoly price, the marginal costs are lowered (by increasing K) in order 
to keep the contribution margin great enough. Figure 23 and Equation (56) 
show that the contribution margin (pԟc) is not just kept constant. It is actually 
increased, in order to compensate for the increased level of risk due to the 
greater investment intensity. 
As soon as the expected equilibrium price falls below the level where c is 
pushed to zero,118 the marginal costs cannot be lowered anymore and the con-
tribution margin gradually diminishes again. The same is true for the expected 
returns of the decision maker. If the expected equilibrium price further decreas-
es, the contribution margin further shrinks until the critical point is reached 
where D’s expected return on the firm investment ϕμ∏T/ϕK ԟ 1 is no more ex-
                                         
118  For simplicity, we assume that c=0. This is in line with our prior assumption  K < f/g 
(see Section 6.2.3 and Footnote 97). 
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ceeding the alternative riskless asset’s return r1. In other words, we are drawn 
towards the limit of our basic assumption, i.e., 
   (ϕμ∏/ϕK ԟ 1)T   ՜   r1   
    ฻  
   (μ∏/K ԟ 1)T   ՜   r1. 
If the decision maker would expect an equilibrium market price below this 
critical level, she would minimize her investment into the firm and accordingly 
invest as much as possible into the alternative asset, i.e. αכ would jump to α. 
Figure 24 gives a graphical representation of the relationship between the ex-
pected equilibrium price pi* and αכ for the optimality case iv). 
 
 
Figure 24: Personal Firm Investment and Equilibrium Price for case iv). 
pො is the critical price for which (μ∏(pො)/K ԟ 1)T= r1. Hence, the dashed ver-
tical line depicts the limit of our basic assumption. The decision maker has an 
incentive to invest her private wealth into the firm if (and only if) the expected 
equilibrium price exceeds this level. Lower expected equilibrium prices would 
induce D to reduce her personal investment into the firm to the minimum 
amount (1ԟ α)W0D. Simultaneously, she would exploit the full debt capacity in 
order to opportunistically maximize her personal returns from this minimum 
personal firm investment. 
Concerning the decision maker’s summarized investment and financing beha-
vior, she augments the firm’s stock of capital K compared to the monopoly sce-
nario if she expects a lower equilibrium market price in the second stage. Ac-
cordingly, her target levels of corporate investment are increasing if the ex-
α 
p*
pො 
α* 
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pected equilibrium market price decreases.119 Thereby, the vertical lines in Fig-
ure 16 are shifted to the right, as depicted by Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25: Properties of (ϕכ, αכ, Γכ) in the duopoly case. 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter integrated the model frame developed in the preceding chapters 
into a strategic duopoly context by outlining a two-stage game with initial in-
vestment and financing choices and subsequent pricing decisions. By considering 
substantial refinements to the original Bertrand frame, we circumvent the cor-
responding zero-profits-result despite considering price competition.  
It has been shown that the resulting equilibrium market price in Stage 2 
crucially depends on the prevalent competitive context (including firm proper-
ties like production capacity, or the nature of the offered product, or the exact 
rules of the pricing game). Therefore, we examined how the respective competi-
tive context (with the decision makers’ corresponding price expectations) influ-
                                         
119  See Appendix A 7.2 for a formal algebraic proof. 
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ence the investment and financing behavior in Stage 1. We distinguished the 
case where the prevalent competitive context gives rise to an expected shared 
monopoly outcome (e.g. if prices are costlessly revocable or if products are to-
tally differentiated), and the case where a lower price pair is expected (e.g., if 
firms are capacity constrained or if products exhibit an intermediate degree of 
differentiation).  
If the decision makers expect the equilibrium of the pricing-subgame to be 
characterized by pi*= pM, each firm’s optimal financial structure decision in the 
initial stage corresponds to the monopoly case, as long as the duopolist’s de-
mand is sufficient to satisfy our basic assumption (μ∏/K ԟ 1)T > r1. If, however, 
a lower equilibrium price pair is expected, the decision makers’ target levels of 
corporate investment augment and the firms investment more intensely in order 
to reduce the marginal cost level. At first glance, this may sound astonishing, 
since, apparently, less favorable circumstances (which lead to lower-than-
maximal equilibrium outcomes) lead to a higher monetary investment into the 
firm. The reason for that is the decision maker’s monetary risk aversion. Risk 
aversion implies that the decision maker’s utility function is concave in money. 
Hence, compared to the monopolist, the duopolist faces a far higher marginal 
utility of wealth. In other words, the slope of the utility function at the locus of 
the duopolist’s expected final wealth is higher, since the shared market implies 
in any case 
W1
DDuopolist< W1DMonopolist. 
Now recall that the target levels are reference points where an optimal 
trade-off between D’s (expected) personal wealth-gain and her risk exposure is 
attained (see Chapter 4). Since each monetary unit invested into the firm exhi-
bits a higher marginal utility for the duopolistic decision maker compared to the 
monopolist, and since D’s risk-exposure rises with the intensity of the firm in-
vestment, this optimal trade-off point has to be higher for a risk-averse duopol-
ist. 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
A 7.1: Target levels for pi* = pM 
From (45), the target levels are given by  
(57) TLMax/Min = (μQ ԟ (1+ं+ℓ)/g)/ηTσQ2 g + ϕ(f-p)/g. 
From Equation (36) we further infer that 
(58)  ϕ(pԟc) = (μQԟ (1+ं+ℓ)/g)/ηTσQ2 . 
Substituting (57) into (36) yields 
(59)  ϕ(pԟc) = gTLMax/Min ԟ ϕ(f-p) 
which, by solving for TLMax/Min displays as 
 TLMax/Min = ϕ(f-c)/g. 
Since c = 2p ԟ a/b , (see Equation (55)), we accordingly obtain 
(60) TLMax/Min = ϕ(f + a/b ԟ 2p)/g.  
Since the prohibitive price remains constant if a rival enters the market 
(a/b =(a/2)/(a/2)), the target levels remain unchanged as long as the expected 
price corresponds to the monopoly scenario. 
A 7.2: Target levels for pi* < pM 
In order to show how the target levels respond to a change in the market price, 
we take the partial derivative from Equation (60) with respect to p. 
(61) ∂TLMax/Min/∂p = ԟ (2ϕ/g)p < 0 . 
Hence, since the target levels are decreasing in p, a lower expected market 
price leads to higher target levels of corporate investment.  
 EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND 
 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 
8 Summary and Discussion of Results 
8.1 Summary of Results 
Explaining firms’ financial structure decisions remains intensely debated in the 
corporate finance literature. Throughout the literature review in Chapter 2, we 
highlighted that in more than fifty years of research since Modigliani/Miller 
(1958), a surprisingly far-ranging disaccord between numerous conditional ap-
proaches has been established. Moreover, fundamental contradictions between 
the predictions made by established theories and empirical observations exist. 
Apart from these disaccords and contradictions, we identified three general 
problems in the pertinent theoretical literature: 
Problem 1: A conceptual separation which isolates the respective analys-
es of financing and investment decisions from each other. 
Problem 2:  A widespread disregard of corporate control considerations. 
Problem 3: A conceptual separation which isolates financial structure 
analysis from 
(1) the properties of the competitive context, and 
(2) the properties of the focal firm’s operations/cost struc-
ture. 
The central purpose of the present thesis has been to account for these 
three shortcomings in order to explain an owner-managed firm’s financial struc-
ture choices. To the best of our knowledge, it provides the first theoretical 
study of financial structure choice which  
CHAPTER 
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 simultaneously endogenizes financing and investment decisions,  
 accounts for the implications of the decision maker’s corporate control 
considerations arising on the grounds of her eventual ownership share, 
and 
 examines the crucial role of firms’ individual and environmental cha-
racteristics (including the decision maker’s risk attitude, the prevailing 
output market conditions, and the cost structure). 
The present study has examined the interplay between these notions with 
respect to their overall impact on corporate investment and financing decisions. 
Thereby, this thesis, firstly, means to be a contribution towards overcoming the 
existing research gap concerning the linkage between the antecedents of finan-
cial structure choice and the output market conditions encountered by firms. It 
further means to contribute to an analytical consolidation of corporate financing 
and investment behavior. Lastly, by supposing the focal decision maker’s utility 
function to depend on both, monetary income and decision power, our model 
combines these considerations with the implications arising from D’s corporate 
control affinity.  
Chapter 3 outlines the general time frame of the model and discloses the build-
ing blocks of the model, which serves as the basis for the subsequent derivation 
of results throughout Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 4 provides a simplified  
analysis which, for the time being, passes on the firm’s actual revenue and cost 
structure by merely assuming that profits are linearly increasing in the firm 
investment. This simplified analysis distinctly examines the decision maker’s 
behavior in terms of investing and financing, contingent on the interplay of the 
different model parameters. Our setting adopts a holistic view by considering 
that the optimal relative proportions of debt and equity (the financing decision) 
are tightly interwoven with the determination of their absolute levels (the in-
vestment decision). 
A central result obtained throughout Chapter 4 is the endogenous deriva-
tion of precise corporate investment objectives which are contingent on the de-
cision maker’s subjective beliefs, her risk sensitivity, and exogenous institutional 
parameters. On the grounds of these investment objectives, a blatant resem-
blance arises to the findings of the pecking order theory (POT) of Myers (1984) 
and Myers/Majluf (1984). The POT, which is one of the most influential con-
tributions in the corporate financial structure literature to date, is based on the 
argument that asymmetric information problems drive the capital structure of 
firms and predicts that companies recur to outside equity only as a last resort, 
after cheaper options such as internal funds and debt have been exhausted. In 
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other words, the POT postulates a hierarchy of financing with a preference for 
internal over external funding and for debt over equity. Our results likewise 
suggest such a funding hierarchy and provide a clear explanation for the widely 
observed preference of small firms for debt as a primary external funding 
source. However, unlike the POT, the hierarchy proposed by our model does 
not contradict empirical studies which observe a systematic raising of outside 
equity besides or even before debt (as particularly stressed by Fama/French, 
2002). Interestingly, our results are not prone to the same antagonism, but in-
stead provide a clear rationale for such empirical observations. The decision 
maker is indifferent regarding the amount of outside equity as long as her cor-
porate investment objectives can be attained without debt and as long as her 
disposition on corporate decisions is assured (Proposition 4.2). Moreover, our 
model’s funding hierarchy results as a direct consequence of the interplay of the 
decision maker’s individual characteristics (such as risk aversion and profitabili-
ty expectations) and environmental properties (such as interest spreads and tax 
imposition). Our results are, thus, grounded on a completely different approach, 
since costs of informational asymmetries between firm insiders and firm outsid-
ers play no role in our setting. Hence, the present study shows that “pecking 
orders” of financing may even arise in total absence of informational costs.  
Another interesting result concerns the fact that the feasibility of external 
equity financing negatively depends on both, the debt capacity and the amount 
of disposable internal funds. In the limit, if Γ and W0
D are sufficiently low, no 
outside equity will be raised at all (see Figure 8 on p. 70). This has an interest-
ing implication. We have already stressed that slow-growing, highly profitable 
firms in mature markets are likely to have high cash amounts from retained 
earnings, contrary to fast-growing but less profitable firms in emerging markets. 
Moreover, established firms also tend to have a considerably larger debt capaci-
ty. Hence, according to our model, young enterprises can be expected to exhibit 
considerably lower levels of external equity financing compared to established 
firms. 
Chapter 5 expands the view and shows how the existence of operative fixed 
costs influences the decision maker’s investment and financing choices. As long 
as fixed costs are positive and Γ ≠ F/(μρԟ  r2), a unique optimal amount of out-
side equity exists. This optimal amount balances against each other two antip-
odal effects of outside equity, i.e., the positive wealth effect and the negative 
power sharing effect. We have shown that the strength of this power sharing 
effect (and, thereby, the locus of the optimal trade-off point) directly depends 
on the characteristics (i.e., the curvature) of the power-related utility compo-
nent v(ϕ). The stronger its curvature, the lower will be the amount of outside 
equity raised in the optimum and, consequently, the higher will be the optimal 
ownership concentration. 
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The simplified analysis of Chapter 4 and 5 paves the way for the subse-
quent chapters 6 and 7. These chapters successively incorporate the focal firm’s 
actual revenue and cost structure and the product market context. Chapter 6 
scrutinizes the case where the firm has monopolistic price-setting power. In con-
trast to the previous simplified approach, the firm’s profit is defined as a func-
tion of costs, demand and price. The decision maker can now influence the ex-
pected firm revenue by virtue of her pricing decision. In fact, the price becomes 
D’s fourth decision variable in her endeavor to optimize end-of-period cash 
flows. Our results have shown that the price-sensitivity of the consumer de-
mand has a dampening effect on the impact of risk on the decision maker’s 
choices. Moreover, it has been shown that monopolistic pricing power causes ϕכ 
to actually tend towards zero, rather than unity in case iv). Thereby, the firm’s 
stock of capital exhibits a larger fraction of outside equity, hence inducing a 
lower ownership concentration in the monopoly case. 
Chapter 7 then scrutinizes a two-stage duopoly setting with initial invest-
ment and financing choices and subsequent pricing decisions. For the second-
stage pricing subgame, a variety of competitive contexts which circumvent the 
original Bertrand prediction of zero profits is outlined. However, no judgment 
on the “right” model of price competition is given. The scrutinized competitive 
contexts (which focused on capacity constraints, product differentiation, or the 
exact rules of the pricing game) do by no means constitute an exhaustive, but 
rather a representative selection. The subject of the present thesis is not the 
examination of such differing modes of price competition, but the impact of the 
corresponding equilibrium outcomes on investment and financing decisions. This 
impact is explored throughout the analysis of the decision maker’s first-stage 
financial structure choice, where differing expected equilibrium price pairs serve 
as a backdrop. It has been shown that competitive contexts which imply an 
expected shared monopoly outcome accordingly yield financial structure deci-
sions which correspond to a monopolist’s behavior. Competitive contexts which 
imply lower expected equilibrium price pairs lead to intensified levels of firm 
investment. Thereby, the contribution margin is widened and the optimal 
trade-off point between the decision maker’s personal wealth gain and her risk 
exposure is attained.  
8.2 Relation to Prior Literature 
Throughout Chapter 2, we reviewed the differing streams of literature that have 
mainly contributed to the theoretical examination of corporate financial struc-
ture choice. In many respects, our analysis relates to, complements, or contrasts 
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the findings of these prior theories. We already stressed the similarity of our 
results to the POT and that, unlike the POT, they do not contradict common 
empirical observations of early outside equity raising. In addition, our setting 
can be contrasted against several further pertinent approaches. 
By connecting the decision maker’s financing decisions with the competitive 
context faced by the firm, our model relates to the seminal work of Brand-
er/Lewis (1986). However, we adopted a wider perspective by abandoning their 
most restrictive basic assumptions (i.e., risk-neutrality of the decision maker, an 
exogenously fixed investment level, non-consideration of control considerations, 
and negligence of the cost and revenue structure). In Brander/Lewis (1986), 
debt merely serves as an incentive mechanism to credibly commit the firm to a 
larger output level. This incentive mechanism crucially depends on the direction 
of the correlation between the firm’s marginal profits and the future states of 
the world. Our approach is completely different, since debt directly enters the 
decision maker’s personal investment problem. It serves as a lever to her per-
sonal investment into the firm and, thereby, also augments her personal risk 
exposition. The decision maker raises corporate debt in order to maximize her 
objective function, given her risk attitude, her personal beliefs, the environmen-
tal properties, and the market characteristics. 
As already stressed, according to our model, young and less profitable en-
terprises can be expected to exhibit considerably lower levels of external equity 
financing compared to established and highly profitable firms. This contrasts 
the tradeoff-theoretical findings of Kraus/Litzenberger (1973). As indicated in 
the literature review (Chapter 2), the trade-off theory postulates a strictly posi-
tive relation between profitability and firm leverage. However, empirical results 
disclose the exact opposite relation: highly profitable firms are mainly characte-
rized by a low level of firm leverage. This is concordantly confirmed by various 
studies120 and in line with the findings of the present thesis.  
Our comparative statics show that decreasing uncertainty (measured by the 
demand volatility) leads to higher fractions of debt in the firm’s stock of capital 
by trend. This contradicts the findings of Wanzenried (2003) and Showalter 
(2005), who arrive at the strict opposite conclusion. The reason for this contra-
diction lies in a difference concerning the basic “function” of debt in the corres-
ponding models. Wanzenried (2003) and Showalter (1995) queue up with 
Brander/Lewis (1986), i.e., debt serves merely strategic purposes. Taking on 
debt gives a strategic advantage, since the presence of uncertainty induces lia-
bility-constrained decision makers to ignore low states of demand. As a result, 
debt leads to price increases for the firms. In our model, investment and financ-
                                         
120  See Myers (1984), Titman/Wessels (1988), or Rajan/Zingales (1995). 
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ing decisions are simultaneously endogenized, and debt serves as a direct means 
to attain the decision maker’s investment objectives. Since these investment 
objectives negatively depend on the degree of uncertainty, a lower uncertainty 
induces a higher stock of firm capital. Thereby, depending on which of the four 
optimality cases is the starting point, debt can only increase or remain con-
stant. 
In the pertinent literature, debt has also been shown to be useful for offset-
ting the problem of over-investment and reducing perk consumption when the 
firm is controlled by a professional manager who owns little or no equity of the 
firm (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart, 1995). These authors, however, typically 
assume that investment decisions are controlled by a professional manager. 
Hence, they ignore any active role of large shareholders in corporate control. In 
contrast, the present study does not consider any kind of managerial moral ha-
zard problems – be it asset substitution or consumption of perquisites. In fact, 
the decision maker herself is considered to be a controlling shareholder who acts 
as an owner manager.  
Novel theoretical approaches scrutinizing financial structure decisions em-
phasized not only the contractual problems arising from the divergent interests 
of “direct” stakeholders (e.g. managers, shareholders, and creditors), but also 
the relevance of financing decisions for “external” stakeholders (competing 
firms, suppliers, consumers, etc.) These novel approaches elaborated that firms’ 
choices made with respect to financial structure influence both their own beha-
vior in the output market and the behavior of other market participants, thus 
affecting competitive equilibrium outcomes. However, these novel approaches 
(like the totality of prior approaches) still largely exhibit a conceptual separa-
tion isolating the respective analyses of financing and investment decisions from 
each other. Hence, they still fail to provide a holistic examination of corporate 
financial structure choice in the sense of an interconnected analysis of invest-
ment and financing. Our setting accounts for this prevailing conceptual deficit 
of the pertinent literature and shows how the simultaneous endogenization of 
investing and financing decisions influences and changes the results obtained by 
earlier investigations, hence leading to further insights.  
It has been shown that, in contrast to Jensen/Meckling (1976), our setting 
predicts that decreasing risk-aversion gradually shifts down the relative propor-
tion of debt in the firm’s stock of capital (see Chapter 4). It has also been 
stressed that this result would have been exactly inverted, had we queued up 
with Jensen/Meckling (and the bulk of the existing financial literature) by as-
suming a fixed stock of firm capital. The same is true for our above-outlined 
findings concerning firm leverage and the degree of uncertainty, which contrasts 
prior results in the literature (Wanzenried, 2003; Showalter, 1995).  
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As emphasized by Harris/Raviv (1988, 1991), controlling shareholders want 
to retain their power, i.e., their disposition on corporate decisions. In our set-
ting, it is straightforward to understand that the decision maker faces a trade-
off: raising outside equity to finance corporate target investments and possibly 
diluting (or losing) control, or keeping control and, in case of a binding liquidity 
constraint, passing on prospective cash flows. Contrary to prior approaches, our 
study considers the properties of this trade-off and explores its effects on the 
financial structure choice. The power-related utility component v(ϕ) functions 
like a “brake” for the raised amount of outside equity, since the (wealth-
induced) marginal utility of outside equity is traded off against its (power-loss-
induced) marginal disutility. This trade-off is additionally influenced by the 
level of debt taken on in the optimum, which in turn results from another 
trade-off (wealth vs. risk). Hence, the decision maker’s optimal investment level 
and financing mix obtains from a non-trivial interplay between these two trade-
offs.  
Existing models typically assume shareholder risk neutrality.121 However, it 
can be argued that investors of all types generally exhibit a certain degree of 
aversion towards risk. Corporations and institutions may well behave less risk 
averse (compared to individuals) due to their large asset bases and greater abili-
ty to diversify. Nonetheless, diversification does not lead to risk neutrality in 
the strict sense, and Gossen’s law of diminishing marginal utility122 suggests at 
least some risk aversion for every decision maker. Therefore, our model relates 
corporate financial structure choice with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function in order to explore how risk aversion influences a decision maker’s fi-
nancial structure decisions in an uncertain environment. In order to craft a co-
herent setting for this exploration, we introduced a riskless investment alterna-
tive that the focal decision maker has at her disposal in addition to the risky 
firm investment. It has already been stressed several times that the assumption 
of risk aversion crucially drives large part of our findings. With a risk neutral 
decision maker, the volatility of cash flows would play no role, and the utility 
function would be linear in wealth. As a consequence, the trade-off between 
wealth and risk would vanish and the decision maker would simply exploit the 
full debt capacity and invest her total wealth into the firm (see Comparative 
Statics Result 1 in Chapter 4). By the consideration of risk aversion, we 
adopted a concave utility function and, thereby, attained potential interior so-
lutions for both αכ and Γכ. 
                                         
121  A rare exception is provided by Leland and Pyle (1977). The difference resides in the fact 
that these authors scrutinize the signaling role of financial structure. In our model, finan-
cial structure decisions have no signaling effect. 
122  See Gossen (1854). 
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On a further note, it feels particularly noteworthy that the chosen invest-
ment levels and the corresponding financing choices are tightly depending on 
exogenous factors. Our analysis has disclosed that an increased (expected) prof-
itability of projected firm projects contributes to a higher corporate debt level. 
Hence, if we acknowledge that such increases in profitability are often the result 
of industrial innovations and technological breakthroughs, our results exhibit a 
compelling connection to the pertinent Schumpeterian theory of business 
cycles.123  
8.3 Limitations and Outlook 
Of course, this study has made a set of specific assumptions concerning the in-
ternal and external properties faced by the focal decision maker. It goes without 
saying that a multitude of alternative and/or additional assumptions could be 
made to explore the generalizability of our findings.  
For example, one limitation concerns the static character of the model. In 
reality, enterprises are typically able to adapt and restructure their financials 
over time; but our model disregards such considerations. 
Another critical feature of our model setting concerns the assumption of 
normally distributed expectations of the decision maker. This implies that, in 
principle, negative firm profits, bankruptcy, and, thereby, negative personal 
cash flows for the decision maker can occur with positive probability. Account-
ing for limited liability of the decision maker would then substantially compli-
cate the technical treatment of the objective function. We have circumvented 
this pitfall by introducing the technical assumption μ > 2σ , which allowed us 
to approximate the decision maker’s expectations by a truncation in the inter-
val of the corresponding random variable, i.e., [ μ ԟ 2σ, μ + 2σ ]. Abandoning this 
assumption certainly constitutes a possible further avenue to explore. However, 
this would require a substantial refinement and sophistication of D’s objective 
function, since the interplay of taxation and the limited liability clause would 
induce discontinuities in the first derivative of W1
D.124 Hence, our model does 
not head towards an exhaustive theory of bankruptcy. However, since bank-
                                         
123  See Schumpeter (1939) and, for a thorough discussion, Andersen (2009). 
124  With a negative surplus, our mode of taxation would effectively turn the tax into a sub-
sidy (see Eq. (2)). Hence, a rigorous modeling would require the distinction of several 
sub-cases contingent on, firstly, whether S is positive or negative and, secondly, whether 
the firm goes bankrupt or not.  
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ruptcy exhibits the important feature that it transfers control and does not nec-
essarily lead to liquidation, a deep exploration of the corresponding considera-
tions of an entrepreneurial decision maker would certainly enrich and comple-
ment our findings. 
One of the crucial pillars of the model is the underlying granularity as-
sumption regarding external equity investors. We have shown that for a very 
high number of small shareholders, the large blockholder D’s power curve ob-
tains as depicted in Figure 6 (see Appendix A 3.2). However, this leaves uncon-
sidered the possibility of the emergence of a second block of votes and the cor-
responding non-trivial effects on D’s voting power. A thorough discussion which 
also includes the impact of voting caps on the power curve is conducted in Kirs-
tein/Koné (2010), from where it is easy to understand that the actual shape of 
the power curve (and, thereby, of the power-related utility component v(ϕ)) 
directly depends on the focal context concerning the structure of votes. Howev-
er, our setting provides a resilient analytical frame which, from a technical 
standpoint, could be smoothly adjusted to account for higher complexity in this 
respect.  
Possibilities to extend our model frame are manifold. For example, we have 
implicitly assumed that firms have easy access to financial markets, with no 
costs of raising debt or outside equity. One could, however, argue that access to 
capital markets entails costs of implementing specific information standards 
such as adequate financial statements or business plans. Including such costs 
would certainly influence the decision maker’s optimal choices.  
Another area of potential expansion concerns the central notion of corpo-
rate control. In our setting, the decision maker’s degree of control does not per 
se exert a direct influence on her personal income. Our model interprets utility 
of control merely as an “intrinsic” enjoyment. Technically speaking, D’s overall 
utility function is additively separable in wealth and control. A promising way 
of further sophistication may concern the additional consideration of “instru-
mental” power. Managing operations and giving orders to subordinates may, 
besides being intrinsically rewarding, well result in the deliberate diversion of 
tangible and/or intangible resources to the decision maker’s benefit. By such 
distorted operative decisions, further distortions of the financial structure deci-
sions taken in the optimum can be expected. 
Regarding the competitive analysis, an obvious avenue for further generali-
zation of the model is the consideration of asymmetry between the competing 
firms and their respective decision makers. For example, one may let the firms’ 
cost structures differ from each other or the decision makers may exhibit differ-
ent attitudes towards risk. Further scrutinized asymmetries could encompass 
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actual expectations, wealth and capacity constraints, and access to external 
capital.  
Moreover, the adoption of an expected utility model can obviously never be 
free from fundamental critique, and the application of alternative concepts (like, 
e.g., a prospect theoretical frame in conjunction with substantial bankruptcy 
risk) certainly constitutes an interesting avenue for future research. However, as 
already pointed out in 1982 by Schoemaker, 
 “…until richer models of rationality emerge, (expected utility) maximization may well 
remain a worthwhile benchmark against which to compare, and toward which to di-
rect, behavior.” (Schoemaker, 1982, p. 556.) 
Certainly, a large amount of work still remains to be done in this field. Be-
sides the above-outlined limitations of the theoretical frame, a vast void of em-
pirical studies scrutinizing a systematic comparison of continental European 
and Anglo-American industries exists. Against the backdrop of considerable 
differences in the respective institutional frameworks regarding corporate gover-
nance, such systematic investigation appears to be a worthwhile avenue towards 
a better understanding of how firms’ decision makers conduct their financial 
structure decisions. 
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